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(i)
ABSTRACT
In this thesis an attempt is made to analyse the 
British conquest and administration of Orissa. Chronologi­
cally the subject covers the period between 1803 and 1819* 
Geographically the subject relates to that'Maratha Orissa 
which was brought under British rule after its conquest.
This work Is divided into ten chapters. Chapter I 
deals with the British attempt to secure Orissa through 
diplomacy. Chapter II describes the British plan of 
attack and final occupation of Orissa. Chapter III outlines 
the British tackling of the rebellion of the Raja of Khurda. 
Chapter 17 recounts the British policy towards some 
tributary states exempted from the general regulations.
Chapter 7 narrates the British religious policy with special 
reference to the management of the temple of Jagannath and 
the collection of the pilgrim tax. Chapter 71 concerns 
economic policy. It. Is subdivided into four sections.
Section I shows the introduction of Cornwallis’s system of 
revenue administration. . Section II concerns the currency 
problem. Section III narrates the introduction of salt 
monopoly. Section 17 concerns the administration of the 
embankments. Chapter 711 explains the introduction of the 
Bengal judicial system. Chapter 7III describes the rebellion 
of 1817* Chapter IX analyses the reforms which were
Cii)
subsequently adopted. In Chapter X an attempt is made 
to bring these themes together.
In a particular country changes in the government 
usually involve problems of adaptation, because old ideas 
are set aside to make room for the new ones. If a 
regulation is enforced suddenly or abruptly, there is the 
possibility of a popular reaction against it. This is 
shown in C^^ters VI, VII and VIII. How far popular 
reactions helped to determine the policy of the Government 
is shown in Chapter IX.
The work is mostly based on original official sources. 
Some private papers are also used.
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eSAPfim I 1
<1
INTRODUCTION
At the end of Maratha rule, the boundaries of Orissa 
were to the east the sea; to the west the Maratha province of 
Chhatisgarh; to the south the Chilka lake and the Ganjam 
district; and to the north the district of Midnapur and the
n (1)province of Birbhum. As J. Richarson, the British Commiss­
ioner of Cuttack, remarked, "The natural Barriers which form the 
Frontier of Orissa are the Ocean on one side, with a difficult 
and scarcely accessible coast, and a wild and a hilly forest 
on the other, which opposes such a desert to the passage of
an Army as would make its progress extremely precarious.
(2)This province is, therefore, capable of easy defence."
We have no means of ascertaining the population of the
country at this period, except for an estimate of about
1,^-50,000 made by Richardson in 1 8 1 5 * ^  This figure is
highly conjectural. The area the province covered was
(^)about 11,930 square miles. It seems that more than
(1) 19 January 180^, G.Harcourt and J.Melville, Commissioners 
for the affairs of Cuttack to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March 180^, No.h-1; Add. MSS. 
1360^, p.9^ (same letter as above).
(2) 20 December l80*f, J. Richardson to Government, Bengal
Revenue Consultations 18 March 181?, No.29.
(3) Ibid.
(1+) n^siis of India. 18?2, Vofc.VI, Bengal Part II, pp.2, 4.
one third of Orissa was covered with jungles in which wild 
beasts like lions, tigers, leopards, hogs, elephants, deer 
and jackals lived in p l e n t y . T h e s e  wild beasts not 
only preyed upon travellers but also sometimes damaged 
crops and might even force the inhabitants of a village to 
desert it. When G. Harcourt, the Commander of a British 
force, entered Orissa for its occupation, he wrote "we suffer 
dreadfully from the tigers, two or three men carried off 
every night, and these animals are so bold, they come into 
the centre of the encampment for their prey and the poor 
victims are found half devoured, close on the confines of the
camp  To this calamity there is no.redress, we shout
and howl all night as if the devil was among us but it is
4 1 H (2)of no avail".
Under Maratha rule, the country was divided into two 
parts, one of which was called the Mughalbandi and the other 
the Garjat. The former, being in general a plain and 
fertile land, possessed a numerous population. The latter, 
being almost entirely a barren tract and a wild expanse of 
rock, forest and jungle, was thinly populated and generally
(1) Enclo^od, 26 October 1803* E.Roughsedge, Lt.Adjt. of 
Ramgarh battalion to Captain F. Marsden, Commanding a 
detachment at Hussainbad. Bengal Secret and Political 
Consultations 12 April lo0*f, No.13#
(2) 27 September 1803, Harcourt to M.Shawe, Private Secretary 
to Wellesley, Add. &£>£>• 13609, p.9?.
did not produce much more grain than sufficed for the mainten­
ance of its inhabitants. The Mughalbandi was actually in 
the possession of the Government as a royal domain or land 
held direct from the Government without any intermediary.
The Garjat was held by tributary chieftains who paid a
stipulated revenue to the Government and stood between it
(1)
and the tenants of the soil.
British relations with Orissa prior to its conquest
may be divided into two periods. From 1633 to 1757 their
efforts were concentrated upon the improvement of trade in
the province. But from 1757 to 1003 there was a growing
desire for the possession of Orissa. This might be called
a period of diplomacy.
Orissa, being situated in the Bay of Bengal, enjoyed
an export trade in grains and manufactured articles. In
1633 the East India Company secured permission from the Nawab
Muhammad Zaman and established the first British factory in
Bengal at Harishpur, the modern Jagatsinhapur, and a second
(2)at Balasore.
(1) 19 Januarv 180^, Harcourt and Melville to Government, Add. 
MSS. I36OM-, p.9*+; (same letter as above) Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March 180^ No.h-1.
(2) C.R.Wilson, English Chiefs at Balasore. pp.1-3*
During Muslim rule the British trade in Orissa flourished, 
especially the export of cloth, without much interference from 
the ruling powers. But the Maratha invasion of Orissa from 
17*1-2 to 1751 brought considerable confusion to the country and 
adversely affected trade conditions.^ Moreover, after the 
establishment of a British factory at Hugly the importance 
of the British factories in Orissa gradually declined.
In 1751 a treaty was made between Aliwardi Khan and 
Raghuji MBhemsla, by which the former agreed to pay a Ghauth 
of twelve lakhs of rupees on condition that "the Marathas 
would not set their foot within his dominion". In consequence 
of this treaty the Marathas became de facto rulers of Orissa 1
although the appointment of its governor required the approval 
of both parties. The Nawab still claimed it to be a part of 
his province and was not prepared to forego his nominal authority 
by acknowledging the Maratha supremacy there. Ttfhen Mir Jafar 
was the Nawab of Bengal his position was on^e embarrassed
because of the junction of the French and Stijanddaulah for an
v.
attack on his kingdom. At this time, Mirza Saleh was acting 
as governor of Orissa with the approval of both the parties, 
but was more subservient to the cause of the Nawab backed by
(1) (notdatei) l805, Harcourt and Melville to Government, Add. 
MSB. 13611, p.6l; J.Long, Selections from unpublished 
records. Nos.72 and 110; Early European travellers in 
Nagpur territories. pp.5 2 -3•
the British* Jamji, Raghujifs son, therefore appointed
Sir Bhatt Sathe to be governor of Orissa without consulting
the Nawab. ^
John Bristow, the British Resident at Cuttack, thought
that if the Marathas gained complete power over the country
it would ultimately be detrimental to British interests. So
he encouraged Mirza Saleh to oppose Sir Bhatt Sathe; he
also sought the help of Mir Jafar to defend the cause of
Mirza Saleh against the Marathas. But Mir Jafar did not
accept the British suggestion; moreover, Mirza Saleh who
first opposed Sir Bhatt Sathe subsequently left Orissa in
favour of him. Thus the British plan failed and Orissa
(2)passed into the complete possession of the Marathas.
When Mir Qasim had succeeded Mir Jafar as Nawab of Bengal 
the British approved of his refusal to pay chauth to the 
Marathas. u So the Marathas raided Burdwan and Midnapur,
(^ )
which had already been granted by the Nawab to the British.
The British themselves were not prepared to fight on their own. 
But they desired the expulsion of the Marathas from Orissa and 
tried to persudde the Nawab to lead an expedition against him
(2) Ibid.
(3) Bengal Secret Consultations 16 January 1762.
(*0 J.Long, Selections from unpublished records; No.570.
(tffcans.).
(1) Siyar./Vol.II* pp.112-3; Orme MSS. India Vol.18, PP*Jj^
and drive them out. They urged this point several times
on the Nawab. They themselves were also ready to assist him
(1)
with their own forces. But the Nawab did not come forward;
moreover he was not prepared to bear, the expenses of the 
(2)
campaign.
A new stage of diplomacy began in 176?, when the Diwani 
of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa was granted to the British. ^
The Orissa of this Grant corresponded to the district of 
Midnapur. If the British could secure the Orissa under 
Maratha rule it would provide a Juncture with the Northern
( if)
Sarkars which they had acquired six years previously. Clive, 
as governor of Bengal, was not in favour of using forc9 to 
secure it. He believed that by paying a stipulated sum 
to Januji, in lieu of the chauth demanded for Bengal, Bihar
(1) Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 16 January 1762;
Bengal Secret Consultations 11 March 1761.
(2) Bengal Secret Consultations 18 February 1762; Bengal
Secret Consultations 12 March 1762.
(3) The Grant was made on 17 August 1765. The Orissa of this 
Grant corresponded to the district of Midnapur (vide G.W. 
Forrest ed., Selections from State Papers...Warren Hastings. 
Vol.I p.2. footnote), which was included in Bengal during 
the time of Murshid Quli Khan. The name of Orissa found 
its place in the Diwani because Bengal, Bihar and Orissa 
had formed one administrative unity for a long time under 
the Mughal emperor and he was not prepared to admit the 
overthrow of his sovereign authority over any part of Orissa 
even though the country was now ruled by the Marathas.
(*+) Bengal Secret Consultations 16 January 17^7*
and Orissa, the possession of Orissa could be secured. The
same policy was vigorously followed by his successor, Verelst.
Januji was quite willing for such a proposal. But there was
a basic difference in the two positions. The British viewpoint
in purchasing Orissa was that it should be ceded without any
condition, while Januji’s motive was to include the sale
of Orissa in a defensive alliance with the British so that he
could get British help in case of an attack from an enemy -
particularly the Peshwa. But, unwilling to incur the illwill
of the Peshwa, the British wanted to evade complying with that
clause of the proposed treaty. When Januji detected this
(1)
intuition, he refused to sign the treaty.
Under Warren Hastings British preoccupations elsewhere in
India led to a change of tactics with regard to Orissa. The
British conflict with Hyder necessitated the march of an army
from Bengal to the Carnatic through Orissa. The Raja of
Nagpur, who was all the while demanding chauth from the British,
found an opportunity to put some obstacles in the way of the
British plan for moving the army. So he sent Chimnaji at the
head of 30 to *+0 thousand horse to Orissa, and directed him
(2)
to invade Bengal from there. Hastings therefore paid
(1) Calendar of Persian Correspondence, Vol.II, No.1393;
Vol.Ill No.203.
(2) G.W.Forrest (ed.), Selections from State Parers....Ifarren 
Hastings, Vol.II, p.200.
thirteen lakhs of rupees to Chimnaji; a loan of another
twelve lakhs was also advanced to him. Thus the Maratha
(1)
force left Orissa.
This incident made the British feel more strongly the 
need to possess the country. Consequently a further stage of 
diplomacy began when Cornwallis became Governor General in 
1786. This time the chief centre of diplomacy was Poona.
That was so, because Cornwallis thought that the Raja of 
Nagpur was entirely dependent on the Poona Government; there­
fore the object could be achieved through the help of the 
Poona Court.
When the Peshwa desired/the acquisition of Salsette from
the British Charles Malet, the Resident at Poona, at the
direction of Cornwallis suggested that the British might agree
to this if the Raja of Nagpur could be persuaded to cede Orissa
to them in lieu of Garh Mandal, which aould be ceded by the
(2)
Peshwa to the Raja.
Several other proposals of a similar nature were very
cautiously and cleverly made before the Poona Court for the
same purpose. ^  But owing to the inability of the Poona Court
00 .
to influence the Raja of Nagpur these plans could not succeed.
(1) Bengal Secret and Military Consultations 29 March 1781.
(2) Bengal Political Consultations 9 January 1789*
(3) Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 3 April 1789;
Haul ?^fnuary 17895
(k) Bengal Political Consultations 9 January 1789*
CHAPTER II
(CONQUEST)
Sir John Shore, Cornwallis^ successor, did nothing 
to acquire Orissa. But Wellesley soon revived the old 
policy of entering into negotiations with the Raja of 
Nagpur to that end. On 16 April 1800, Colonel Kirkpatrick, 
secretary to the Government, wrote to Colebrooke, the 
Resident at Nagpur, that the Company desired the acquisition 
of Cuttack ,ffor an equivalent in money or otherwise11 and
(1
asked him to influence the Court 4>f Nagpur to that effect.
At the same time a proposal was brought before the 
Raja of Nagpur for the establishment of a British subsidiary 
force in his territories. The Resident was told that the 
Governor General "would readily accept a security for the 
payment of the subsidy of the troops, and even prefer to 
any other arrangement an assignment of such part of the 
province of Cuttack as should be adequate to the purpose, 
and should place under the management of the Company such 
a tract of the territory as should establish the continuity
(1) 16 April 1800, Government to Colebrooke, Y. M. Kale,
(ed.), Poona Residency Correspondence. Vol. V, p.**8.
(1)of their dominions from Bengal to Northern drears".
But this negotiation proved a failure, partly because of 
the Raja of Nagpur!s apprehension of losing his independence 
by maintaining a British force, and partly because of his 
resentment at the British alliance with the Nizam of 
Hyderabad, a country which had so long been subject to 
Maratha plunder. It now appeared to the Governor-
General that nothing short of a war would give him an 
opportunity to fulfil his cherished desire.
On 27 June 1803, the Governor-General wrote to 
Arthur Wellesley, "From the Rajan of Berar I wish to 
acquire the whole province of Cuttack so as to unite 
the Northern Circars by a continued line of sea coast 
with Bengal. This cession including Balasore &c. to be 
made either absolutely or upon payment of a moderate rent 
or as a security for a subsidiary force to be introduced 
into the dominions of the Raja of Berar." He farther 
instructed Arthur Wellesley that in the event of a war 
with the Raja of Berar this object could be easily achieved; 
he should not make peace with the Raja unless Orissa was 
secured.
(1) Ibid.
(2) T. E. Colebrooks, Life and Essays of fl.T.Colebrooke. Vol.I,
pp.118-22.
(3) Bengal....papers relative to the Maratha war in 1803, p.165.
It may be remembered that on 31 December 1802, the
treaty of Bassein was signed by the Peshwa and the British,
as a consequence of which the Peshwa was obliged to accept
a subsidiary alliance. This was a cause for resentment
amongst the Maratha chiefs, particularly Sindhia and
Raghuji. Having collected an army at Ujjain, Sindhia crossed
the Narmada; Raghuji approached Sindhia*s camp at Chikhli,
and on *+ June there was a juncture of the confederate forces,
(1)but they avoided any open rupture with the British.
On 18 July Arthur Wellesley demanded that Raghuji and
Daulat Rao Sindhia should immediately rettLre from the Nizam*s
frontier near Ajanti. On 1 August, the Governor General
in Council reported to the Secret Committee of the Court
of Directors that he had made arrangements for the occupation
(2)of Cuttack, explaining that "By the reduction of Cuttack 
in Orissa, an effectual blow would be struck against the 
Raja of Berar*s resources; the only maritime territory 
of the Marathas, on the eastern side of the peninsula of 
India, would be secured from all intercourse with the French, 
a /valuable addition would be made to our revenue and a 
strong barrier added to the frontier of Bengal against
(1) Ibid. p.181.
(2) 1 August 1803? Governor General in Council to 1'^ Secret 
Committee of the Court of Directors, M. Martin, (ed.),
The despatches, minutes and correspondence of the Marquess 
Wellesley, Vol.Ill, pp.22?-6.
predatory incursions; the intercourse between Bengal and
the territories of Fort St. George would also be protected
(1)
from interruption".
War was declared against the Maratha confederates on 
3 August. Colonel Campbell, of His Majesty's y^th regiment, 
commanding the northern division of the army of Fort St.
George, had already been directed to prepare for an invasion 
of Cuttack.
On 21 August he was told to invade, because it was
thought that during the absence of the Raja of Berar from the
centre of his dominions, the seizure of a place as celebrated
as Jagannath would produce an early impression on the minds
of the confederate c h i e f t a i n s . W .  Thorn rightly remarked,
;,the occupation of the maritime district of Cuttack formed
a principal part of the general plan of attack against the
( q )
confederates". ^
(1) Bengal....papers relative to the Maratha war in 1803, p.235.
(2) 21 August 1803, Clive, Governor of Madras to Campbell,
Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 29 Dec. l803,No.l6l
(3) W. Thorn, Memoir of the War in India, p.253.
Sir William Thorn was born in 17615 joined the 29th Light 
Dragoons in India 1799; served in the Maratha War under 
Lord Lake 1803; at Laswari 1 November 1803; in the capture 
of Mauritious 1810 and of Java 1811 and Palembang in Sumatra 
1812; returned to England l8l*f; one of his other works 
is‘"Memoir of the Conquest of Java": C.E.Buckland,
Dictionary of Indian Biography. n.V23.
The plan of invasion consisted in the movement and 
joint operation of forces from four different directions - 
from Ganjam, Kedigree, Jaleswar and Midnapur.
First the main force under Campbell consisting of 
about 1,500 native troops assembled at Ganjam. In 
addition, a detachment of two companies of His Majesty's 
22nd regiment with artillery was detached from Bengal 
by sea. The British were so sure of success that they 
appointed John Melville civil commissioner for the settle­
ment of the revenue at Cuttack. Captain Blunt, an engineer
(1)
who had some local knowledge of the country, accompanied them.
In view of the military equipment and arrangements 
directed against Cuttack, there was no fear of any successful 
resistance on the part of the Marathas, but the Governor 
General wanted a peaceable surrender of the province. From 
the character of the Maratha administration, it appeared 
probable that the Maratha officers might be induced to 
surrender the province in return for pensions or donations 
of money from the British Government. Letters were therefore 
addressed by the Governor General to Bungaji Pandit, under 
whose management lay ten-sixteenths of the province, and
(1) 3 August 1803, Government to Melville, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations 1 March 180*+ No.l; Add. MSS. 
13608, pp.2-*f (same letter as above-).
Harbansa Ray, who managed the rest of the country; both
Campbell and Melville were authorised to open negotiations
with them. Considering that a considerable portion of the
province of Cuttack was occupied by chieftains, many of fahom
acknowledged no superior authority or were merely tributary
to the Maratha State, they were instructed to negotiate
engagements on similar terms with such chieftains as possessed
(2)
the means of embarrassing the progress of the British force.
Campbell and Melville were instructed that they '‘should 
employ every possible precaution to preserve the respect 
due to the temple of Jagannath and to the religious prejudices
(3)
of the Brahmins and pilgrims". To persuade the Brahmans 
at Puri that they could have confidence in placing the temple 
under the British administration, a letter was obtained from 
Jagannath of Triveni, the oldest and the most eminent of the 
gandits in Bengal to Rama Chand and other Brahmans residing 
at Jagannath which recommended that "they need not be afraid 
to form connection with the British Government, which is 
distinguished for peculiar benevolence to its subjects".
(1) 3 September 1803, Government to Melville and Campbell.
Add.MSS. 13608 pp.13-*+; 7 September 1803, Government to
Bungaji Pandit and Harbansa Ray, Bengal Secret Persian 
Correspondence (trans.) Letters Sent 1803, Nos.123 and 12^ f.
(2) 3 September 1803, Government to Melville and Campbell,
Bengal Secret and political consultations 1 March 180*+ No.ll.
(3) 9 September 1803, Government to Melville and Harcourt,
Add.MBS. 13608, p.13.
This letter was transmitted to Campbell to deliver to them
at a suitable t i m e . ^
On 30 August, news having been received that Maratha
reinforcements from Nagpur were expected, another detachment
consisting of 500 Bengal native volunteers, commanded by
Captain Dick, which had first been intended for the occupation
of the port of Balasore, was sent with some additional
battering guncS to reinforce the main body of troops at 
(2)Gan j am.
The reason why the main force was despatched from 
Ganjam was to enable it to reach Cuttack quickly, take the 
fort of Barabati, the chief Maratha stronghold, and then 
to send a detachment to secure the Barmul pass, which was 
called "the Key or the western gate of Orissa", because it 
occupied a strategically defensible position through which 
the Marathas entered Orissa. It appeared that several 
advantages would be derived from the occupation of that 
important pass. First it would probably attract the 
attention of the Government of Berar and induce them to 
detach a force towards the pass in order to keep the British
(1) Enclofcd, 3 September 1803, Government to Melville and 
Campbell, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 
180h- No.12A; Abstract of the contents of the letter ffom 
Jagannath of Triveni to priests at Jagannath, Bengal Secret 
Persian Correspondence (trans.), Letters Received l803,No.l8C
(2) 31 August 1803, Government to Campbell, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations 1 March 180^ No.51; 3° August 1803, 
Government to Harcourt, Add.MSS.13608, p.11.
troops in check. This would diminish their means of
opposition to any attack which might he directed by the
British from Allahabad and Hyderabad. Secondly, it
would establish the security of the province of Cuttack
by closing it against predatory Maratha attacks from that
quarter. Thirdly, it would enable the British to complete
their arrangements for an invasion of Berar from the side
of Cuttack and transport troops and equipment without
difficulty to the western extremity of the p a s s . ^
After collecting provisions, Campbell marched from
Ganjam. But high fever endangered his life. He was
therefore carried back to Ganjam, and Lieutenant Colonel
Harcourt of His Majesty's 12th regiment proceeded to
Prayagi. There he took command of the troops on 11 Septem-
(2)ber. At this place he heard from a Brahman that "the
Brahmins at the holy place consulted and applied to Jagannath
to inform them what power was now to have this temple under
his protection and that he had given a decided answer that
(3)the British Government was in future to be his guardian".
(1) Add.MSS.13608, pp.151,155-6. (a memorandum sent to Harcourt, 
no date or author).
(2) 1 November 180*4-, Governor General in Council to t.:.e Court of 
Directors, Bengal Military Letters Received, 11 August 1803, 
2b January 1805 Vol.I, pp.538-9; 11 September 1803, Harcourt 
to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations
1 March 180*4- No.55.
(3) 11 September 1803, Melville to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March 180*4- No. 13*
He utilised this as a divine message worth communicating in
his lettdrs to numerous chiefs and 2amindars, in order to
encourage them to submit to the British authority^ Although
no treaty had yet been made with the Marathas, Sayid Rahimutl~r
ullah, a munshi, acting on Melville's instruction, circulated
a report amongst the people of Cuttack that the Maratha chief
(2)
had delivered up the country to the British in writing.
On the other hand, the Maratha government at Cuttack 
offered to all the tributary Rajas to relinquish a whole 
year's revenue if they would assist in preventing the British 
from obtaining the possession of the province. But there
n )was no response. ^ The Marathas also made other defence
arrangements. The Maratha chief at Balasore was appointed
to the command of forces stationed at Guzur ghat, Narasingpur,
Ramachandrapur, Khathipur in Mayurbhanj and Phulwar pass,
which in all consisted of more than 1,000 matchlockmen,
(k)
100 horse and a number of paiks. 7 It appears that he was 
in charge of guarding the northern frontier of Orissa from
(1) 19 September 1803, Melville to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March 180*+ No.I1*-.
(2) EncltjCjd 2k September 1803, Lieutenant Col. Archibold 
Ferguson, commanding a detatfchment on the bank of the 
SuvarnaMkha, to Government, Bengal Secret and Political 
Consultations 1 March lSO^ f No.191.
(3) Ibid.
(^ f) Add. MSS. 13609, ppA3-!? report from Bhagaban Naik,
Kotwal of the Company's factory at Balasore, witliomb date).
British attack. One detachment consisting of cavalry
and infantry under the command of Balaji Kunar crossed the 
Mahanadi and took post on the north bank. He occasionally 
circulated a report that he would invade Bengal. Another 
detachment was placed in the fort of Barabati.in Cuttack.
A third under the command of Dharam Rai Pandit was posted 
at Biplipur (Pipli) to oppose the British army from the south. 
3,000 Maratha troops were also reported to have left Cuttack 
with the intention of disputing the passage of Harcourt at 
Manikpatna.^
When Harcourt reached Mi-tkakna on 13 September the 
reported strength of the Marathas marching towards Manikpatna 
rose to 5,000 infantry. But when Harcourt fired a volley 
with blank cartridges, the Maratha force intending to oppose 
his passage fled away. The British force took possession of
v (2)
Manikpatna on lk September. Fateh Muhammad, the Maratha 
officer commanding the southwest frontier of Cuttack, agreed
(3)
to the proposed terms offered by Harcourt. He sent his
brother to the British camp. His brother accompanied the
British force for some distance and helped them considerably
(1+)
by his local knowledge.
(1) Encl^ /'-.u, 2^ September 1803, Ferguson to Government, Bengal 
Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 180*+ No.191.
(2) 13 September 1803, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations 1 March 180*+ No.5o.
(3) 17 September 180*+, Harcourt to M. Shawe, private Secretary 
to Wellesley, Add.MSS. 13609, p*68.
(*+) 19 September I803, Melville to Government, Bengal Secret
and Political Consultations 1 March l80*f No.l*+.
19.
By the time the British force reached Narasingpatna on 
17 September, they’ faced some difficulty in transporting 
adequate stores and provisions by land* It had been thought 
that they might be carried by water to Cuttack. But now 
it was found that the boats had to be unloaded owing to the 
shallowness of the water. In view of these obstacles the
(1)
idea of transporting anything further by water was abandoned.
Moreover, four-fifths of the road through which the detachment
would have to pass belonged to the Raja of Khurda. What was
apprehended most was that the Raja might be in secret alliance
(2)
with the Maratha Government. Therefore, Harcourt discussed
the matter with Melville. Melville suggested that the Raja
should be requested to afford every assistance to the British
to expedite the advance of the stores, baggage and artillery
and send fighting men to co-operate with them to expel
the Marathas, for which he should be paid one lakh of rupees.
This proposal was accepted by Harcourt. Accordingly, a letter
was written to the Raja to that effect. As a result the
(3)Raja helped the British.
(1) 3 October 1803, Melville to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March I80V N0.17.
(2) J November 1803, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March 18o4 No.28.
(3) 3 October 1803, Melville to Government, Bengal Secret
and Political Consultations 1 March 1804- Noll7$ 13 Nov­
ember 1803, Commissioners to Raja of Khurda, Bengal Secret 
Persian Correspondence (trans.), Letters Received l803>No.
238.
From Narasingpatna, Harcourt moved to Puri, passing
through highly cultivated country. He took possession of the
city on 18 September. A very conciliatory attitude was
shown to the people here. A guard of Hindus was stationed
in the temple of Jagannath. Measures were taken to give the
Brahmans and the chief officers of the temple confidence in
the British administration.^^
Then Lieutenant Ogilvie, commanding a detachment of 2nd
battalion of the 17th regiment Madras native infantry, was
directed to take post at Manikpatna because it commanded the
passage of a river and was the chief means of entrance into
the province to the southwards; it was also important as
commanding a convenient landing place. He was instructed to
protect that part of the country from Maratha predatory raids
and to forward with nroper escorts such stores and treasures
(2)
as might be sent from Ganjam for the troops under Harcourt.
(3)
A force was placed under the command of Major Fletcher, 
who was ordered to remain at Jagannath. He was directed to 
post sentiies on the road to Cuttack as a precautionary measure 
against the Miarathas. He \7as to keep a watch on what was
(1) 18 September 1803, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations / 1 March 1804- No.59-
(2) 21 September 1803, Harcourt to Ogilvie, Add.M§§*13609,p.80.
(3) Robert Fletcher, Captain,17th regiment Madras Native 
Infantry.
passing to the southwards of the Pagoda.
Some stores which Harcourt found it impracticable to
carry with him were left at Jagannath. Then he proceeded
in the direction of Ahmadpur, crossing the rising nalas
(2)
and rivers with great difficulty. The Marathas attempted
to harass the British force on the w^y, but after a few
skirmishes here and there they were driven off by the
advanced guard under Captain Hutchinson of the 20th Bengal
regiment. The Marathas lost twenty men. On the British
side only three were wounded. The bad weather and the
inundated state of the country, together with the attack of
the Maratha foraging party, delayed the passage of the heavy
guns and baggage for five days before Harcourt reached
(3)
Birapurnsottampur. In view of these difficulties a
force was detached under Hutchinson to occupy a position 
near Mukundapur. As soon as he left the camp, he was 
confronted with serious opposition from the Maratha forces, 
both horse and infantry, on his flank. The charge of the 
Marathas was so vigorous that Hutchinson could save his
(1) 20 September 1803, Harcourt to Fletcher, A d d 13609,
pp.8*+-!?.
(2) 19 September 1803, Harcourt to Government, Bungal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March 180*+ No.60.
(3) ^ October 180?. Harcourt to Shawe, Add. MSS. 13609 p.1005 
27 September I0O3, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March l80*f No.62.
position only by a heavy discharge of grape shot from six
pounders. This dispersed the Marathas. On the British
(1)
side 21 were wounded and two killed.
The next resistance to the British force was offered
by the Marathas on b October, when the advance guard under
(2)
Colonel Clayton was marching to Mukundapur. But well-
directed fire from the British guns forced the Marathas to
retreat towards Balakati. In this skirmish the British
(3)loss was one pioneer wounded.
From Balalhiu the Marathas took shelter in the fort of
Barabati, situated on the north of the island, like Cuttack, ,
(k)
and commanding to the northward the Mahanadi and the ferry*
Soon after his arrival at Cuttack, Harcourt took possession 
of the fort of Lalbag, which was on the south side of the 
island* and covered the town which lay between it and the 
fort of Barabati. This fort also commanded occasionally the 
ferry and always the ford over the Kathjuri river which 
"bounds the Island to the south-ward as the Mahanuddy does 
to the northward". Then he pitched camp 1,000 yards in
(1)2^ October 1803, Harcourt/todMblville'to: Goveynment, Bengal 
Secret and Political Consultations 1 March l8b^ f No.oO.
(2)Thomas William Clayton, Lieutenant Colonel, 18th Bengal 
Native Infantry.
(3)2*+ October 1803, Harcourt and Melville to Government, Bengal 
Secret and Political Consultations M 1 March 180^ No.80.
(^ f)29 October 1803, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.HSs?. 13609,p«lo2.
front of the south face of Barabati from which the Marathas 
were very weakly firing at his c a m p . ^
Harcourt in consultation with Melville was prepared to 
take the fort by negotiation by paying the garrison up to 
half a lakh of rupees. But he received no response from the 
Marathas. So arrangements were made to beseige the fort.
All the boats on the Mahanadi were assembled and an officer 
was placed over them wi*’ * ' J J the
was fixed at a distance of ?00 yards from the outer gate 
of the fort. A battery was completed on 13 October and a 
twelve pounder, two howitzers and two six pounders were placed 
in it. After a heavy fire the Maratha guns were silenced at 
11 o fclock in the forenoon, and most of the defences on the 
south face of the fort were taken off. Clayton had to pass 
over a narrow bridge with one six pounder and a party of 
artillery men. He ultimately succeeded in blowing up the 
wicket only after being exposed fof forty minutes to a heavy 
and ill-directed fire of musketry from the Marathas inside 
the fort. No sooner was this work complete than a storming
(1) 29 October 1803, Harcourt to Shawe, Add .MSS.13609?pp.l62-3*
(2) 11 October 1803, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS. 13609, p.102;
13 October 1803* Melville to Harcourt, Add.MSS.13609,p.l23
Marathas from throwing supplies! to the garrison A spot
papty entered singly with much boldness into the fort
proceeding^! two different directions although it had to
face des^ar^te resistance from the hands of the enemy in the
defence of the inner gates. The Marathas fled, leaving three
elephants and 120 guns of different calibres behind in the
f o r t . ^  While some of them were making efforts to escape
( 2 }they were drowned in the ditch.v '
Meanwhile Harcourt carried on negotiations with Shiva 
Prasad, a Hindu chief at the head of a corps of infantry, 
who were considered by the Marathas as amongst their best 
troops; he was ultimately successful in detaching him from 
the iuarathas, and utilised his services in taking possession
(3)of the fort of Sarangagarh.
Secondly it was decided to send a detachment to Balasore 
from Calcutta by sea. The object of sending this force was, 
first, to induce a Maratha force to be detached in that 
direction, which would facilitate the progress of the army 
under Harcourt to Cuttack, and, secondly, to open communica­
tions between Jaleswar and Balasore and between Balasore and 
Cuttack, which would co-ordinate the actions of the British
(1) I? October 1803, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret
and Political Consultations 1 March 18o4 N0.7O; 27 October
I8O3 , Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and Political 
Consultations 1 March 180^, No.90.
(2) 15 October 1803, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations 1 March I80*f No.70.
(3) 27 September 1803, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March loO1* No.62.
forces against the Marathas on both the north and the south
of Balasore. For this purpose Captain Morgan, of the 15th
Bengal Native infantry, was appointed to the command of a
force eonsisting of five companies of volunteers, 500 men,
one artillery officer, thirteen artillery men with guns, lashkars
and artificers, and one assistant surgeon.^ The Governor
General had been informed that a considerable number of
Pathan adventurers from the British possessions were employed
in the military service of the Maratha Government at Cuttack.
(2)
He wanted to induce them to desert. With this in view,
a Muhammadan subahdar belonging to the bodyguard of the 
Governor General was ordered to act under the orders of 
Captain Grant, who accompanied Morgan.^ Morgan was 
instructed to use force should he fail to obtain possession 
of Balasore by amicable means. He was ordered to be cautious 
not to interrupt such pilgrims passing to and from Jagannath. 
Considering the difficult navigation of the Balasore river
(1) 6 September 1803, Government to Morgan, Bengal Secret
and Political Consultations 1 March 180*+ No.209; *+ Septem­
ber 1803, Government to Morgan, Add.MSS. 13608, p.96.
(2) 6 September 1803, Government to Morgan, Add.MSS.13608, p.105*
(3) 6 September 1803, : ; Government to Morgan, Bengal
Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 180*+ No.209;
7 September 1803, Government to Morgan, Add.MSS.13608,
pp.109-10.
Mathew Wright, an experienced pilot, was ordered to attend 
him. ^
(2)Morgan with the fleet of transports left Kedegree on
1*+ September and reached the Nilgiri hills in the afternoon
of the 17th at a distance of about sixteen miles from the
bar of the river at Balasore. Because of adverse winds, he
(3)could not reach this place as early as he had expected.
(1) *+ September 1803, Government to Morgan, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations 1 March 180*+ Ho.208; same letter 
as above, Add .MSS.13608, pp.97* 101.
The original idea for sending a force by sea to Balasore 
was explained by Harcourt to the Governor General in 
Council and accepted on 19 August 1803. This expedition 
was considered to be most secret. During the prepara­
tions for it the letters&om John Shore, Secretary, Marine 
Board, to Harcourt were sent without mentioning the name 
of the place; only a long line was drawn in the letters in 
place of Balasore. In one of his letters Harcourt wrote 
to the military secretary to the Governor General 11 if you 
will be kind enough to call me at the Government House 
this mor&ing /25 August/ we will settle the whole business; 
you will, of course, not mention anything which will tend 
to the discovery of the destination of this little expedition 
(Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 27 October I8O3 
No.59).
(2) It consisted of Alexander. George, Charles. Fairlie. Lizard. 
Anne and two long boats (Letter V  October, Shore to E.Lowes, 
Commander of Company's Cruiser Teighmouth, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 27 October 1803.)
(3 ) 20 September 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret and
Political Consultations 1 March 180^ No.218; 22 September
I803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret and Political
Consultations 1 March 180*+ No. 219*
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The bar at the entrance of the river had ordinarily
only two feet of water at low tide and ten feet at high tide,
and was considered unsafe for larger vessels without the
assistance of the local pilots who had some knowledge of the
(1)
depth of the water. So Wright, on the morning of the
18th, went out to explore the bar and wished to obtain a
native pilot if possible. He came as near as Balramghari
house, where there was a Maratha post of infantry. The
Marathas suspected the identities of the party headed by
Wright and they fired into their boat but without causing
any injury. The party thus managed to return to their
place of anchorage. Later on, with the help of Pike,
the Pilot from the George, Wright was successful in finding
a channel for the transports. Leaving the two large
vessels, Alexander and Anne, at anchor, other transports
ipoved on the 19th. They all crossed the bar at a favourable
flood tide, except one of them, the Lizard* which was deeply
laden. Two of the six pounders and a number of the detachment
from her were taken off and placed in one of the long boats.
Then the party entered the Balasore river and anchored nearly
(2)opposite the nalramghari house cn the 20th.
(1) 19 August 1803, Shore to harcourt, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations 27 October 1803 No.59*
(2) 20 September 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March l80*f No.2185 22 Sept­
ember 1803, Morgan to Government, Bungal Secret and Politi­
cal Consultations 1 March 1801* No#219.
Some of the inhabitants of the villages near the
entrance of the river approached the vessels; they supplied
native pilots. The fleet proceeded up the river but, owing
to the darkness of the night and a very heavy fall of rain,
they were forced to anchor for that day. ^
The next day (21st morning) it was reported that a
party of Marathas who had been posted at the ghats between
the river and Jaleswar were making rapid marches either to
defend the town of Balasore or to destroy it. At this
Morgan and Grant left the transports behind. They took
with them two six pounders and as many fighting men as a
few boats could hfcld, and went up the river for two hours
till they reached a clear spot of ground, where they were
informed that it was only four miles by land to Balasore.
Here Morgan consulted Grant. Both agreed that the enemy
should be attacked without waiting for the guns. Accordingly
with nearly 300 rank and file they landed from the boats. Then
after crossing over paddy fields Inundated from one to three
(?)feet in water they halted at the town of Balasore. '
(1) 20 September 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March 18o4 No.218.
(2) 22 September 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March 18o4 No.219; same 
letter as above, Calcutta Gazette, Thursday 3 November 1803, 
pp. 260-1 (I.0.C,Vol.year 1803).
Meanwhile the Marathas had put Moro Pandit, the
faujdar of Balasore, into confinement in the Maratha
fort outside the town because he had been attempting to
go over to the British in consequence of their intrigues
with him. Now, in order to resist the attack of the enemy,
they advanced on a place where the ground was elevated and
commanding. The inner space contained several spacious
buildings well-adapted to the accommodation of troops,
perfectly dry and sufficiently large to receive from f^OO
to 500 m e n . ^  This continuous long defile stretching
from the entrance of the town up to the neighbourhood of
the factory house was cleverly lined by the Maratha cavalry
and infantry in order to oppose the march of the British
(2)
into the town and the factory house.
A British advance party was ordered to move on the 
Marathas. But they opened fire on it. So a flanking 
party was detached to assist the British advance, in consequence 
of which, well-directed fire poured on the Marathas from both 
the parties, which drove them from their first position; ten
(1) 23 September 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March 180m- No.220.
(2) 22 September 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations ;■ 1 March l80*f No.21$.
to twelve of them fell to the ground. Finding the British
detachment moving forward the Marathas as a des
attempt poured fire on it from the entrances of the lanes,
from the tops of the houses and from behind the walls and
heights. Yet the detachment continued to proceed on its
way and returned a spirited fire at intervals. Then it
took possession of the factory house. Soon parties yere
posted in all directions outside it to ward off the Marathas,
The Marathas sniped at the British for some time; they then
moved towards the south. Grant tried to seduce a party
of Pathan horse from the Maratha detachment but without
(1)
success.
After the Maratha departure a part of the outside of 
the town called the Maratha fort was brought under the 
British possession. It was found that the Marathas had 
left there three old unserviceable guns on decayed carriages, 
one that appeared to be a six pounder, a small quantity of 
grain of different kinds and two chests with papers relating 
to the administration.^
Soon after occupying the town of Balasore, Morgan 
sent a detachment against a party of Marathas; but they
ate last
(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid.
evaded it. On 26 September, there was a rumour that a
party of Marathas, hiding in some part of Balasore, were
determined to burn and plunder the town; further, it
was learnt that a large body of Marathas had been encamped
(1)
at the village of Ramnath eight miles from Balasore. In
(2)
order to reassure public opinion Lieutenant Tanner, at 
the head of a small detachment, was ordered to proceed to 
that village. Before he reached the place the weather 
had cleared up; so a large body of Marathas who had been 
encamped there had left on the 26th and marched to a small 
fort called Deoghur in a jungle about seven miles from
(3)Bamanaghati. So Tanner with his men returned to Balasore.
Meanwhile, the dak to the south of Balasore, was not 
able to pass Suranga. So to open communications between
Balasore and Cuttack, two companies, under the command of
(*0 (5)
Captain Slye were sent in that direction. Slye reached
Haetierpur. He left it on 29 S e p t e m b e r ; ^  encamped at
(1) 27 September 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March 180*+ No. 22*+.
(2) Henry Tanner, Captain, 2*+th Bengal Native Infantry.
(3) 17 September 1803, Tanner to Morgan, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations 1 MajTch 18o4 No.225.
(^ f) Charles Slye, Captain,28th Bengal Native Infantry.
(5) 28 September 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March 18o4 No.226.
Begunia the next day, where he was informed that the Marathas 
had left the town and were encamped about two miles to the 
south. He marched on and gave the Marathas, consisting 
of 500 foot, a surprise attack on 1 October. After a short 
resistance the Marathas abandoned their position. Fifteen 
or twenty of them were killed or wounded. Five were taken
(i)prisoner.
By the time he reached Damnagar, he received news that
between 2;,000 and 3*000 Marathas had assembled at Suranga.
The country there was covered with jungles and had a road
generally no more than a narrow defile. With a small
detachment he was not prepared to risk a fight. He wrote
(2)
to Morgan for reinforcements- in response to his letter,
3nsign Scot, at the command of a company passing through
(3)
Begunia, joined him; the combined force now took
possession of Suranga; the Marathas left it and fled
(*0towards Bhadrakh.
At Suranga one of the sepoys belonging to the British 
detachment informed Slye that Maratha forces to the number
(1) 30 September 1803, Slye to Morgan, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations 1 March 180^ No.230.
(2) Ibid.
(3) 2 October 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret and
Political Consultations 1 March 180^ No.228.
(*+) 3 October 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret and
Political Consultations 1 March 180*+ No.231.
of 2,000 horse and foot were collected at a place called
Jaketjpur about fourteen coss towards the south and situated
on the bank of a large nala which was there fordable. Slye
desired some verification of this news. So he sent Chait
Sing and Baker Sing, two sepoys of his detachment, in the
(1)
disguise of fakirs to Jabalpur. They returned with the
news that the forces amounted to 500 well-mounted horse and
600 irregular foot. They also added that they heard from
the Maratha camp that a force consisting of 10,000 men
under Raghunath Bakhshi was on its way from Nagpur and within
a few days1 march&om Cuttack. The Raja of Athgarh was
proposing to send soldiers to assist the Marathas; some
zamindars and rich neople were in league with them to oppose
(2)
the British. But at the news of the advance of the British 
force under Harcourt from the south, the Marathas at Jafeajpur 
and on the north of the river Mahanadi fell back towards the 
river in the direction of the fort of Barabati. So Slye 
had no further encounter with the Marathas.^
Thirdly an attack was planned from Midnapur; so a force 
was ordered to be ready at Jaleswar under the command of
(1) 6 October 1803, Slye to Ferguson, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations 1 March 180^ No.198.
(2) 9 October 1803* Slye to Ferguson, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations 1 March 180*+ No.202.
(3) 9 October 18035 Ferguson to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March 180*+ No.199*
Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson.^ Soon he was joined by a
detachment from the Governor Generalfs body guard, with
guns, tumbrils, ammunition, draught, carriage, cattle and
(2 )so on. J He was instructed to have correspondence with the 
commanding officer at Cuttack, not to interrupt the pilgrims 
going to the temple of Jagannath, and to be very conciliatory 
to the ihhabitants of Orissa when he passed the Maratha 
frontier. The object of sending this detachment was, first, 
to drive out the Marathas from the immediate frontier of 
Bengal and the country between Balasore and Jaleswar, and 
secondly, to remove all obstacles on the way from Jaleswar 
to Cuttack and to reinforce the main force under Harcour^^
As soon as Ferguson received the intelligence of 
Morgan1s possession of the town of Balasore, he moved in 
that direction to reach the place “within the shortest period 
of time'1. But owing to rain and bad weather his progress 
was hampered In consequence of the attack of the force 
under Morgan at Balasore the Marathas stationed at the ghats
(1) Archibald Ferguson, Colonel, 2*fth Bengal Native Infantry.
(2 ) 17 September 1803, Ferguson to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March 180^ No.177•
(3 ) 5 September 1803, Government to Ferguson, Add.MSS.13608,
pp.87, 90-2 .
(if) 28 September 1803, Ferguson to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March l8Qif No.195*
between Jaleswar and Balasore had f l e d . ^  So Ferguson,
without receiving any opposition from the Marathas, arrived
at Balasore. He left it on 10 October on his way to
Cuttack. By the time he reached Suranga, he received the
news of the fall of Barabati. His detachment finally
(2)
reached Cuttack without opposition.
Fourthly a plan was made for an immediate occupation 
of the Maratha territory on the north east of the Suvarnaffekha 
which chiefly consisted of Pataspur, Shahbandar, Kamarda, 
Bhograi, Raji-chand and Eirchand because they were long 
desired by the British for a natural boundary between Bengal 
and Orissa. Therefore Colonel Fenwick commanding at
(*f)Midnapur was directed to take measures for that purpose.
It was apprehended that the Marathas with the help of
the powerful zamindars on the border might make incursions
into the Company's territory. Therefore Fenwick was
instructed to encourage the zamindars on the frontier to
oppose such an attack; similar instructions were also given
(•>)to T. H. Ernst, the acting magistrate at Midnapur. Sumitra
(1) 26 September 1803? Grant to Government, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations 1 March 180^ No.2?8.
(2) 7 December 1803, Morgan to Fenwick, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations 1 March 180^ ho.l*+9.
(3) John Fenwick, Colonel,5th Bengal Native Infantry.
(*f) 16 July 1803? Government to Fenwick, Bengal Secret and
Political Consultations 29 December 1803 No.l8c; ? September 
I803, Government to Fenwick, Add..MSS* 13^08, pp.82-3.
(5) 8 September 1803, Ernst to Government, Bengal Secret and
Political Consultations 12 November 1803 No.118; 17 
I8O3, Govt.to Ernst, Bengal Secret & Pol. Cons. 12
Dei, the Rani of Mayurbhanj, had lands both in the Maratha
and in the Company's territories. As a Company's tenant
she was in arrears to the extent of Rs.1,600 owing to loeses
she had sustained from inundations during the last two years.
Now the payment of these arrears was suspended by the order
(1)
of the Governor General. Similar friendly intercourse
was maintained with Jagannath Dhall of Dholbhum and other
(2)
Zamindars. Ernst, by a proclamation, offered the protection 
of the Company to such of the zamindars as might choose to 
become its subjects.^) Accordingly most of the zamindars 
in the Maratha territories either sought this protection 
or showed a more submissive attitude. But Ramanand Bhuyan 
of,Jamoconda, who had for some years created disturbances
5\
injCompany's land, remained adamant. Raghunath Paikaraw
Bhuyan, another zamindar of Xirchand, who on many previous
occasions had plundered the British territory, was also not
ready to listen to the British proclamation. Rather he
preferred to be secure in his fort, which was said by Ernst
(L)
to be "the strongest on the southern frontier".
(1) 16 July 1803? Government to Fenwic#, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations 29 December 1803, No.l8c.
(2) 17 September 1803, Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal 
Secret and Political Consultations 12 November 1803 No.120;
8 September ib803? Ernst to Government, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations 12 November 1803 No.118.
(3) 17 September 1803, Government to Ernst, Bengali Secret and 
Political Consultations 12 Nov. 1803 No.119; 28 September4*03, 
Government to Ernst, Bengal Secret and Political Consultat­
ions 12 November 1803 No.123*
(*f) 8 September 1803 Ernst to Government, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations 12 November 1803 No.118.
On 23 September 1803, by order of Fenwick, Captain 
Lamb of the 5th regiment, at the head of a detachment 
proceeded to the parganas Pataspur, Kamarda, Shahbandan* 
and Bhograi, to establish the police daroghas and 
tahsildars appointed by E r n s t . B e i n g  frightened 
at the approach of the British force, Ramanand Bhuyan 
surrendered to Lamb, who made him prisoner and sent him 
to Midnapur. His forts were destroyed.
Another detachment under Lieutenant Cooper was sent 
against Raghunath Paikara. All that belonged to him 
on both sides of the Suvernar&kha was soon occupied.
The bamboo fences surrounding the forts were burnt. The 
mud forfcfe were at once delivered up. But Raghunath Paikara 
managed to retire with a few attendants into the thickest 
part of the jungle.
The whole of the Maratha territories on the north­
east of the Suvarnar£kha was soon brought under British 
rule.
Thus the total number of troops employed for the 
conquest of Orissa amounted to *f,9l6 men. Out of this
(1) 2b September 1803, Fenwick to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. lMf.
(2) b November 1803, Ernst to Fenwick, Bengal Secret&nd 
Political Consultations, 29 December 1803, No. *fl;
17 November 1803, Government to Ernst, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations, 29 December 1803, No.*f2.
(3) Ibid.
number some 3 ,0^1 constituted the main force which marched 
from Ganjam and 500 men under Dick reinforced the main 
force later; ?2 including 21 artillery men formed a party 
under Morgan to occupy Balasore; 85^ were ready at 
Jaleswar with a view to move whenever it would be necessary; 
1,300 were stationed at Midnapur in order to render assis­
tance to troops at Balasore and Jaleswar.^
In consequence of the attack and march of the British 
troops from different sides, whatever Marathas were found 
in the country fled away in fear. After the fall of 
the fort of Barabati, a party of the Marathas under Balaji
Kunar, consisting of 200 horse and 300 foot, retreated
(2 )towards Barmul pass. 7 Major Forbes, at the head of a
(?)
detachment, was sent to chase them,J/ but they araded him.
He occupied the Barmul pass, and the entrance of the
Marathas to Cuttack was closed. Now a commanding position
was available to him to watch the behaviour of the hill
Rajas in the vicinity. As this station was unhealthy
it was arranged that the garrison of 500 men would be
(h.)
relieved from Cuttack every fortnight. 7
(1) Bengal ... papers relative to the Maratha war in
1803, p.2¥f.
(2) Enclayedj 2k March 1804-, M.S. Elphinstone, Resident at
Nagpur to Government, Bengal Secret6nd Political 
Consultations, 21 June 1801*, No. 53*
(3) 18 October 1803, Harcourt to Forbes, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations 1 March 180h-, No. 87*
(*+) 21 October 1803, Harcourt to Shawe, Add. MSS. 13609, p.!37»
After securing possession of the country, the British 
stationed troops near the passes and at different strategic 
places to maintain order and prevent Maratha raids from 
any direction. First, a force consisting of 1,000 men 
exclusive of the Europeans was stationed on the ’island1 
of Cuttack of which 300 formed the garrison for Lalbag, 
to be relieved weekly from the principal strength in 
Barabati. Secondly, the post established at Manikpatna 
was reinforced. Thirdly, it was arranged to maintain a 
regular force at Jagannath. Fourthly, a force of 3°0 
men with a field six-pounder was placed at Pipli. Fifthly, 
the post established at Suranga was abolished; a force 
of 300 or ^00 men was stationed at Jahajpur and Bhadrakh. 
Sixthly, a post nearly of the same strength was established 
at Balasore. Seventhly, a strong detachment was stationed 
at Kendrapara, which commanded the most material points 
towards the sea, in order to check the Raja of Kujang and 
some subordinate chiefs in that part of the country.^
After completing these security measures, Harcourt
(1) 3 December 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret
and Political Consultations, 1 March 180^, No. 2^;
7 December 1803, Morgan to Fenwick, Bengal Secret^nd 
Political Consultations, 1 March I0O3 , No. 2*+9;
29 October 1803, Harcourt to Shawe, Add. MSS-13609,
pp. 162-70.
posted the 9th Madras native infantry in the fort of Barabati. 
This consisted of about *+50 men. Shiva Prasad's irregular 
corps gave him 100 more. To it he wished to add *+00 or 
500 Europeans, 1^0 troopers with gallopers, four six- 
pounders and two howitzers. With a force thus formed, he 
planned to proceed direct to Sonpur. From that place he 
wished to march along the Sasabalpur route to secure the 
possession of Rattanpur and the valuable district of 
Chhatisgarh, because he thought their acquisition would 
afford security to the whole of the possessions of the 
British Giovernment from Banares to Ganjam. In fact this 
was not done because peace was established shortly afterwarcls^ 
On 30 November 1803, Jaswant;; Rao Ramachandar, an 
ambassador of the Raja of Berar met Arthur Wellesley at 
a conference at Deogan for the conclusion of peace. In 
course of discussions on various points, Arthur Wellesley 
said that he would require the province of Cuttack to be 
connected by a convenient frontier with the Company's 
other territories. The Vakil made no objection, except 
to point out that "Jagannath was his /Raja'll/ own pagoda, 
he was desirous to retain it, that his honour was involved
(1) 1 December 1803, Harcourt ctofehawe, Add. MSS.
13609, pp. 217-8.
in this point. 11 Arthur Wellesley replied that the whole 
province of Cuttack was absolutely necessary, that the 
Company had long been desirous to obtain this province 
in order that there might not be any break in communications
t
between Calcutta and Madras, and to take only half of it, 
or to allow the Raja to take only half of it, would 
entirely defeat that great object. The vakil was now
convinced on this point. The treaties were prepared 
during the night of 16 November I8O3. They were signed 
on 17th by both Arthur Wellesley and Jaswant Rao Ramachandar. 
The British occupation:- of Orissa was confirmed. (2).
(1) Home Miscellaneous, Vol. 623, pp.86, 103.
(2) Ibid, p.Ill; proclamation 9 January 180^, Bengal 
Secret Persian Correspondence (trans.), Letters 
Sent, 180*+, No.l.
Appendix to Chapter II
1st.
2nd.
3rd.
(1)
Christimas Day,
2?th December I8O3 .
On this auspicious Morn, to Britons eacred 
More than the Feast of Hassan was to Tancred,
Soon as the sun arose, his gentle beams displayed 
Cuttack's fair Provence saw and onn'd his aid,
Cold chilling dews forsook our Lines; the Barrabatty 
Confessed the sun alone had made it happy.
So we from Britain's Isles much fairer far removed
From families and homes, the son's Great Power has prov'd,
Who shelters us from Cold, Protects us from the scorching
heat,
Climetical Diseases treading down, To him this day is
dedicate.
No more Grim Death shall overwhelm this Land 
Conquered by Christians. They shall always stand.
Pale Pestilence shall fly from every Tent
Farwel /farewell/ to sad disease and meagre discontent.
Vth. O'er Gentle seas which laves the Banks of Ganges,
Shall blow a wholesome Breeze 
Whistling thro' the shady Trees,
From the Extent of utmost Lands it Ranges 
To cleanse and purify Mankind 
And leave no more disease behind.
5£h. Thus spake Great Britain's Genii with loud voice,
Let Harcourt still in Health and Wealth rejoice, 
Tho' years renew'd his Fame still be increased, 
And happiness Eternal Crown him at the last.
Signed John Symes, 
Pte. M.E. Regt.
Camp near Fort Barrabatty 
Add. MSS. 13609, p.336.
Mf.
(2)
On the bth of September we marched from Ganjam 
But we soon lost our road and turn'd back again.
This march proved fatal that very same day
Through the suh's scorching heat 
Which on us did beat 
Till several of the army fell dead by the way.
We then came to Pihgy and staid a little space
Till our Baggage and followers came all into place
Then we bent our way to Jaggernaut, that city of fame,
Our Road was o'er the sandy beach scarce one we touched the
plain.
This City of Great Eminence we Beheld with some disgust,
For Reasons truely scriptural, and consequently just.
It seemed that Heaven and Earth did war as soon as we came
there,
For our Camp became a swamp and we felt it most severe.
When we left Jaggernaut most wretched was our March, 
the Mharrattas gall'd our Picquet to prevent our approach.
We encamped near Ahmedpore, while the rain poured down,
And most of our Men lay on the wet ground.
The 13th Employed in needful preparation, 
the iVth Asaulted and took this great station.
Three Pieces of Ordnance was all we did play,
From 6 in the morning till Eleven the same day*
The assault then was warm. Britons led the Way
That before 12 o'clock Cuttack was our Prey
And the Ensign of Britain on their Flagstaff did play.
And now to C o ^  Harcourt, the Brave and the wise, 
and likewise to His Staff, all happiness be theirs, 
May Health, Wealth and Honours fill up every day,
And years yet unnumbered - Long free from Decay.
signed J. Symes, 
Private, M.E. Regiment.
Add. MSS.13609, p.337*
(3)
Hail Gentle Muse, let me invoke thy lay,
To sing the praises of the present day.
To give to truth and honor each their due 
Amongst the Multitude that each may View, 
Himself as in a natural glass 
Things past and present to possess.
To bear in mind each worthy Deed
Evils encounterfd and o fercome with speed.
To fire Each British youth and present evil 
That none may yield to Scindiah or the Devil.
Add. MSS.13609, p.337.
CHAPTER III
REBELLION OF THE RAJA OF 
KHURDA
The rebellion of the Raja of Khurda, which occurred 
soon after the British conquest of Orissa, had its origins 
in the Karatha period* During the administration of 
Shiv Bhatt Sathe, Narayan Deva the gamindar of Ehemidy 
and a descendant of the royal family of Orissa had claimed 
the throne of Khurda and had invaded the country. The 
Raja of Khurda in his distress sought the help of the 
Earathas, which was granted on condition of a payment of 
one lakh of rupees. The Raja of Khemidy was driven out 
of Khurda, but the Raja of Khurda was unable to pay the 
money bargained for. Ee was forced to surrender to the 
Karathas four mahals including Lembai, Rahang and Purusottam 
Chhattar in which the temple of Jagannath is situated 
(i.e. the country between the Daya, the Chilka lake and 
the sgs), together with the tribute of fourteen khandaits 
of the hills subject to his c o n t r o l . T h e  Raja was so
(1) A.B.Mahanty (ed.), Madalapan.1l. p»79; Bengal Political 
Consultations h December 1759*
angry at being deprived of the management of the temple 
of Jagannath, a privilege which he had long enjoyed, that 
heionce tried to obtain 500 Telingas and provisions from
k.
the chief of Ganjam and together with his own force to 
invade Puri. It was only on a representation from Raja 
Ram Pandit, the Karatha governor of Orissa, to the Governor 
General of Bengal, that the chief of Ganjam was dissuaded 
from helping the RajaTs design. Consequently this project 
was a failure.^
During the march of the British troops under Harcourt
f
to occupy Orissa, negotiations were carried on with the
Raja of Khurda to detach him from the Maratha interest.
One lakh of rupees was offered to the Raja provided he
would withdraw from the Marathas, afford a clear passage
(2)
and provide men and supplies for the British troops.
The Rajafs vakil agreed to this proposal but strongly re­
presented that the restoration of the four mahals should be
treated as an essential condition for the fulfilment of
(3)the agreement. But Harcourt did not accept this. Yet
(1) C.P.C. Vol. V, No.l22tf.
(2) 1 October l80*f, Harcourt and Melville to Government,
Bengal Secret and Political Consultations b April 1805 No.l 
10 October 1806, R.T.Turner, Acting Magistrate of Midnapur 
to Government, Board’s Collections, Vol.318, 722*f, p.2.
(3) 21 September 1803, Melville to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March 180^ No.15.
V9.
the Raja did not give up the hope that his representation 
might be considered at some future date.
The Raja gave the British some assistance and was 
willing to the extent of his means to afford men and supplies 
against the Marathas. But in consequence of the early 
reduction of the fort of Barabati, there arose no necessity 
for the British to demand any further help from him according 
to the terms stipulated. By this time Rs.50,000 out of the 
promised lakh had been paid to h i m . ^
During the Raja's minority Jayi Rajaguru was administer­
ing the country. Acting on behalf of the Raja he proceeded 
to Cuttack in March 180^, attended by 2,000 armed men. He 
had an audience with Harcourt when he submitted a petition 
requesting the restoration of the four mahals and urging 
payment of the balance of the stipulated amount. He further 
desired the reduction of the annual peshkash to the British 
which had already been reduced to ten per cent. In regard 
to the money demanded, the British agreed to pay a further 
Rs.20,000; the rest it was promised, would be paid at some 
future date. Regarding the second claim Harcourt observed
(1) 1 October 180*+, Harcourt and Melville to Government 
Bengal Secret and Political Consultations b April 1
No. 1.
that "not a span of land could be given up". He also
(1)
rejected the request for a further reduction in the peshkash.
Rajaguru returned from Cuttack and said, according to
the Raja's subsequent account, "I at first warned you from
forming an alliance with the Commander of the Company's Troops
(2)
and from affording him a safe passage". He further added 
that Harcourt was not only unwilling to give up the mahals 
but also had intentions of taking from the Raja whatever
(3)hereditary country remained in his possession.
(1) Ibid.; 10 October 1806, Turner to Government, Board's 
Collections Vol.318, 72^, p.^.
(2) Such statements from Rajaguru appear quite credible;
Harcourt in many of his letters to the Government has 
put the blame on Rajaguru for hostilities between the 
Raja and the British Government. In one of them he 
said, "It appears the Raja himself is not inimical to
us but his Dewan is. extremely so and he controls everybody 
and everything at Khurda". (vide 23 Octoberjf^Harcourt 
to Shawe, Add.MSS. I36IO, p.102; also vide 12 February 
18099 Buller to Government, Bengal Board of Revenue 
Proceedings February 1809, No.l.). The subsequent events 
confirm our belief. Rajaguru was hanged for abetting 
rebellion (vide Madalanan.ii. p.82).' Again the Raja 
was in imprisonment; he filed a petition -pleading his inno­
cence and holding the Rajaguru responsible for the rebellion. 
Consequently he was released (vide Board's Collections 
Vol.318, 7 2 p.31 5^ °date nil).
(3) 10 October 1806, Turner to Government, Board's Collections 
Vol.318, 72^, p.b.
The Raja was chagrined at the news of Harcourt!s 
attitude. He therefore assumed a hostile attitude towards 
the British Government. That Government had prepared 
agreements defining in liberal terms its relations with 
the tributary Rajas. These agreements were readily 
accepted and signed by all except the Raja of Khurda. The 
Raja made delays on various pretexts. Consequently the 
dommissioners at Cuttack sent one of their principal native 
officers to explain to the Raja the nature of the terms 
proposed. He was also instructed to warn him of the 
impropriety of his conduct and of the danger of its con- 
tmuance.
The Raja appeared to be submissive but nevertheless 
delayed signing the agreement for a space of nine weeks.
At this the dommissioners at Cuttack ordered their messenger 
"to quit the Khurda Durbar within eight and forty hours 
after the receipt of their orders in the event of the Raja 
continuing to withhold his signature and the acceptance of 
the terms proposed11. Thereupon the Raja accepted the agree­
ment and affixed his seal to it but while delivering it he 
observed (according to a report from the dommissioner of 
Cuttack) arrogantly and impertinently that "he made peace 
with the English" . ( 2 5
(1) 1 October 180*+, Harcourt and Melville to Government,
Bengal Secret and Political Consultations b April 1805 No.l
(2) Ibid.
Moreover with a view to seizing the four mahals 
from the British, he sought the help of the Raja of Berar 
and accordingly carried on a correspondence with him. Some 
letters referring to this intrigue were intercepted by 
British officers. In one of them Antaji Naik (an officer 
of the Nagpur Government stationed at Raipur) wrote to 
Raghuji Bhonsla, "I have come from Ryepur to Khurda and 
seen the Raja, he desires me to hire 1,000 horse and foot 
of which he says he will defray the expense and write to 
your highness requesting you to give Raghunath Boxy a 
dress of horse and send him thither with some troops and 
some guns. The Raja and I have found out the lucky hour, 
we have circulated a report that Raghunath Boxy marched 
from Nagpur which has inclined the Hulkee Zemindars (tributary 
Rajas) to join.'1^  The existence of an intrigue was con­
firmed by the xamindar of Raigarh and by Elphinstone the
Resident at Nagpur. However the Raja of Khurda could not
(2)get any help.
Further, the Raja increased his establishment of troops 
and appointed some Maratha sardars. He also improved the
(1) 20 November 180*+, Elphinstone to Harcourt and Melville,
Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 4 April 1805
Nos.12, 13.
(2) 19 September 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS. 13610, p.64;
6 October 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add .MSS .13610 p. 82;
1 November 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, p.llfr.
7 November 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.I36IO, p. 126.
internal defence of the country by repairing roads and 
stationing troops at Dompara and Banpur; 200 guards
stationed at the gate of Khurda were reinforced by an/
additional 300 guards and two pieces of can|>n. The Raja
often went to the hills in search of a place of security
to which he could resort in time of need*^^
Again, the Raja induced the other tributary chiefs
to unite in common cause with him against the British.
Sambhu Bharati, an influential gosain (religious mendicant),
who was disaffected with the new British revenue system was
(2)
engaged by the Raja for this purpose. Accordingly the
Raja of Kujang and Kanika readily accepted such invitation.
The latter was in fact more hostile to the British than the 
former. ^
In the month of March 180*+ the British had made engage­
ments with the Raja of Kanika for the purchase of all the 
salt made in his territories and he agreed to construct
(1) 21 Cdtober 180*+, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations April 1805
Nos.20-2; 13 November 180^ -, Government to Elphinstone,
Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 29 November 180*+ 
No .161*-; 10 October 180*+, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.136lO,
p.91; 7 November l80*t, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610,
pp.125, 127.
(2) 6 October l80*f, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.136l0, pp.80-1.
(3) 7 November l80*f, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.I36IO, pp.129-30.
51*-.
golas at convenient places# A gumashta had therefore 
been appointed to take charge of the golas; he was also 
supplied with some money for the purchase of salt. But now 
the Raja suddenly seized all the workmen employed in 
constructing golas and plundered the money from the gumashta.
In July 18CA- when the attendance of the Raja was required
at the Cuttack town he defied the order, though other tributaries
presented themselves with readiness. When he fell into
y
arrears with a considerable part of his revenue, chaprasis 
were sent to him with commissioners badges to demand payment 
but they were turned out of his territory. He collected a 
large body of armed men who were placed under the control of
a Ilaratha sardar who was a well-known enemy to the British
+ (1)Government.
Lastly the Raja of Khurda withdrew his vakil from Cuttack 
and thus, in the opinion of the British, set a bad example 
before the other tributaries.^^
Such hostile proceedings were detected by Harcourt soon 
after the fall of the fort of Barabati. He attempted to
(1) 20 November 180^, Elphinstone to Harcourt and Melville,
Bengal Secret and Political Consultations k April 180?
Nos.12-3.
(2) 7 November 180*+, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.136lO, pp. 131-2.
bring the Raja to his senses by conciliatory measures but 
without success. He observed "Our moderation has been 
construed into weakness, our silence into ignorance and 
our endeavours to conciliate into apprehension and fear'1.^^ 
He was afraid that the Raja of Khurdafs example might be 
followed by other tributary chiefs. "Everything tends,
I think, to increase the necessity of making an example 
of that fellow £the Raja of Khurda/,,. Again, he wrote 
MI do think the Raja of Khurda must be exterminated. It 
is my intention to demand the immediate dismissal of his 
troops and destruction of his barriers; that he should 
give up his correspondence with any persons dissatisfied 
with the British GovernmBnt. 11 ^
But Wellesley was not prepared to consent readily to 
this proposal. Indeed his schemes for the extension of 
British authority in India had already been opposed by the 
Court of Directors. Again, when in June 180*+ war was 
declared against Holkar the Court of Directors condemned
(1) 6 October 180*+, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.136l0, p.81.
(2) 3 October 180*+, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS. I36IO, p.7^*
(3) 1 October 180*+, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.i36lO3pp.66-7 *
56.
Wellesley's policy more vehemently than before* Thus
criticism from home perhaps dissuaded Wellesley from pursuing 
any further military measures. M. Shawe, private secretary 
to Wellesley, wrote to Harcourt, "Lord Wellesley desires me 
to inform you that he has had quite enough of war and is 
very unwilling to engage in fresh operation of a military 
nature".
Another reason for Wellesley's unwillingness to use 
force against the Raja of Khurda at that moment was that 
the war with the Maratha confederates was not yet over. He 
had received information that Holkar's agents were attempting 
to excite an alarm amongst the petty chieftains dependent 
on the British Government by spreading the idea that it was 
the secret aim of the British to deprive them of their powers 
and to reduce them gradually to the condition of the zamindars 
subject to the Company. Wellesley feared that any operations 
against the Raja of Khurda at that moment might give an air
n)of probability to these rumours. J
Wellesley therefore told Harcourt to try to bring the 
Raja to his senses without using force. He added that if
(1) C. H. Philips, East India Company, pp.1^0-1
(2) 7 November 180^, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.136l0, p.139*
(3) 11 November ISCA-, Government to Harcourt, Add.MSS.13608,
pp.1^2-3.
force had to be used it would be best to wait until
Holkar had been defeated.^
Accordingly as a precautionary measure against the
unity of the tributary chiefs behind the cause of the Raja
of Khurda, Harcourt imprisoned Sambhu Bharati, who carried
messages on behalf of the Raja of Khurda from one/tributary
state to another.^
Secondly he wanted to demand the removal from office
of Rajaguru, who was at the root of the Raja's hostility
against the British, and to explain to the Raja the various
points concerning which the British felt suspicious of him.
For this purpose, Captain Blunt was selected and empowered
(3)to adjust differences.
A messenger was sent in advance to request the Raja 
to receive Blunt. The Raja agreed and behaved with every 
appearance of submission. But on the following day Rajaguru 
informed the messenger that the Raja had changed his mind 
and that Blunt could nbtccome to Khurda. As the messenger 
insisted on the necessity of compliance, after a long
(1) Ibid.
(2) 6 October 180*+, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS. 13610, p.8l.
(3) 23 October 180*+, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.136l0,p.l02;
9 November 180^, Harcourt to Elphinstone, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 2 M^y 1805 H o . 10 October 
180*+, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.136l0, p.90.
discussion Rajaguru yielded to the extent of saying that he
would explain the matter to the Raja and obtain a letter
from him. Thus the messenger was detained for fourteen
days, at the end of which he was told that should he attempt
(1)
to stay any longer at Khurda it might he dangerous for him.
He therefore left Khurda for Cuttack, but on the confines
of the Raja's territory he found that several harkaras going
to Khurda with letters urging the Raja to receive Blunt had
been detained by the Raja's guards. One of their letters
had been seized and opened. They could procure supplies
(2)
only with great difficulty. From here the messenger
made an attempt to induce the Raja by letter to acquiesce
in the British demand. But as this proved of no avail,
(3)
he returned to Cuttack.
Thus negotiations were broken off. By this time the 
war between the British and the Karatha confederates was 
over and Harcourt had already made preparations to curb the 
power of the Raja. Before he took any action the Raja 
had already imposed restraints on communications into his 
territory by placing a guard on the banks of the river
(1) 9 November 180*+, Harcourt to Elphinstone, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations 2 May 1805 No.MfpJ 7 November l80*f, 
Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.136lO, pp.l27-o.
(2) 7 November 180*+, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, p. 128.
(3) ? o f f i ! c a ! r c o § * i t i ? i s s " r 5 £ t r E i s 6 § " i i J ; e % . B e n e a l  S e ' r,5t a n d
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Mahanadi, who attempted to seize all property coming down to
Cuttack, declaring that Mthe Raja's orders were that nothing
was to pass belonging to English sirdars at this place.
The Raja also sent a party of about 250 cavalry and about
900 Barkandazes, who entered the disputed mahals and plundered
(2)them. They also disarmed a small detachment in the service
of the Company. After that they posted themselves in and 
near the village of Delang.
Captain Hickland ‘H h o  was posted at Pipli soon marched 
with a party of 120 sepoys and a six pounder at two o'clock 
in the morning of 22 November l80*f and reached Delang at 
5 o ’clock. Soon he made a sudden attack and routed the 
Raja's force. In the attack which was made on the garh 
near the village, the Raja's force lost upward of 100, while 
the loss on the side of the British consisted of one lashkar 
killed, together with one hawaldar, one drummer and six 
sepoys wounded.
(1) 16 November 180^, Harcourt to Elphinstone, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations 2 May 1805 No.Mf6 ; 5 November 180*+, 
Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, p.120.
(2) 19 November 180*+, Hickland to Harcourt, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations b April 1805 No.2 7.
(3) 10 October 1806, Turner to Government, Board's Collections 
Vol.318, 72^ ,  p. 5-; 16 November 1804, Harcourt to Elphin­
stone, Add.MSS.136IO, p.150.
(*0 John Hickland, Captain, 5th Bengal Native Infantry.
(^a) 29 November l80*f, Hickland to Harcourt, Bengal Secret&nd 
Political Consultations *+ April 1805 No.27; 20 November
180*+, Hickland to Harcourt, Add.MSS. I36IO, pp.156-7*
While Hickland was returning to Pipli about 5° horse
kept on hovering on his flank on the way, wounded two British
sepoys and one of the Europeans. Then they set fire to
some villages nearby. In consequence of the firing of
Hicklandfs flanking parties three of the Raja's men were
killed. As he was occasionally harassed by the Raja's
men, Hickland took post at Pantpur and was ultimately
successful in scaring them a w a y . ^
A force under Harcourt now moved from Cuttack, on which
the Raja's soldiers who were plundering in the Kughalbandi
(2)
retreated and took shelter in the fort of Khurda.
After reaching the fort of Khurda Harcourt reconnoitred 
the thick bamboo jungles and hedge surrounding the fort 
within 500 yards of the gate. He sent a detachment under 
Captain Storey in the direction of Gangapara, the way towards 
which was reported to have been blockaded by bamboos. When 
Storey was about 500 yards from the blockade, two sentried 
posted there gave the alarm. When the British detachment 
came nearer, the sentries opened fire and then gave way.
(1) Encl., 20 November 180*+, Harcourt to Captain Armstrong, 
Bengal Secret and Political Consultations b April 1805,
• No.27.
(2) 21 November 180*+, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.136lO, p.15^ 
7 December 180*+, Harcourt to Armstrong, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations *+ April 180?, No.32.
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After securing possession of the blockade, a strong 
party was sent to get intelligence of Hickland but they 
were not able to reach him; the detachment then returned 
to Khurda*
In response to a proclamation issued by Harcourt 
stating that whoever promoted the British interests would 
be suitably rewarded, Shaikh Wyoz Muhammad, a native of 
Cuttack, offered his services with a contingent. He 
was placed in the charge of a piece of artillery and was 
directed to reduce the fort of Banpur, which he did. He 
also captured four of the Raja’s brothers and one s o n . ^  
Meanwhile a twelve pounder battery and two flanking 
batteries, one of two howitzers and the other of four six 
rounders were constructed against the walls of the fort. 
They were completed on December l80*f and opened fire at 
daybreak on the following day. At ten o ’clock in the 
morning a practicable breach was made near the principal 
entrance of the outer fort. Major Fletcher was directed 
to assault the place with about 120 men of a Madras 
European regiment and with two flank companies of 2nd
(%) Encl., 21 October 1815, Impey to Government, Bengal 
Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 31 October 181? 
No. 18.
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batallion 7th Bengal native infantry together with a six
a (i)
pounder and a proportion of artillery men and gun laskars.v ' 
The main party was covered on its right by two flank 
companies of the 19th Madras native infantry under Hickland 
and one from the 9th Madras native infantry. These 
covering parties were told to assist the party under the 
command of Fletcher. When the outer fort had been 
carried the inner fort was plainly visible. Soon Fletcher 
was provided with a ladder, with which he succeeded in 
climbing the wall, followed by his party.
When the British troops were busy entering the outer 
work, the Raja escaped, together with the diwan and the 
other principal sardars.^) He then made for the jungle 
from where he sent a vakil with a request for an audience 
with Harcourt. But the vakil was made a prisoner. Then^ 
the Raja sent his diwan for the same purpose but he was 
also made ^/prisoner. After this he sent a servant of the 
Company. When he returned from Harcourt and was encouraging 
the Raja, a small detachment seized the Raja in the jungle
(1) 7 December 180^, Harcourt to Armstrong, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations, b April 180?, No. 32.
(2) Ibid.
(3) 5 December 180^, Harcourt to Shawe, Add. MSS. 13610, 
p. 17^.
30 miles from Khurda on the night of 3 January 1805, and
sent him a prisoner to Cuttack*^
After settling affairs at Khurda Harcourt sent a
detachment to Nayagarh to capture Antaji and Kannoji,
who were chiefly implicated in the intrigue between the
Raja of Khurda and the Raja of Nagpur.^ Then he
proceeded directly towards Gope, from which he intended
to go up the sea coast by Golra, Marichpur, Harishpur
and Bishenpur, Kujang and Kanika in order to deal with
those who sympathised with the rebellion and to establish
(•})
order in those parts of the country. J
' The Rajas of Marichpur and Bishenpur had promised
to join hands with the Raja of Khurda against the British; 
the former in particular drove away many British raiyats 
from the frontier villages; he also went to the extent of 
sending parties to raise contributions in some of the 
Mughalbandi villages and neglected the orders of the 
commissioners that he should pay tribute. On the arrival
(1) 10 Outober 1806, Turner to Government, Board1s 
Collections, Vol. 318, 72*+*+, P«6; b January 1805, 
Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and Political 
Consultations ^ April 1805 No. *+0.
(2) Ibid.
(3) 13 January 1805, Harcourt to Government, Bengal
Secret and Political Consultations, 2 May 1805,
No. M+8.
(h
of Harcourt1s army in the neighbourhood of their territories
(1)they soon submitted* '
The Raja of Kujang looked to the Raja of Khurda as 
his immediate superior• He had therefore made some 
preparations together with the Raja of Kanika, but the 
fall of the Raja of Khurda deterred him. When Harcourtfs 
detachment reached his territory in the middle of February 
180? he did not provide them with the grain which they 
required* As soon as Harcourt crossed the river Mahamad^, 
he took to flight. His elder brother was thereupon 
seated on the throne on the following conditions:
First, 1 that all arrangements made in the Moghulbundi 
territories with regard to the salt manufactured therein 
should be considered as extending over Kujang territories 
as far as they might be deemed applicable thereto by the 
British Government. Secondly the Raja should account 
to the British Government or authorities at Cuttack for 
all property found from the wrecks of the vessels on the 
sea coast of his territory.tr Thirdly, he should obey all 
orders he might receive from the British .Government in 
the capacity of a chief of a tributary estate. Lastly, 
the family of the Raja who took to flight should be taken
(1) 29 January 1805, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret
and Political Consultations, 2 May 180J No. h-^-8.
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care of and provided with a suitable maintenance.
The Raja of Kanika, who was a very active supporter 
of the Raja of Khurda, had already shown a hostile 
attitude to the British at the time of the rebellion. 
Although a British detachment was stationed near his 
territory, perhaps with a view to frighten him, he drove 
away the raiyats and other inhabitants.from the British 
frontier, and prevented them from collecting their crops.
He imposed considerable restrictions on the passage of 
vessels up the river, and threatened to put the crews to 
death. He assembled parties on the frontier of the 
Mughalbandi for the purpose of invading it. A party of 
Barkandazes was actually crossing the Kanika river to 
enter the Mughalbandi, when the arrival of a British vessel 
in the river prevented it. When a British officer went 
on cluty to a port in the Rajafs country he was surrounded 
by an armed force. When the inhabitants of the villages 
offered him trifling supplies they were carried off and 
put in confinement. Therefore Harcourt had sent a 
detachment towards Kendrapara village in the Mughalbandi 
to prevent any predatory incursions from the Raja of Kanika.
(1) 17 February l805> Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret
and Political Constultations 2 May 1805 No. ^50.
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By the time the detachment reached Kendrapara the Raja
of Kanika had heard of the British success at Khurda. He
therefore abandoned his attempts to seize a British vessel,
and disbanded several hundred of his armed peons.^ In
view of the Raja*s misconduct Harcourt imprisoned him ahd
sent him to Balasore. From there he was later removed to
the fort of Midnapur. His country was entrusted to the
(2)charge of the judge and magistrate of Cuttack.
The Raja of Kanika was subsequently released from 
confinement and restored to his estate on paying' the same 
annual tribute as before. But this piinciple was not 
applied in the case of the Raja of Khurda when he was freed 
from imprisonment. When the question of restoring him to 
Khurda arose, the Raja was not permitted to pay the same 
tribute as before. He was asked to engage for his estate 
at a higher assessment. The commissioners at Cuttack 
desired to make an example of him and believed that such a 
measure would subdue the rebellions spirit of the tributary 
Rajas. Harcourt wrote to the government, 111 conceive that 
such manifestation of our justice and moderation coupled •
(1) 22 December 180^, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret
and Political Consultation, *+ April 1805 No. 3 6; 30
December 180*+, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations April 1805, No. 39*
(2) 16 May 1805, Government to Harcourt, Bengal Secret
and Political Consultations, 16 May 1805, No. MD5*
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with the example that has been made of the rebellions Raja 
of Khurda will effectually prevent the occurrence of 
those difficulties we have already experienced.*1^
But the policy which was calculated to prevent trouble 
from the tributary chiefs ultimately led to a rebellion, 
twelve years later, from that part of the country which 
changed hands from the Raja of Khurda to the British.
(1) 2h December 180**, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS. 13610, 
p. 193.
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CHAPTER IV 
TRIBUTARY STATES.
During the Maratha rule that part of Orissa which 
was known as Garjat was held by a number of tributary 
chieftains* They managed their own territories, 
maintained their own forces and paid a quit rent to the 
Maratha government either in money or in k i n d . ^
If the tributary chiefs committed any offence or 
acted contrary to the interests of the Maratha government 
they were punished. Maratha troops marched into their 
territories to auprehend criminals and occasionally 
dethroned a chief himself. The chiefs of Khurda, Athgarh, 
Ali and Darpan had each been imprisoned, and the first 
died in the fort of Barabati. Thus, though the tributary 
chiefs generally enjoyed freedom in the internal adminis­
tration of their territories, the Maratha government 
interfered if it thought fit.^^
(1) 19 January 180^, Harcourt and Melville to Government, 
Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 180*+, 
No. k2.
(2) 17 October 1815, E. Impey, Superintendent of tributary 
mahals to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Con­
sultations (Lower Provinces) 1*+ November 1815, No. ^1.
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When the British took possession of Orissa they found 
30 hill chiefs. The territories of some of them constituted 
the Garjat. The territories of others were scattered 
over the Mughalbandi, The most powerful of them, the 
chief of Khurda, rebelled against the British Government 
and consequently his estate was annexed to the Mughalbandi, 
The territories of the remaining 29 were generally called 
"Tributary Mahals•" In accordance with the practice of 
the Maratha ^Government, the British entered into 
engagements for fixed jama with these tributary chiefs.
It was considered that such a liberal policy was likely 
to bind them to the British Government, In these 
engagements there was no provision for the protection of 
the agricultural community against oppression from the 
chiefs. But this did not prevent the British Government 
from exercising an active control in such matters if it 
wished. The sum total annually derived by the British 
Government from these 29 Imahals amounted to sicca Rs,
118,687. The supplus thought to be enjoyed by the 
proprietors was estimated at approximately Rs. 523?250.^^
(1) 17 July 1818, Governor General in Council to Court
of Directors, Revenue Letters from Bengal 1818-19 
Vol. IX, pp. 106-9; 20 December 181*+, Richardson to
Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 18 March 
1815 No. 29.
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Thirteen out of the twenty-nine mahals were 
subjected to the British regulations and the remaining 
sixteen were exempted from them. While the former were 
absorbed in the Mughalbandi, the latter with some later 
additions emerged as the real tributary states of Orissa.^ 
This group of sixteen states covered a hilly tract, 
having the districts of Singhbhum and Midnapur on the 
north, the Mughalbandi on the east, the district of Ganjam 
in the Madras presidency in the south and the states of 
Athmalik, Baud, Bamra, Radhakol, Sonpur and Patna on the 
west. In many parts of this tract there were hill tribes. 
The southern part was inhabited by a large number of Kandhs, 
the middle by Savaras and the northern by Kols and Santhals. 
The greater portion of this tract was unfit for cultivation 
and the small portion cultivated produced a scanty 
subsistence. The majority of the inhabitants turned
(1) The sixteen states were Mayurbhang-, Nilgiri,
Angul, Athgarh, Dhenkanal, Banki, Daspalla,
Nayagarh, Narasingpur, Ranpur, Talcher, Tigiria, 
Hindol, Sukinda, Keonjhar and Khandpara:
Bengal C3dvi& ? l Judicial Consultations
5 September 160? No. 32 (Regulation XII 180?).
to employments like the manufacture of iron, charcoal, 
boat building and felling timber*^
At the time of the conquest of Orissa, the hilly 
nature of this tract and "the uncivilised manners of the 
Zemindars'1 and of the other inhabitants prompted the 
British to adopt a policy towards them that was quite 
different from their policy elsewhere* While the 
British regulations were extended to other mahals, the 
chiefs of the sixteen states, in accordance with special 
agreements made with them, enjoyed full freedom in the 
internal administration of their territories. Their 
only obligation was to pay a stipulated tribute to the 
British Government punctually. 'The provisions of the 
agreements show that these chiefs were treated as subordin­
ate allies: on the one hand, they were required to
acknowledge the supreme authority of the British, on the 
other hand they were pledged to prevent the passage of 
enemies of the British through their territories and to 
help the British in punishing and reducing to obedience 
any offenders in their neighbourhood. It was administrative 
expediency that regulated the British relationship with
(1) 20 December l8l*f, Richardson to Government, Bengal
Revenue Consultations 18 March 1815 No. 29.
these sixteen states. It did not arise out of any rights
asserted by the chiefs. The British Government reserved
the power of interfering in these states if if was found
n e c e s s a r y . T h e i r  tribute was treated as ordinary
revenue by the British. If they delayed payment they
were fined as a penalty. If they could not pay at all
their lands were sold up. Thus, as in the case of the
samindars of the Mughalbandi, as well as in that of the
chiefs of the tributary mahals not exempted from British
regulations, the common mode of enforcing the collection
of tribute from these sixteen states was to put the lands
up for sale. For example, on one occasion six of them
were advertised for sale for the recovery of arrears.
As suitable bidders were not found, the collector purchased
them on account of the Government. But subsequently they
were restored to the Rajas on the discharge of the arrears
(?)due from them.' 7
(1) Encl., 1 October 180^, Harcourt and Melville to 
Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 
b April 1805 Nos. 3, k.
(2) 29 February 1820, A. Stirling, Secretary to • .
Commissioner of Cuttack to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 19 May 1820, No. 25; 26 October 1818,
ICer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 20 
November 1818 No. 52; 29 September 1818, Trower to
Stirling, Bengal Revenue Consultations 2 0 November 1818 
No. 53-
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Formerly the method of collection was defective in 
that there was no exertion ofi the part of the Government 
to press the collection of tribute from the chiefs.
There were therefore arrears outstanding in every year.
In 1818 when Ker was the commissioner of Cuttack a better 
arrangement was made for securing the punctual payment 
of the tribute from the sixteen states. A rule was 
established that each Raja should send in the amount of eaeh 
IdLst on the day of its being due with a despatch (chalan) 
to the collectors office and address a petition (arzi) 
at the same time of their having done so. If this 
petition were not given, orders (parwanas) would be 
despatched calling for payment and peons would be sent 
from the comMssionerfs office after a certain interval.
This system proved a success. Stirling, writing on 
behalf of Ker, stated that “punctual collection of the 
tribute due from the sixteen Gurjats exempt from 
regulations was very happily and successfully effected 
by Mr. Ker during 1226 Umlee/1818/12./ without its being 
found necessary to advertise any one of them for sale.r,(D
(1) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal
Revenue Consultations 19 May 1820 No. 25*
7^
True to the agreement made with the tributary 
chiefs, the British government avoided interfering in 
the internal administration of these sixteen states.
They thought that those chiefs would be rtthe conservators 
of the Public Peace and the distributors of Justice.t!
But in l8l*f it was reported that some of them were 
indulging in serious crimes. The chief of Dhenkanal 
was said to have killed one person and tortured others. 
Similarly the chief of Mayurbhanj was said to have killed 
someone. The Government directed the magistratiof Cuttack
A
to take cognizance of these cases. Enquiries were 
conducted. Owing to the want of evidence, however, these 
chiefs were acquitted of the charge of murder. But 
the chief of Dhenkanal was convicted of other charges.
The.-Government also came to suspect that the chiefs had 
been party to the alleged crimes.
Therefore the Government decided to appoint an 
officer to supervise the condtiict of the chiefs of the 
sixteen states so as to prevent the commission of crimes
(1) Encl., 1 August 1812, I.W. Sage, Magistrate of Cuttack
to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations 
L.P. 22 August 1812 No. 2 6; 22 August 1812, Government
to Sage, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P.
22 August 1812 No. 27.
(2) 18 October 181^, Government to Richardson, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations h.I * 18 October 181^ No. ?3.
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and outrages. This officer was designated the
"Superintendent of the Tributary Mahals.11 'Impey, the
magistrate of Cuttack, was the first to hold this office.
He was appointed in 181^. The power enjoyed by the
superintendent was of a political nature; it was not
closely defined. It was thought that the superintendent,
"being unfettered by any precise rules, might serve as
a useful check on their conduct." The whole idea
underlying this arrangement was to secure the interests
of the people by interfering as little as possible in
(!)
their chiefs1 internal administration.7
An attempt was made to see if the police in thewe 
states could be improved. Impey was directed to obtain 
accurate information regarding the states and the character 
and disposition of their chiefs. When his enquiries began 
some of the chiefs apprehended that police thanas would 
be established in their states and objected to the 
enquiries on the ground that it was not consistent with 
the agreements made with them by the first commissioners.
It was only when the Governor General in Council made 
clear that "It was not in contemplation to establish police
(1) Board!s Collections Vol. *+9^ 11899* PP*1> 2, 33-*+.
(]no date).
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thanas on the part of the Government” in the tributary
states that the chiefs1 suspicions were allayed*d)
In fact the enquiries showed that on the one hand
the application of the Bengal regulations to these states
would be ”very inexpedient”• First it was thought that
the daroghas at such a distance ”amongst a people so ill-
informed” and ”so little acquainted with the nature” of
British laws and methods would harass and oppress the
people* Secondly even if the regulations were extended
they would be productive of much expense but as the
tribute of the states was fixed, there was no means to
recover the expense* On the other hand, enquiries
convinced the Government that if the tributary chiefs
were left entirely uncontrolled, that would increase the
(o)
amount of crime in the states.
Therefore the British Government took a middle 
course. As a result, in 1816 these states were brought 
under the ordinary jurisdiction of the criminal courts in 
so far as serious crimes were concerned. The chiefs 
were left in control of the police but their exercise of
(1) 1^ December 1815, Government to Impey, Bengal Criminal 
Judicial Consultations, L-ji-P. 1*+ November 181? No.
(2) 20 December 181*+, Richardson to Government, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 18 March 1815 No. 29*
177
this control was now made subject to the supervision of 
the superintendent* They received sanads from the 
superintendent under the authority of the Governor General* 
They were to send all persons charged with murder, robbery 
or heinous crime within 2b hours of arrest to the nearest 
policedarogha or military detachment. They had to 
transmit monthly reports to the superintendent of all 
occurrences relative to the police of their states,
n  )especially all heinous offences.
The enforcement of the police regulations in the 
tributary states does not appear to have been very 
successful. The orders of the Government for the 
submission of monthly renorts of crimes to the superintendent 
were not nroperly carried out. Ker thought the reports 
"were made up ... in the Cuttack bazar without reference 
to the actual state of things." Therefore he discontinued 
the practice of submitting such reports. But he specifically 
asked the chiefs to report to him the occurrence of any 
crimes of magnitude and to send in the accused with the 
necessary information and evidence so that proper steps 
might be taken against them. In other words the chiefs
(1) Encl., 20 October 1815, M.H. Turnbull, Register,
Nizamat Adalat toGovernment, Bengal Criminal Judicial 
Consultations L.P. 10 May I8l6 No. 2.
i
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were deprived of jurisdiction over serious crimes* From
1816 to 1819 only two cases were brought before the
superintendent* In one case a charge of murder was
preferred by a merchant against two khandaits in.Mayurbhanj•
The charge could not be properly established; the
defendants were acquitted. In another case of a similar
nature the nrisoners were released from want of proof.
But there was no definite procedure for trying criminal
cases from the tributary states. This, in Ker’s opinion,
to some extent made it difficult to prove the guilt of the 
(1)defendants. '
Similarly, the civil jurisdiction of the British courts 
was not extended to the tributary states until I8l6.
In some of the states succession disputes had resulted in 
murder. For example, after the death of Tarwar Singh, 
the chief of Angul, his younger brother Jai Singh succeeded 
him. He was in possession of the state for three months 
when it was alleged that Prithwi Singh, his half-brother, 
murdered him and his three children in 1809/10 (1217 Amali) 
and retained possession of the kingdom. Lokanath Singh, 
a son of Tarwar Singh, claimed the succession. He 
appealed to the British Government. An enquiry was made* 
The Government was convinced that the crime was committed
(1) 29 February 1820, A. Stirling, Secretary to Commissioner:; 
of Cuttack, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1820 No*25*
7 9
by Prithwi Singh. But as a matter of expediency the 
Government did not inflict any severe punishment on him 
because it was apprehended that in view of his power and 
influence over the people any such punishment would 
provoke disturbances.^*^
After this incident, a regulation was parsed to 
control the decision of claims relating to succession 
to the sixteen states. All claims to the succession 
to any of these states were to be decided in the first 
instance by the superintendent. He was to be generally 
guided by the established laws and usages of the ptates.
An appeal could be made from the superintendents decision 
to the Sadar Diwani Adalat provided that the petition 
of appeal was preferred within three months after the 
original decree had been p a s s e d . ^ )
The policy of the British government in determining
(1) Encl., 23 July l8l*+, Richardson and W.C. Ward, 
Commissioners appointed to investigate into( 
disputed claim to succession to Augul, Bengal 
Criminal Judicial Consultations LpP. 16 August 
l8l*f No. 31:
16 August 181^, Government to Richardson and Ward, 
Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P.
16 August I8l*f No. 33.
(2) Encl., 10 May I8l6, Government Ltpo Impey, Bengal 
Criminal Judicial Consultations^10 May I8l6 No. 16.
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the relation of the Mughalbandi with the Garjat was one 
of avoiding any complication or confusion and of acting 
as far as practicable within the limits of the agreement.
On two occasions, when tome of the inhabitants of: 
the Mughalbandi aprlied for the recovery of debts from 
the hill chiefs, the superintendent dismissed the applications
to
on the ground that the regulations relative^suits for the 
recovery of debts did not extend to the Garjat chiefs 
and that he had consequently no jurisdiction over them
n }in such matters.vy
When two Mughalbandi estates were purchased privately 
by two hill chiefs, the Government objected on the ground 
that the lands taken under their control would be liable 
to the British regulations and consequently would involve 
the purchasers in inconvenience and embarrassment. To 
quote the opinion of Ker, Has the Hill Chiefs are exempt 
from the operation of the Regulations in their proper 
capacity of tributaries, we are entitled to demand from 
them in return for this and other high privileges which 
they enjoy that they confine themselves to their Hills and 
abstain from intruding on an order of thirgs of which they 
form no part.*1 (2)
(1) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 19 May 1820 No. 25.
(2) Ibid.
In the matter of trade between the Mughalbandi and 
the Garjat, at first during Impey1s superintendence many 
of the tributary chiefs were imposing vexatious duties on 
merchants and grain dealers trading with or through.the 
Garjat, When Ker was superintendent he considered that 
this was injurious and that the chiefs had no right to do 
so. Therefore he prohibited the chiefs from imposing 
duties on trade.
If we examine how far the chiefs were eager to keep 
themselves within the limits of their agreements, it seems 
that the chief of Nayagarh for many years afforded shelter 
and support to several of the most active leaders in the 
rebellion of 1817. He also failed to help in the capture
(2)of rebel leaders whose haunts lay beyond his own frontier*
The country of the chief of Mayurbhanj suffered for 
sometime from the depredations of a tribe of Kandhs or 
Kols. But when the chiefs was called on, he did not make 
any adequate exertions to restore law and order.^3)
Sometimes inhabitants of the Mughalbandi charged 
with crimes absconded to Keonghar and remained safe from
(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
pursuit. Orders from the superintendents office calling 
on the chief to apprehend them were often evaded and the 
regulation for bringing the offenders to task did not 
often produce the desired effect.^
In short, in the management of the tributary states 
exempted from the regulations, the British strictly 
enforced the punctual payment of tribute from their chiefs. 
They X\rere also anxious to enforce the observance of the 
engagements made by the chiefs with their first commissioners. 
They reserved the right to interfere in the internal 
administration of the tributary states, and they did 
interfere when some chiefs committed heinous Crimes. They 
tried to persuade the chiefs to improve their administration, 
but they thought it expedient to abstain as far as possible 
from interference lest it might create discontent against 
the British rule.
(1) Ibid.
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CHAPTER V 
RELIGIOUS POLICY
In the eighteenth century the British religious policy 
in India, it has been said, was based not only on toleration 
but also on nrotection. Especially in the southern and 
western parts of India the British were firm supporters of 
Hindu religious institutions. The basic idea behind the 
policy was that whatever the native government would have 
done they were bound to do.^^ By the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, the British patronage of Hindu religious 
institutions was being criticised by numerous bodies of 
zealots in Britain, especially the Evangelicals. They 
pleaded that practices like the burning of widows and self- 
immolation under the wheels of the car of Jagannath were 
evils inherent in the Hindu religion which could only be 
removed by western education and a knowledge of Christianity. 
Some members of the Clapham Sect, notably Wilberforce, Grant, 
Henry Thornton and Parry, took an active part in this movement. 
Some spoke in Parliament. Parry and Grant tried as Directors
(1) J. W. Kaye, Christianity in India, pp.391-2.
to influence the Court into withdrawing official patronage
from Hindu religious institutions.^^ But when the news of
the Vellore mutiny reached London the opponents of the
Clapham Sect vigorously attacked the idea of preaching
Christianity in India. It was represented that the preaching
(2)
of Christianity was one of the causes of the mutiny.
Public opinion supported them. Consequently the home
Government was not inclined to make any changes in the
religious policy of the Indian Government which might create
misgivings in the minds of the people that the British wanted
to convert them to Christianity. In short, in the first two
decades of the nineteenth century there was no significant
(3)
change in the religious policy of the Indian Government.
This uolicv autOjed ecmallv to Orissa ss to the rest.L V  V
cf India. Like that of the Marathas, the British religious
policy in Orissa took special consideration of the religious
feelings of the people in general and of the Brahmans at 
Jagannath in particular. When the British army under the
(1) C. H. Philips, East India Company, pp.158-60;
3.II.Howse, Saints in Politics, pp.73-82.
(2) Parliamentary Papers, H.C.1812-1813 Vol.VIII, pp.517-26.
(3) C. II. Philips, East India Company. pp.l6l, 190-1;
E. M. Howse, Saints in Politics, pp.87-9^•
command of Harcourt marched from Gan3am for the conquest of 
Orissa, he was warned by the Government not to offend the 
Brahmans in any manner and was instructed, 1 On your arrival 
at Jaggernaut you will employ every possible precaution to 
preserve the respect due to the Pagoda and to the religious 
prejudices of the Brahmins and pilgrims. You will furnish 
the Brahmins with such guards as shall afford perfect security 
to their persons, rites and ceremonies and to the sanctity of 
the religious edifices and you will strictly enjoin those 
under your command to observe your orders on this important 
subject, with the utmost degree of accuracy and vigilance.1 
The same consistent policy was followed, when the British 
had taken possession of Orissa.
The temple of Jagannath was looked upon as a prominent 
Hindu institution, having a great political influence behind 
it. After the conquest of Orissa Harcourt with reference 
to the temple remarked that "in a political light its value 
is incalculable.1 (2) In 1813 Kishen Chunder Singh, the 
proprietor of the pargana of Rahang, claimed title to certain 
lands in the immediate vicinity of Jagannath which he had 
purchased at a public sale. The Brahmans contested this,
(1) 8 August 1803, Wellesley to Campbell, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations 1 March 180*+ No.^6.
(2) (no date) 1805, Harcourt and Melville to Government, 
Add.MSS. 13611, p.62
and affrays ensued in which a Brahman lost his life.
Richardson after due enquiry recommended that the lands 
should he free of assessment as being attached to the 
temple of Jagannath and as being appropriated for the 
residence of the priests. He further added that "any 
infringement of the just rights of the Brahmins will be 
productive of most injurious effects in the political point 
of view for, I conceive that on the security of those rights, 
depends the respectability of the priests". The Government 
approved of this proposal.^
The British policy towards the priests and Brahmans 
received a due response from them. In July 180*+, when 
Harcourt with his party visited the car festival at 
Jagannath, he was received by the pilgrims and priests 
"with shouts and clapping of hands". They appeared so 
grateful that Harcourt was astonished.. He was of opiiiion 
that the gratifude they expressed for the protection afforded 
them, and the confidence they felt that it would be continued, 
were "powerful reasons to believe them sincere". He further 
stated that "in every instance they have manifested the
(2)strongest feeling of respect and attention to all of us."
(1) 15 April 1813, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 1 May 1813 Ho.25; 1 M§cy 1813* Government to
Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 1 May I813 No.26.
(2) 10 July 180^, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS. I36IO, pp.9-10»
In the same month compliments were presented to Wellesley
in a message on a long slip of paper overlaid with gold leaf
with the signatures of priests, abbots, recluses, vaishnavas
and Brahmans of P u r i . ^
The pensions enjoyed by the Brahmans under the Maratha
Government for the support of religious institutions and the
maintenance of religious ceremonies were continued under
(2)
British rule. Similar privileges were also extended to
the muslims. For example, in 1805 in conformity with usage,
the kazi of Cuttack was given a khilat consisting of two
shawls, four turbans and *+C0 kahans of Kauris or 100 rupees
(3)in cash for the celebration of the Id.
In short, the keynote of British religious policy was
to support the natives in the "undisturbed exercise of
their religious rites and ceremonies, and to preserve their
(*0places of worship inviolate". In this connection the 
British were faced with two important problems - first the 
management of the temple of Jagannath and secondly the collec­
tion of the pilgrim tax from the pilgrims who went there.
(1) S. N. Sen and U. Mishra (edsj, Sanskrit Documents, pp.9-10.
(2) 1^ December 1813, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 2b December 1813 No.17; 2b December 1813, 
Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 2b 
December 1813, No. 19; In- October 1806, R.Ker, t'= :• Judge 
of Cuttack to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 23 
October 1806 No.20 (vide also No.21, enclosed).
(3) 10 January 1806, G.WeMi, Collector of Cuttack to Board of, 
Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 30 Jan.l806, No.33*
(b) 1 July 181*+, Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 1 July 1811* No.2^.
Formerly the Raja of Khurda”, as the superintendent
of the temple of Jagannath, had supervised its internal
administration. After his removal from this office during
the rule of Shiv Bhatt Sathe, the temple was brought under
the direct administration of the Harathas. A purcha who
was also the Amil of the Purusottam Chhattar, acted as the
controlling authority. Owing to the want of vigilancd
of the Karatha Government, discipline gradually relaxed.
The situation deteriorated still further after the British
conquest because the absence of any controlling authority
allowed the servants of the temple to do whatever they
(1)
pleased.
For example, regularity was so much neglected that the 
ceremony which should have been performed before daylight 
was now sometimes postponed to an advanced hour of the day; 
consequently many of the daily ceremonies were altogether 
set aside. Secondly, it was forbidden to use any present 
made to Jagannath. But such was the impiety and disorder 
throughout the whole department of the temple, that even the
(1) 10 June I805, C.Groeme, Collector of Xila Jagannath, to 
Thomas Fortesque, Secretary to Commissioners of Cuttack, 
Add.MSS5136U ,  pp.23-31; (same letter as. above) Bengal 
Secret and Political Consultations 1 March lSO^ No.25*
principal servants took horses and other things given in 
the name of the diety, and misappropriated them for their 
own use. Thirdly, it had been a practice that if any
person knowingly touched any articles intended for Jagannath 
he was severely punished. But now no attention was paid 
to this. Fourthly, it was the duty of the Dewal Purcha 
to occasionally attend to the ingredients of which the Bhog 
was made, to weigh the different articles and to taste the 
whole, when dressed, but this was totally neglected; half 
the articles were embezzled either by the cooks or the 
persons supplying them. Fifthly, it was contrary to the 
established custom to sell Mahaprasad at any other place 
except the twenty second step of the east gate of the temple. 
But Hahanrasad was in fact indiscriminately sold in every 
part of the temple.
The problem now before the British Government was 
whether to leave the temple in that condition or to exercise 
some control over it; to have &eft the temple unreformed 
might have allowed a further deterioration in its management. 
That was why the first commissioners of Cuttack decided to 
intervene. Paying due regard to the precedents left by
(1) Ibid.
the Harathas, and in consultation with many Brahmans and
priests of the temple, they allowed Shewaji Pandit to
continue temporarily in the office of Dewal Purcha. He
was also directed to control the receipts and disbursements
of the temple as before. But they also authorised the
collector of the southern division, who had his head-quarters
at Puri, to intervene in the management of the temple if
he thought it necessary for the good of the institution.^
In 1805 the commissioners submitted a proposal to the
Government recommending some legislation for the management
of the temple of Jagannath. In short, they suggested that
the Government should aupoint a Committee of Pandits to
superintend the affairs of the temple while the real control
over receipts, disbursements and discipline was to be vested
in the collector of the pilgrim tax. G. Udney, one of the
members of the Governor-General1s Council, was influenced
by Evangelical ideas and had given some encouragement to
(2)missionaries in Bengal. He now suggested that the proposed 
regulations "would operate to sanction and tend to perpetuate 
a system of gross idolatry which the Government is neither 
bound nor does it seem becoming in it to do". He pleaded
(1) 12 November 1803, Harcourt and Melville to Government, Bengal 
Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 180^ No.32;
8 April 1808, Crovernment to Board of Revenue, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 8 April 18,08 No. 19•
(2) J.W.Kaye, Christianity in India. p.212#
that the whole economy should be left exclusively to the
management of the officers of the temple* But in spite of
his objections the proposals were enacted by the Governor
General in Council as Regulation IV, 1806.^^
During that period Parry was the chairman and Grant
was the deputy chairman. Both of them took a different
view of the whole regulation* They recommended to the
Board of Control that the Government should be prevented
"from interfering in matters which it cannot be proper or
competent for that Government to regulate* For a government
which is not Hindoo to elect the priests who are to superintend
the affairs of a Hindoo temple, or to exercise control over
its Ministers and Officers or to take the management of its
funds would seem to us to be a direct invasion of some of the
most revered of the Hindoo Institutions; and for a government
professing Christianity to do these things would be to act
(2)
incompatibly with its own principles'1. The Court also 
recommended that the government should not contribute anything 
from its revenues for the management of the temple because 
that would mean patronising "idolatrous11 institutions*^
(1) Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 3 April 1806 No*8A 
(Regulation); Parliamentary Parers H.C.1812-13 Vol.VIII,
, . P.557.
(2) Draft No.33 (18 January 1809),Bengal Draft Despatches 
Vol.21, pp.80-2.
(3) Parliamentary Papers, H.C. 1$12-13, Vol.VIII, p.335*
Robert Dundas, the president of the Board of Control, 
thought that political sovereignty gave the Company the 
obligation to preserve the public institutions of the country. 
He approved the regulation with the following remarks on the 
draft submitted by the Court. He stated that "it is 
undoubtedly desirable to avoid as much as possible the 
exercise of any control over the management and concerns 
of the temple, as our interference in such matters cannot 
but be, at all times, disagreeable to the feelings and the 
prejudices of the Hindoos, and may occasionally furnish 
ground of jealousy and misrepresentations in regard to our 
views and intentions respecting their religion."
When this was intimated to the Court, Parry and Grant 
were shocked at the attitude of the Board of Control. In 
18C9 they wrote a long letter representing their case to the 
Board of Control. They reiterated their sentiments with 
further explanations. One of the chief points on which they 
argued was that the Government had no right to interfere in 
any circumstances; interference in such religious institutions 
would give "real cause of/6ffence to the Hindoos" or would
(1) Board*s note on Courtfs Draft, 18 January 1809,
Draft No.33, Bengal Draft Despatches Vol.21, pp.80-1.
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1 furnish ground of misrepresentation in regard to our views 
and intentions concerning their religion"* ^  ■
Dundas upheld his former decision. But he amplified 
it with further remarks. He stated "the Company have 
virtually contracted an obligation, before they draw a single 
rupee of revenue from the country, to support and maintain on 
a proper footing and upon proper regulations, these establish­
ments which have immemorially been laid in.reverence and 
deemed sacred by their native subjects. As long as the 
Bast India Company were permitted to retain political power 
and authority over the British territories in India, their 
directors will be held responsible for their adherence to 
those maxims of Government on which the preservation of the
national character for good faith, justice and moderation must
(2)
in these countries mainly depend," That was why he did
not concur in the denial of the competency of Government as 
"the denial appeared" to him "to have been based as much on 
the principles of the Christian religion as upon regard to the 
prejudices of the Hindoos". He further added that he was not 
prepared to concur in the views of the Court of Directors 
that the principle of disbursing out of the public treasury
(1) 2b February 1809, Court to Board, Letters to Board 
Vol.Ill, pp.317-8.
(2) I-one Hi scellereous Vol. 59, pp.^-7^— 6.
anything towards the support of religious institutions
was objectionable when he considered that' "the revenues
by which that treasury is supplied, are wholly derived from
persons of those religious persuasions". But he stressed
the propriety and expediency on every account of "avoiding
all unnecessary control or interference" on the part of the
(1)Government in regard to the management of the temple.
This policy was intimated to the Government of India
(2)
through the Court of Directors.
As a result, the Government now modified Regulation IV,
1806, by inserting a provision that the Committee of Pandits
should be elected by persons attached to the temple instead
of being appointed by the Government. They were to have
(3)general control over the temple and its priests.
Meanwhile it had been noticed that even the interference 
of the collector of the Pilgrim tax in the purchase of food 
for offerings to the idol and of sundry articles for ceremonial
(1) b March 1809, Board to Court, Letters from Board, Vol.Ill 
pp. 137-^3; Horne Miscellaneous Vol.59, pp.*+79-80.
(2) Home Miscellaneous Vol.59, p**+79•
(3) Parliamentary Papers, H.C. 1812-13, Vol.VIII, p.531.
purposes had not resulted in any economy of expenditure.
Again, on subsequent consideration it was found that the
management of the temple by an elected body was contrary
to precedent. The Government therefore concluded that
if the internal administration were left to a hereditary
priest, it would result in economy, ensure effective control
over the temple and prevent dissatisfaction among the great
body of the people at any neglect or irregularity in the
(1)
administration of its affairs.
The Raja of Khurda was found to be a fit person for
this purpose on account of his caste and of the control
which he and his ancestors had exercised on the temple.
That was one of the reasons why he was released from imprison
(2)
ment in the fort of Midnapur. In 1809, therefore, the
Committee of Pandits was replaced by the Raja of Khurda.
Ee and his heirs were to hold the situation as long as they 
continued to donduct themselves with integrity, diligence
(1) 9 October, 1806, Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 9 October 1806 No.27.
(2) Board's Collections Vol.318, 72*+*+, p.31 (no date); 20 
April 1807, Bengal Secret Persian Correspondence (trans.) 
1807 Letters Received No.151.
( 1 )
and propriety.
It was apprehended that if the Raja were given the
power of appointing or dismissing purchas, he might abuse
it. The three purchas were therefore appointed direct by
the Government. The Raja was authorised to punish persons
subject to his control for neglect or misconduct by imposing
fines not exceeding one monthfs salary or by removing the
(2)
offender from his office.
It was a decided policy of the Government not to interfere 
in the internal administration of the temple. For example, 
in about 1812 Mahadev Mekap, master of the wardrobe to the 
idol of Jagannath died. As a matter of course he was 
succeeded by his son Dhundi Mekap. But as he complained 
that it was difficult for him to perform the duties of his 
position without assistants, the Raja of Khurda appointed 
three denuties under him. The Raja took from the store room 
such articles as were required, gave them into the charge
(1) 17 February 1809, G. Buller, Commissioner of Cuttack to 
Government, Bengal Board of Revenue Consultations February 
1809 No.22; (no date) September 1808, Buller to Fauquier, 
Bengal Board of Revenue Consultations September 1808 No.7;
17 February 1809, Buller to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 17 March 1809 No.32; ^7 March 1809, Government 
to Buller, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 March 1809 No.33*
(2) Ibid.
of the deputies, shut the store-room and returned the keys 
to Dhundi Mekap. But when in September 1813 the inventory 
was taken, it was found that some articles were missing.
The collector of the pilgrim tax made enquiries and suspected 
that when the deputies had been appointed and the storeroom 
was opened by the Raja, the property was taken. The Raja 
pleaded his innocence.
This matter was brought before the Government. The 
Government held that the 6‘ollector of the pilgrim tax had 
no right to interfere in such a matter as this, which, accord­
ing to the arrangements made in 1809, fell within the power
(2)
of the Raja of Khurda as the superintendent of the temple.
Bven if the Raja sometimes misused his power, the 
Government was not prepared to take any drastic measures 
against him. When Richardson.came.as a commissioner £o 
Cuttack, he proposed the removal of the Raja from his office. 
His proposal was based on two reasons. First, he was of 
opinion that since the Raja of Khurda became superintendent 
there were fewer first-class pilgrims, because the Raja
(1) 25 January 181^, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 12 February 181^, No.36.
(2) 11 February 181*+, Government to Richardson, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 12 February 181^ Ho.37*
generally showed an "offensive, contemptuous and disrespectful"
behaviour towards them. In support of this view he stated
that, during a short period of one or two years he had
received such complaints from persons like the Raja of
Khemidy, the Raja of Khandpara and the Rani of Sambalpur.
His second reason related to the political ambitions
of the Raja. He learnt that the Raja was inculcating a
belief that he would, one day, through the power and
influence of Jagannath, be restored to his former authority
as a ruling power of Cuttack. This he thought was likely
to create some difficulty in the peaceful administration of
Orissa. On this point his words were in a sense prophetic
as two years after a rebellion broke out to place the Raja
(2)
on the throne of Orissa. But Richardson1s proposal 
contained no satisfactory- alternative suggestions as to . . . 
how the management of the temple would be conducted in the 
absence of the Raja. That was why the Governor-General in
Council rejected it. It was remarked that "the active
interference of an Buropean officer in affairs of this nature 
was by all means to be avoided on every account, less /sic/
(1) 8 January l8lV, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 5 February 181*+ No.29.
(2) Ibid.
offence should be given to the people in some very tender 
point by mistakes into which an European might be easily 
led in matters so very foreign to him, and lest the British 
Government and its officers should be held forth in the light 
of direct promoters of an odious superstition11.
"Were that superstition less obnoxious it would still 
be a natural conclusion that the care of religious worship 
is mostly fitly entrusted to persons of the same religious 
persuasion and that Government shun the occasion of being 
mixt in affairs with which it has no concern and by any 
erroneous management of which most serious differences
(1)
might be excited very gratutiously among its native subjects".
All that the Government decided to do was to give a
warning to the Raja to conduct himself properly in his duties
(2)as the superintendent of the temple- of Jagannath. ...
The main sources of the income of the temple were lands. 
Under the Maratha rule some lands were under the purcha of 
Satais Iiazari Mahal. He made collections from them. There 
was another type of lands which were also appropriated for 
Jagannath, being denominated "Koth Hhanja". These were
(1) 1 July 181*+, Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 1 July l8l*f No.2^.
(2) Ibid.
under the charge of the Mathdharis; they were assigned to
(1)
them to defray the established expenses of the temple.
But owing to the slackness of the Maratha Government,
the amount of the annual demands from the above two types
of lands were not properly collected. The major portion
of whatever was collected was misappropriated by the nersons
(2)
entrusted with the management. The British Government
took pains to remove the causes of disorder. Many of
the lands under a fixed assessment were brought on the 
jama of the district; the amount was paid by the Government.
The old practice of collecting this revenue from the land­
holders through the servants of the temple, who received a 
deduction in the revenue on this account, was abolished.
The average annual collections from lands assigned to pay 
for the expenses of the temple from 1810/11 to 1815/16 were
Rs.17,7^.
(1) 10 June 1805) Groeme to Commissioners of Cuttack, Add.MSS.I3feii,
pp.18, 86, 90-k.
(2) Ibid, p.18.
(3) 8 January 181^, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 5 February 191^ No.29; 13 December 1813, 
Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations
5 February 181*+ No.23; Enc., 13 December 1813* Richardson 
to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 February l$lV 
IJ0 .2 6; Enclfc, 12 January 1015) Board of Revenue to Richardson 
Bengal Revenue Consultations 11 March 1815 No.52; Encl%>
3 December 1816, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 21 February 1817 No.39.
Another important source of income for the temple was 
the tax paid on the sale of Mahaprasad. During the Maratha 
rule this collection was affected because, first, the articles 
of the food required for the Bhog were not purchased in 
proper season; secondly, articles were bought in the town 
at an exhorbitant rate; thirdly, the purcha did not keep - 
proper accounts. ^
The collector of the pilgrim tax claimed that in 
consequence of the vigilance of the British Government and 
the control of the internal administration in the hands 
of the Raja of Khurda, this source of income increased.
The average annual income from the sale of holy food from 
1810/11 to 1815/16 was Rs.5,795.
A sort of religious tax under the head of sayar under 
the Maratha Government was abolished; collections on account
(1) 10 June 1805, Groeme to Commissioners of Cuttack, Add.MSS. 
13611, p.19; 19 December 1807, Webb to Board of Revenue, 
Bengal Revenue Consultations 29 January 1808 N0.3O.
(2) Encle, 13 December 1813, Richardson to Government, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 5 February 181^ Bo,23; Encl^l3 Dec­
ember 1813, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 February l&lk 
No.26; Snclfc, 12 January 1$15, Board of Revenue to Richard­
son, Bengal Revenue Consultations 11 March 1815 No.52;
Encli#, 3 December 1816, Board of Revenue to Government, 
Bengal Revenue Consultations 21 February 1817 No. 39.
of Dhuja and Pindika were retained. But the amount under 
this head was not considerable.^
For the first few years the British Government followed 
the Maratha system of making up the difference between the 
receipts and expenditure of the temple. This showed a 
deficit every year. In order to improve the system, on 
the basis of the expenditure of past years the whole annual 
exnenses of the temple were computed to be Rs.56,000. In 
spite of the improvement'in the established endowments of 
the institution and in the other sources of income, the 
amount was not found sufficient for the support of the temple 
on the existing scale. It was therefore decided to grant in 
addition to the proceeds from established sources, an allow­
ance at the rate of twenty per cent upon the net receipts
(2)
arising from the pilgrim-tax. . .
Under the Maratha rule a tax was collected from the 
pilgrims resorting to the temple of Jagannath. The pilgrims 
raying the tax were divided into two classes, one called
(1) 19 December 1807, Webb to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 29 January 1808 N0.3O; 27 January 1809*
F.Fauquier, Collector of Cuttack, to C.Buller, Commissioner 
of Cuttqck, Bengal Board of Revenue Consultations, February 
1809 No.2.
(2) 18 March 1808, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 8 April 1808 N0.I7.
Laljatris; the other called Bhurangas. It seems that the 
classification was made on the basis of wealth, social 
distinction and nedigree. The upper classes constituted 
the Laljatris. The middle classes constituted the Bhurangas.
The Maratha Government exempted the poorest people, known as
hangals, from paying any tax.^^
The tax was collected at ghats or stations established
for that purpose in different parts of the country. The
two important ghats leading to the town and temple of 
Jagannath were the Atharanala ghat and the Lokanath ghat.
They were on the high road that passed through the province 
from the north to the south. While the latter was close 
to the town, the former was within a distance of one mile 
from it. Officers and guards were appointed where the tax 
was collected. Collection from the pilgrims coming from the 
northward began at a place called Khunta on the border of 
hayurbhanj and continued up to Atharanala. At all stations 
between IChunta and Atharanala parties of pilgrims paying 
tax were granted passes, specifying the number of pilgrims, 
the date and the amount paid by each of them. The same 
principle was adopted in case of nilgrims coming from the
(1) 10 June 1805> Groeme to Commissioners of Cuttack Add.MSS.
13611, pp.lV-15, 6^-66.
19**.
south and from the west, passing through the Jobra ghat to
Atharanala.
Generally the people coming from the rich and fertile 
Gangetic plain and the surrounding areas were considered 
richer than the people of the south, who were thought to 
he coming from a country of less fertility. The Maratha 
Government therefore charged a higher rate on people coming 
from the north than on those coning from the south. Accord­
ing to information collected by Harcourt at the time of the 
conquest, the collections made by the Marathas at the ghats .
were estimated at from two and a half lakhs to five lakhs
(2)
of rupees.
The pilgrims were made over to the pandas for 
two reasons, first to prevent unnecessary delays at the 
ghats, and secondly to prevent people of■ low caste from 
going into the temple. Besides the taxes collected at the 
ghats, every pilgrim who came from the west and went round 
the !Sinhasanf or the throne of Jagannath had to pay a fee 
of four pans and twelve and a half gandas (kauris), if he
(1) Ibid.
(2) 26 September 1803, Melville to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March 180^ ho.16.
In Orine the fees collected by the Marathas are stated 
to be three lakhs. There is no date in the report, but 
it arrears to have been submitted to Government in 1776. 
(vide Orme MSS. India, Vol.18,p .?120).
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belonged to the lower class. This amount passed into the
accounts of the G o v e r n m e n t S o o n  after the British had 
taken possession of Puri, the collection of duties from the 
pilgrims was suspended because Karcourt desired to know the 
policy of the Government. Two courses were open to them.
They could have continued the existing system established by 
the Marathas. Alternatively, they could have made a declara­
tion that the Government had nothing to do with the revenue 
derived from the pilgrim tax. At first Wellesley was more 
inclined towards the latter policy than towards the former, 
not because of any Evangelical principles but because he 
thought that it would be an act of humanity to relieve the
pilgrims from paying an "oppressive tax1 that had been
(2)imposed by the Marathas. But this could not be effected
because the Brahmans repeatedly.requested Karcourt to collect 
the pilgrim tax. This was not without reason. During the 
Maratha rule the income from the endowments of the temple was 
always inadequate to meet its heavy expenses. Every year 
the Maratha Government granted a considerable sum of money 
for the repairs of the temple, for the maintenance of the
(1) 10 June 1805, Groeme to Commissioners of Cuttack, Add.MSS. 
I36H ,  p.16.
(2) 1 November 1803, Government to Commissioners of Cuttack,
Add.MSS. 13608, p.3?; J.W.Kaye, Christianity in India, p.
383-
establishment and for the principal jatras of Jagannath.
(1)
This grant came from the pilgrim tax.
The British considered that to deny the Brahmans the 
privileges they enjoyed under the Marathas would be inexpedient, 
if the tax were continued it would afford the best possible 
guarantee for the protection of their religion. It would 
convince them that the expenses of the temple would be 
regularly defrayed by the Government. Moreover, the Govern­
ment thought that the collection of the tax would relieve 
it from a heavy expense which it otherwise would have faced 
if it desired to support the temple. The Maratha systePi 
of collection was therefore continued for about two years.
In l8G5 the commissioners for the affairs of Cuttack sub­
mitted a draft regulation to the Government for the collection 
of the pilgrim tax. This was mainly based on Maratha practice
but with certain changes which were to provide better facilities
(2)for the pilgrims.
This issue was linked with that of the management of the 
temple. It raised controversies at Government level. The 
Governor General in Council decided in favour of collecting
(1) 26 September 1813, Melville to Government, Bengal Secret 
and Political Consultations 1 March 180*+ j No. 16; J.W.Kaye, 
Christianity in India, pp.383-5•
(2) 1 November 1803, Government to Commissioners of Cuttack,
Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 180^ No.26
the tax, but when the matter was referred to the Court 
of Directors, the Court led by Grant and Parry objected 
to it. The Court held that whatever might be the example of 
the preceding Government, the British ought not to tax Hindu
(1
pilgrims because it would be contrary to Christian principles.
They sent this draft to the Board of Control for approval.
Dundas remarked that because the tax was established by the
previous governments there was no substantial objection to
the continuance of those duties under proper rules for their
collection. He stated, "The Board are not aware of any
reason why a (government administered by (christians may not
derive a revenue applicable to ordinary purposes from a tax
on persons performing superstitious rites or pilgrimages
in a case in which these practices are not introduced or
tolerated for the sake of the tax, but have been found
among the ancient usages of the country, and must be permitted
to continue, in a case therefore in which the operation of the
tax in regard to such practices must be to diminish rather
(2)
than to increase their frequency".
When this was intimated to the Court of Directors, 
they expanded their argument by stating that "when the imposer
(1) Draft Ho.33 (18 January 1809), Bengal Draft Despatches Vol.
21, pp.82-3*
(2) 18 January 1809, Board to Court, Letters from Board Vol.Ill,
pp.7^ -5.
believed, as the Hindoo Government did, that the privilege 
was a real and solid good, it was on his principles allowable 
for him to put a price upon it, but when the Government know 
the supposed privilege to be a delusion the Court must question 
the propriety of its( continuing the practice, though it may 
be ancient, that reason not having been deemed by our Govern­
ment, in other instances, sufficient to. sanction customs 
repugnant to the principles of justice’1. ^
Dundas maintained his own decision. lie remarked that
the arguments brought forward by the Court were not based
on sound reasoning. This final decision of the Board of
Control was intimated to the Government through the Court
of Directors. Consequently the collection of the pilgrim
(2)tax under the Regulation of 1806 was confirmed.
Collection was•entrusted to an officer called.the . 
collector of the pilgrim tax. The general superintendence 
of the collections and the control of the officials employed 
in the performance of the duty was vested in the Board of 
Revenue at Fort William. At the time of conquest the 
commissioners reported to the Government that the annual
(1) 2b January 1809, Court to Board, Letters to Board, Vol.Ill,
pp.319-20.
(2) March 1809, Board to Court, Letters from Board Vol.Ill, 
pp.lVo-ML.
collection from the pilgrims might amount to between two to 
three lakhs of rupees.^ At first, the collector of the 
tax was therefore a covenanted servant and an ex officio 
assistant to the magistrate of Cuttack. But when the 
regulation was enforced and the collections were made they 
fell far short of expectations. The average annual collec­
tion from 1805/6 to 1807/8 was only Rs.76,891. 80 in
consequence of a report by Buller in 1808 to that effect,
(2)
the post was opened to uncovenanted servants.
The collector of the pilgrim tax had to superintend the
ghat daroghas, to keep the accounts of the number of pilgrims
and of the amount paid by them at the different places where
certificates were sold. He enjoyed the power to exempt
pilgrims from paying the tax. He reserved sufficient funds
under his charge to make payment of the authorised expenses
of the temple. Then he sent the surplus amount to Cuttack.
(3)This was regarded as Government revenue.
(1) 23 October 1803, Melville to Government, Bengal Secret and 
Political Consultations 1 March 18(A- No.2^.
(2) 17 February 1809, 3uller to Government, Bengal Board of 
Revenue CoBroSladings February 1809 No.22.
(3) 8 April 1808, Government to Board of Revenue. Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 8 April 1808 No.19; 17 March 1809, Government 
to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 March 
1809 No.32; 13 July 1810, Government to Board of Revenue, 
Bengal Revenue Consultations 13 July 181G No.21.
A pilgrim paying the established fees received a pass 
from the darogha which was to be lodged by the pilgrim or 
the panda at the sadar kachkkri and there exchanged for 
another bearing the signature of the collector of the pilgrim 
tax. The latter pass specified the date on which it was 
granted, the time it was to be in force, the nature of the 
person taking it out and the name of the panda under whose 
guidance the pilgrim performed his devotions.(1)
A muharrir appointed by the Government %at the temple 
gate was to check the date on which the pass was first 
presented and marked on the back of it the date when it 
expired. It was the duty of the panda to return all these 
passes to the office of the collector of pilgrim tax, receiv­
ing in return from him khalas chitthi or release. If the
(?)
panda failed to return the pass he might be fined.
For the convenience of the pilgrims coming from differ­
ent parts of India, depots for issuing Rawanas were opened 
at several places in the company’s provinces, like Dacca, 
Bihar, Benares, Murshidabad and Madras. This helped the 
pilgrim to pay the tax near his place of residence. By the 
production of his Rawana at the ghat the pilgrim passed into
(1) 7 March 1808, Webb to Baard of Revenue, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 8 April 1808 No.18.
(2) Ibid.
the town to the collector’s kachj&Ari without any difficulty.
For the protection of the pilgrims from undue exactions
on the part of the pandas and pariharis of the temple,
a table of the rate of fees was fixed at the temple of
Jagannath, and in places adjacent to it. The officers
attached to the temple were accordingly strictly urohibited
from making any demands for money exclusive of the tax and fees
specified. These restrictions did not preclude them from
(2)
receiving gifts voluntarily made.
The collection of tax from the same pilgrim at different
ghats, as practised by the Marathas, was abolished because it
was considered unnecessary and unjust; according to the
regulation, collections were only made at two.places. These
(3)were Atharanala and Lokanath.
The classification of pilgrims during the British period 
underwent changes from time to time: this was with a view
to increase the collections and add to the advantages of the 
pilgrims. In fact the collections did not increase to the
(1) 18 March 1808, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 8 April 1808 No.17; 7 March 1808* Webb to
Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations o Anril 1808 
TTo.18.
(2) Board’s Collections Vol.223, ^92, p.125 (Regulation IV,
1806).
(3) Ibid.
extent expected, although in many respects the pilgrims enjoyed 
better advantages than before. According to the Regulation 
of 18C6 the pilgrims paying the tax were in conformity with 
Maratha precedent divided into two classes. One class of 
pilgrims as before were called-the Laljatris; they paid ten 
rupees each at Atharanala and six rupees at Lokanath; the
other class called Bhurangas paid two rupees each at both the
(0
ghats.
When the regulation was enforced some defects were noticed. 
There was no provision in the regulation to allow the Laljatris 
to purchase a lower class ticket if they desired. If they 
were not willing to pay at the rate fixed for a Laljatri, 
they were either turned back or were detained under examination 
until they paid it. This led to complaints and dissatisfaction 
amongst the pilgrims. Again it was found that the total' 
number of Laljatris was very small in comparison with that of 
the other class. So the Government decided to change the 
classification of pilgrims and to regulate thd -tax so 
as to attract more people by charging less than before. It 
was thought that the additional number would in that case
tt)
compensate for the loss of the higher tax upon the Laljatris.
(£) Ibid; 27 February 1809, Buller to Government, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 17 March 1809 No.32.
Thus by the Regulation, of 1809 the pilgrims from whom
the tax was to be levied were divided into three classes
instead of two, as prescribed by the Regulation of 1806.
The Laljatris were included in class I, paying the same amount
as before. A new class was now introduced. It was called
class II. The pilgrims of this class were called Nimlals.
They had to pay five rupees coming from the north and passing
Atharanala and three rupees coming from the south and passing
Lokanath. Thq^hanirangas came under class II, paying the same
as before. Any pilgrim was permitted to take anv pass for
(1)
any class at his own option.
According to the Regulation of 1806, a pilgrim had to 
visit the temple on the date marked on his pass. As the 
pilgrims were not usually given the chance to go to the 
temple more than once, it often happened that manv crowded 
at the same time at the temple gate. As a result, there was 
a big rush and many pilgrims could not get through the gate.
In order to avoid this difficulty the Regulation of 1809 
prescribed a certain number of days to different classes of
(1) 27 February 1809, Buller to Government, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 17 March 1809 No.32; 15 August 1808. Fauquier
to Buller, Bengal Board of Revenue Consultations 28 Septem­
ber 1808 No.1.
pilgrims for access to the temple, allowing access to the 
pilgrims of class I for more days than class II and to class II 
for more than class III* For example, pilgrims of class I 
were allowed free access to the temple for fifteen days, while 
the pilgrims of class II were only allowed access for four
* " (Ddays.
According to the Regulation of 1806, many pilgrims in 
conformity with former usage were exempted from paying the 
tax, hut they were not classified. By the Regulation of 
1809 such pilgrims were divided into three categories and 
added to the three classes of Pilgrims paying the tax. Thus 
persons called Kangals, or pilgrims in actual state of poverty; 
were allocated to class IV. They were admitted without 
payment and had access tc the temple for one day. Under, 
class V came Bairagis, Sanyasis and people carrying the water 
of the Ganges to the temple of Jagannath or to any other temple 
in Puri, together with Brahmacharis, Ilahanhs, Gosains and 
Magas. They did not pay anything and they had free access 
to the temple. Class VI consisted of persons whose residence
(1) 27 February 1809, Buller to Government, Bengal Revenue 
G 17 March 1809 No.32.
m .
was between Baitarani Bala and the Gan jam river or Rusikulya
Tala. These peonle were exempted'from taxation both according
to the Hindu scriptures and to immemorial usage as this tract
(1)
of land was regarded as holy. They were called Desis.
The Regulation of 1809 provided no satisfactory safeguard
against the congestion of the pilgrims at the ghats, narticular-
(2)
ly at the time of the main festivals of Jagannath. According 
writing as
to Trower,/collector of Cuttack, this was the more so because
the ghat daroghas and peons might detain pilgrims under the
pretext of examination in order illegally to exact money
from them. Even respectable persons with their families
underwent strict examination and the curtains (pardas) of the
Dolis were lifted up to see that they did not conceal anyone
within. Such practices were not detected by the Government
(1) ■
until 1813.
In June 1813 the Rath jatra or car festival was celebrated. 
The nilgrims of all descriptions, most of whom seemed to be 
Desis and Kangals together with a large number of Bhurangas,. 
were crowding in the vicinity of the Atharanala ghat to enter
(1) Ibid; 29 January 1810, S.Rusbyp to Buller, Bengal Board 
of Revenue Consultations January 1810 Ko.27«
(2) Ibid.
(3) 16 August 1813) Trower to Richardson, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 5 February l8l^ Ko#30*
li>5.
the town. On 30 June tlieir number exceeded one. lakh. As a 
result, the examination of the pilgrims became difficult, and 
the collection of the tax was for some time impeded. When 
the gates were opened the crowds trampled on each other in 
their eagerness to nrostrate themselves before the idol. They 
were not restrained even by the cries and groans of the 
sufferers; one fell after another and 36 persons were.crushed
4- ^  (1)to death.
It was during this time that Richardson, the commissioner
of Cuttack, was there. He was influenced by Evangelical ideas,
and was interested in the preaching of missionaries who were
attacking some practices in the worship of Jagannath, particular-
(2)
ly that of self-immolation under the wheel of the car. He 
was also convinced that the pilgrim tax was to a certain extent 
a state sanction to idolatry. Now he thought it an opportune 
moment to bring a proposal before the Government for its abolition. 
His suggestions were founded on three considerations - first, the 
casualties which arose in admitting pilgrims to the temple, 
secondly the benefit which would arise by the enhancement of 
the British reputation for liberality and tolerance, and thirdly
(1) Ibid.
(2) Periodical accounts of the Baptist Missionary Society Vol.IV,
p • M+8 •
the incompatibility of a tax of that nature with the principles
(1)
of the Christian religion.
But the Government objected to his proposal for several
reasons. In particular they held that the argument regarding
toleration was not of any weight as the system existed under
the Maratha Government. Moreover, the British Government had
freed it from vexatious and oppressive exactions* Further
they thought the present system promoted the convenience of the
pilgrims under the supervision of the local officers. In the
absence of this control they would have been subject to the
exactions of the pandas. It was also decided that casualties
(2)
could be nrevented in future by proper precautions.
As a result, enquiries were made. The Regulation of 1809 
was modified by a Regulation of 1813« It was found that the 
number of the Kangals and the Desis- particularly at the prin-- 
cipal festivals was great. It was thought that if a duty 
was levied on them it might reduce congestion. The Desis who 
had formerly been exempted from duty were now required to pay, 
like the other pilgrims at the'principal jatras (the Dol, the 
Asin and the Rath) unless they arrived there three days before 
the commencement of the festival. The Kangals who had
(1) 5 February 181*+, Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 5 February 181^ No.36.
(2) Ibid
previously been exempted from tax were now required to pay a
sum less than two rupees*^
According to the Regulation of 1809, the servants of the
pilgrims were obliged to quit the t o ™  before their masters,
as they were aiven very limited time to stay. They therefore
preferred to accompany their masters merely at the time of the
festivals. On the one hand, this added to congestion. On
the other hand, it added to the inconvenience of the pilgrims.
Mow the Government thought that if the servants were allowed
a longer period to stay it might induce the pilgrims to come
earlier. Moreover, it would be advantageous to the pilgrims.
So by the Regulation of 1813 the pilgrims were permitted to
retain their servants as long as they stayed there on payment
of fees for them. The rate of fees for a servant varied
according to the class of pilgrim to which he belonged. To
achieve the same object the pilgrims were also allowed to live
in the t o ™  for a longer period than before on payment of an
(?)additional amount
From an account of the number and description of pilgrims 
annually resorting to the temple of Jagannath between 1805/6
(1) Regulation 18135 Encl., 8 January 181^, Richardson to 
Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 February 101^
Mo.32; 1 July l8l*f, Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue-
Consultations 1 July 181^ IJo.21*.
(2) Ibid.
and 1813/1*+, it appears that the average number amounted to 
90,273 out of which 75?712 passed through the Atharanala ghat 
and 1^,561 through the Lokanath ghat. Of this total (90,273), 
6*+, 069 were exempted from the pilgrim tax, in other words more 
than two thirds. Of the rest the average number of Laljatris 
(class I uilgrims) was 2,185 and Bhurangas (class III pilgrims) 
23?565* This latter class alx^ays formed the largest number 
of pilgrims. The Nimlals (class II pilgrims) from 1809/10 
to 1813/1*+ always formed the smallest number, averaging only 
79 rer year at both ghats.
Laljatris passing through Atharanala averaged 1,81*4-, and
those through Lokanath 370. The Bhurangas passing through
Atharanala averaged 21,3*+6, and through Lokanath 2,219. The
Nimlals from 1809 to 1813/1^ passing through Atharanala averaged
28 and through Lokanath 51* From the above figures it may be
seen that on the whole the number of pilgrims coming from the
(2 )north was larger than those coming from the south. '
The number of pilgrims invariably increased particularly 
during the Rath Jatra dnd Asin Jatra. The average collection 
during the above two Jatras very often exceeded more than
(1) 13 May 1818, W.Ewer, Commissioner of Cuttack to Government^ 
Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818, No.15*
(2) Ibid.
half of the collection of the whole year. The average
collection from April 18C6 to July 1811 was Rs.'*+0*f, 129; hut
the average collection from the Rath and Asin jatras alone
was Rs.213)225* The number of nilgrims became very great
if the year was an auspicious one. Tn 1806/7 the number
of the pilgrims was as great as 113)266. This year the
the
collection from the Rath and Asin jatras was/very large
amount of Rs • 65*370*
The total collections from the pilgrims from January
1806 to the end of April 1813 amounted to Rs.530,650. The
various expenses* including the establishment of amlas, during
the same period was Rs.528,1*4-0. This leaves a net surplus
revenue to the Government of Rs.2*5l0. In short* the surplus
(2)
revenue during this period was inconsiderable.
Then the Charter Act of 1813 came before Parliament, 
Babington* Stephen* Thornton, Wilberforce and others of the 
Clapham Sect strove hard to promote Christianity in India.
(1) Ibid; 15 August 1808, Fauquier to Buller, Bengal Board 
of Revenue Consultations 28 September I8O0 No.l; Encl®^
17 August l8ll, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 3 September 1811 No.2*+.
(2) 8 January 181*4-* Richardson to Government* Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 5 February 181*+ No.29; 16 August 1813, Trower 
to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 February I8l*f
No.30.
As a result , provision’ was made for an Episcopal establish­
ment in India* Wilberforce said, UI am persuaded - that 
we have laid the foundation stone of the greatest edifice 
that ever was raised in Asia.11^ ^  It seems that this 
victory of the Clapham Sect had some effect on the Court of 
Directors and on the Government of India. In 181*+ the Court 
of Directors declared that the pilgrim tax should be used
only for the interest of the temple rather than as a source,
(2)of revenue to the state* Accordingly, the Governor-
General in Council decided that the surplus revenue was to 
be spent in the first instance upon the repair of the temple*
Secondly it would be applied to the completion and repair
of the Jagannath Hoad that was to be extended from Calcutta 
to Jagannath. Thirdly, should any cash still remain it was
to be spent for any useful work connected with the temple of
«  (3)Jagannath.
In short, as successors to the Marathas, the British 
considered it an obligation to protect the religion of the 
natives. Under the British the people enjoyed the undisturbed
(1) E. M. Eowse, Saints in Politics. p. 9^ -
(2) 28 October 181*+, Court of Directors to Governor General
in Council, Revenue Letters to Bengal 1813-1?, Vol.Ill,p.191
(3) Resolution of Governor General, no date, Board’s Collec­
tions V o l . 12129? p p A - 5.
exercise of their religious rites and ceremonies; their 
places of worship were inviolate. The British patronised 
the temple of Jagannath; they set its management in order, 
made the collection of the pilgrim tax more systematic and 
provided better facilities for the pilgrims than before.
1 2 2 .
CHAPTER VI 
ECONOMIC POLICY
The conquest brought the British face to face with 
serious economic problems. To the British, the Maratha 
economic measures appeared to be unsystematic and complicated. 
They therefore tried to introduce new ideas and methods in 
tackling economic problems. . But because of their ignorance 
of the details of local institutions and of the Maratha 
economic system, these new ideas and methods could not be 
established smoothly and quickly. The attempt to do so had 
unexpected consequences. Indeed, the British economic policy 
ultimately led to some popular dissatisfaction - especially 
in connection with the introduction of the zamindari system, 
with the currency system, , with the salt, monopoly and with the 
management of embankments.
The British set aside the old Maratha revenue system.
They introduced a zamindari tenure such as existed in Bengal. 
But they miscalculated the Maratha jama and thus started 
from a wrong basis. As the jama was enhanced there were 
heavy arrears. To facilitate collection, the sale law was 
rigorously enforced. Consequently many old zamindars were
overthrown. Their places were occupied by zamindars from 
Bengal. In their turn the raiyats could not pay the enhanced 
jama demanded by the zamindars. Many of them were put into 
jail. Only when nothing could be recovered from them were 
they set free. Thus both zamindars and raiyats were 
discontented.
During the Maratha rule the kauri was the principal 
currency, the medium of calculation and also of exchange.
There were also some silver coins of different sorts in 
circulation. For the sake of convenience the British 
collected the revenue in sicca rupees. But this resulted 
in diminishing the demand for kauris. The country was 
over-assessed and a great amount of silver was sent out to 
the Calcutta treasury. Silver therefore became scarce.
The value of the kauri depreciated., This affected the 
people more particularly in the mufassal.
During the Maratha rule thereX\ras nothing like a salt 
monopoly. The British introduced this. The price of salt 
was raised higher than before. Again the British committed 
an error in estimating the supply of salt to the Mughalbandi. 
Consequently there was a popular clamour for more salt at a 
lower price.
During the Maratha rule the zamindars were entrusted with 
the money for repairing embankments. The British abolished that 
system because they thought that management by a committee 
would be more efficient than by the zamindars. The British 
officers fully relied upon the bund daroghas, owing to the - 
want of their own local knowledge. But the bund daroghas 
misappropriated the money advanced to them for repairing the 
embankments. Some of them became zamindars themselves. But 
many embankments were neglected, floods destroyed crops and 
this also aroused popular dissatisfaction.
SECTION I 
REVENUE SYSTEM
The old Eindu revenue system had undergone various 
modifications by the time the Harathas secured Orissa. The 
Marathas, in turn, made some changes in the Mughal revenue sys­
tem. As in other parts of the Nagpur territories, the 
Karathas appointed Amils for the collection of revenue. 
Terminology, for example the use of mamlatdar for the 
collector of the revenue, such as was commonly applied in 
Maharastra, x^ as not used here. But in fact the function 
of the Arnil was similar to that, of the mamlatdar. The 
Eughalbandi was divided into 150 parganas and was placed 
under the management of 32 Amils. Each pargana was generally 
divided into two, three, four or more allotments.^
The old hereditary revenue officers commonly termed 
Talukdars were placed under the Amils. They were in charge
of talukas or subdivisions. They collected revenue from
(2)the Mukaddams.
The Mukaddams of the Mughal period were the headmen of 
the villages. They were allowed to retain their situations
(1) 15 October 1821, A.Stirling, Secretary to tn ,-., Commissioner 
of Cuttack to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations
1 August 1822 No.5«
(2) Ibid.
as before. Their functions were similar to those of the patels
CU-
in Maharastra. They collected the revenue from thecultivators.
In return for the service they rendered to the state, the
Amils and the Talukdars were given Nankar lands. They were
also allowed certain perquisites and deductions as expenses
of collection. Similar privileges were also enjoyed by the
(2)Mukaddams*
If any taluka were brought under the khas management of
the Maratha Government owing to the default of a Talukdar, the
Amil would be told to engage directly with the Mpkaddams to
collect revenue. This generally appeared'convenient to the
Maratha Government. Therefore under the rule of Baja Ram
Pandit many Talukdars were set aside, and the Amils collected
the revenue from the Mukaddams. Such was the Maratha system
(3)  
until the British conquered Orissa.
The gross estimate of the revenue under the Uarathas was 
at times as much as sicca Rs.1,388,880. But the net
receipts always fell far short of this sum, because of the 
expenses of collection, allowances to proprietors and remissions 
on account of natural calamities. Over and above these
(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(*+) about Arcot Rs. 1,500,000.
deductions large balances were always outstanding* The
Maratha gross jamabandi included various allowances in money
or land to the revenue officers, together with other expenses
of collection and authorised deductions; the expenses were
such that generally there remained a surplus of about four
(1)
lakhs to be annually dispatched to the court of Nagpur.
Soon after the British conquest in 1803, two joint 
commissioners were appointed to place the general administra­
tion of the country on a satisfactory footing; these 
commissioners were entrusted with the settlement and collec­
tion of the revenue. Under them were two collectors, one 
for each of the two divisions, known as the Northern and 
Southern divisions, into which Orissa was divided. The 
appointment of these commissioners was terminated in 1805; 
the country was then placed in the charge of only one collector. 
He continued in his duties of collection and settlement of 
land revenue except on two occasions when his powers were
temporarily superseded by two commissioners on deputation
(2)
from the Bengal Government.
(1) Ibid.
(2) 2 August 1805, Iiarcourt, Commissioner of Cuttack to 
Government, Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 5 September 
1805, No.30. ( vide also Nos.31a, 32.).
On 15 November l80b a proclamation was made regarding the 
settlement of hhe province which was embodied in Regulation XII, 
in I805. The plan was to have a settlement for one year 
(for 180^/5 or 1212 Amali) and then for three years. Then 
another settlement was to be made for four years. Then a 
further settlement for a period of three years was to be 
concluded. It'was announced that at the close of these 
eleven years a permanent settlement would be concluded on 
such terms as the Government considered both fair and equit­
able. It appears that the object behind this plan was that 
these settlements at short intervals would enable the 
revenue officers to gain an accurate knowledge of the 
resources of the country, so that the Government would not 
be the loser nor the people be too heavily taxed before a
............................ ( a .................................
permanent settlement could be effected.
In the first settlement of the province made by the
collectors in l80h/5 (1212 Amali) all the Individuals whose
names were found in the Maratha accounts supplied by Gopal
Pandit and Narayan Rao Mahashay, two Maratha record keepers,
(in other words, zamindars, Talukdars and some Mukaddams and
sarbarahkars or village accountants) were allowed to enter
(1)
into engagements direct for the revenue of their respective
( l) 31 mu “  ; " :
(1) These engagements were drawn out in Persian.
mahals. From the time of the triennial settlement for 1805/6, 
1806/7 and 1807/8 (1213? 12lh and 1215 Amali) all these persons 
were recognised as actual proprietors of the soil (in Persian 
Malikan-i-zamin) under the provisions of Regulation XII,l805» 
The titles of Talukdar and Mukaddam were replaced by the more 
general term of zamindar, which was invariably applied to the
, L (i)
individuals with whom the collectors made settlements direct.
The zamindars were responsible for collecting the revenue
from the raiyats in their own estates and submitting it to
the treasury of the collector in the appointed kists or
(2)instalments. If a zamindar could not pay his revenue in 
time he would be required to pay some interest as a fine for 
the delay.
(1) 15 October 1821, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 1 August 1822 Nd.5*'
(2) 30 June 1809, Buller to Government, Bengal Revenue Consul­
tations 1*+ July 1809 No.33; 18 April 1809, Fauquier to
Commissioner <3f Cuttack. Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 May 
1809 No.32; 2b April 1809, Buller to Government, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 5 Hay 1809 No.32; 30 November 1810,
Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 
21 December 1810 N6.7*
(3) 3 July 1805, R. Ker, Collector of Northern division of 
Cuttack to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 
10 August 1805 No.20; 16 December 181*+, Richardson to 
Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 23 December I8lh 
N0.I7 .
The estate for which the person considered by the
Government to be the original proprietor refused to engage
was either offered for sale to a suitable farmer or was brought
under the khas management of the Government. But the
original proprietor received a malikana at the rate of ten
(2)per cent on the Government jama of the estate. The 
revenues of the estates under khas management were collected 
by tahsildars appointed under the order of the collector
(3)of the district.
In the first assessment of the land revenue by her and 
Groerne for 18CA-/5 (1212 Amali) the jama was settled at 
sicca Rs.1,180,870. The principle which they appear to 
have followed in assessing the revenue was to take the same 
amount as the Ilarathas had done on an average of past years
(V)
and after deducting certain abva.b:-s.
The jama rose to Rs.1,239*397 in 180576 in the triennial 
settlement made by G. Webb as collector of Outtack. Much of
(1) 8 March 1816, Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 8 March I8l6 Bo.22.
(2) 7 August 1813* Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 7 August 1813 Bo.28.
(3) 13 May 1818, Bwer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consulta­
tions 17 July 1818 Bo.15.
(k) Ibid.
this augmentation was due to the fact that kauris were
converted into rupees at the rate of four kahans to the
rupee, in pursuance of the provisions of Regulation XII, 180J,
in place of four kahans and two pans as in the preceding year
by the order of the commissioners.^
Regulation IX, 1805* prescribed the formation of a
settlement of four years. But Minto deviated from the
policy of liellesley. lie enacted a new regulation, Regulation
X, 1807• This provided that the jama assessed in the last
year of the settlement was to be fixed permanently, subject
to the approval of the Court of Directors. Consequently
on the expiration of the triennial settlement the question
of effecting a permanent settlement arose. The collector
of Cuttack submitted a report on the triennial settlement to
(2)
tne Board of Revenue. Charles Buller, a member of the
Board of Revenue, strongly supported the establishment of a 
permanent settlement in conformity with the declaration made 
by Regulation X, I807. But the rest of the members vehemently 
objected to this. Their reason was that the information
(1) Ibid.
(2) 26 July 1808, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal
Revenue Consultations 5 August 1808 No.1* 5 6 January 1809*
Fauquier to Buller, Bengal Revenue Consultations 27 January 
1809 No.36.
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submitted by the collector was very inadequate. They 
remarked that the limits of the district were scarcely known; 
moreover, the number of zamindars, the several descriptions of 
tenure, the general state of cultivation, the produce of the 
district, the quantity of waste land capable of cultivation, 
of lands liable to revenue and of unassessed lands were •cer­
tainly* not known. They suggested that a member of the 
Board of Revenue should be deputed to make local enquiries 
and collect information before a permanent settlement was 
effected in O r i s s a . T h e  Government observed the report 
of the collector with regret. It decided that further 
provision should be made for the superintendence of the
collector. Accordingly some modifications were made in the
(2)
rules contained in Regulation X, lc07. Buller was now
nominated by the Government to superintend a triennial
(3)settlement. Ileanwhile, as a temporary measure, the
(A)
collector was asked to hold a settlement for one year only.
(1) 26 July 1808, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 5 August 1808 No.*+.
(2) 2 September l808, Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 2 September 18C8 Ho.35*
(3) Governor General1s minute, Bengal Revenue Consultations 
2 September 1808 Bo.36.
(h) 9 September 1808, Government to Commissioner of. Cuttack, 
Bengal Revenue Consultations 9 September 1808 Bo.11.
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In conseauence of the settlement for 1808/9 I2l6 Amali)
(1)
the jama, including resumed ja-girs, amounted to Rs.1,2U2,980, 
Buller then completed a triennial settlement. Under it 
the jama for 1809/10 (1217 Mali) was Rs.1,36*+,700. The 
system of farming estates was hitherto confined to the mahals 
which were the property of the Government. But from Buller*s 
settlement it was made a more general nractice.(2)
The triennial settlement expired in 1811/12 (1219 Amali). 
After this period petitions from some zamindars asking 
permission to relinquish the management of their estates on 
the plea of over-assessment were submitted to the revenue 
authorities. ^ 3)
Bven this ettlement did not provide all the information 
needed. The Government therefore felt that further superin-
(If)
tendence was necessary. ■ ■ The Board proposed the name of 
J. Richardson, one of their members to superintend the
(1) 26 November 1818, U.Trower, Collector of Cuttack to
Stirling, Bengal Revenue Consultations 13 May 1819 No.22
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(*+) 31 December 1812, Government to Richardson, Bengal
Revenue Consultations 2 January 1813 No.Vl.
(1)
This was approved by the Government
1 2 )
pending settlement
It was therefore announced that a further settlement of two
intend the settlement, at the end of March 1813•
It may be remembered that the principles adopted for 
settlement in the Western Provinces were the same as those for 
Orissa* The Government made pledges with the zamindars of 
the Western Provinces that a permanent settlement would be 
concluded. Commissioners were appointed to give effect to 
the declaration. An enquiry was made. In 1808 the Commission 
ers strongly remarked that the Western Frovinces did not 
resemble Bengal; the information so far collected regarding 
revenue matters was highly disappointing and insufficient to
effect a permanent settlement.
(1) 15 Decembqr 1812, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 19 December 1812 No.25»
(2) 19 December 1812, Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 19 December 1912 ITo.26.
(3) 5 October 1813, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 16 October 1813 No.22; 27 February 1813*
Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 
27 February 1813 No.21.
(b) 26 November 1818, Trower to Stirling, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 13 May 1819 No.22.
(5) J.W.Kaye, Administration of the Bast India Company;
(3)
Richardson reached Cuttack to superyears should be made
(5)
PP.236-9
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When a proposal for a permanent settlement in Orissa was
brought before the Court of Directors, it disapproved of it
for the same reasons as had applied to the Western Provinces*
The Court*s policy was that a permanent settlement was not
expedient without proper “knowledge of the resources of the
country, of the rights of individuals and of the tenures of 
(1)
property’*. As the time of settlement. approached difficul­
ties were experienced in inducing the zamindars to agree to 
an increased jama. However, by holding out hopes of a 
permanent settlement, Richardson managed to complete his
settlement by October 181^. The jama of the district was
(2)
Rs. 1,1+69, 501.
The Court*s disapproval of a permanent settlement 
necessitated a modification of the previous plan. Accordingly 
in Way 1815 a regulation was passed directing the continuation 
of the existing settlement for one year after 1815/16 
(1223 Amali), affording the zamindars an option of relinquish­
ing the management of their estates if they were dissatisfied
(1) 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General in 
Council, mnxR'R:?".5xx Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820
Vol.V,p.315.
(2) 21 October 191*+, Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 21 October l8l*+ No.37; 26 November 1818,
Tjnwer to Stirling, Bengal Revenue Consultations 13 May 
1®19, No.22.
with the terms on which they held them. Under this option
53 estates bearing a jama of Rs.32,773 were thrown up, because
as stated by Trower, a subsequent collector of Cuttack, “doubts
began to arise ih the minds of the zamindars as to the permanent
settlement and the disappointment was proportioned to the hopes
that have been previously excited”. As a necessary consequence
of this more estates now passed under the khas management of
the .Government. All the khas mahal, together now formed
nearly one fourth of the Mughalbandi and bore a jama of about
Rs.300,000. In 1815/16 (1223 Amali) the jama of the whole
(1)
district was Rs.1,515,526 and rose still higher in 1816/17
■ (2)
(122k Amali) to the amount of Rs.1,520,^09*
In short, there was a constant increase in the assessment, 
and a considerably higher jama than that of the Marathas. The 
maratha gross jama was in fact inclusive of all allowances in 
money or land, expenses of collection and every authorised 
deduction. But the British jama excluded the ten per cent 
allowed to the zamindars and the expenses of collection. After 
deducting those expenses and abwabss we find that the Maratha 
jama of 1802/3 (1210 Amali) was Rs.1,080,770. Their collections
(1) 26 November, T8l8, Trower to Stirling, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 13 May 1819 No.22.
(2) 13 Hay 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consulta­
tions 17 July 1818 No.15.
for 1801/2 (1209 Amali) had been Rs.1,073,8^8. The average 
of two years was Rs.l,077,312, and the average of the twelve 
years ff*om 1790/1 (1198 Amali) to 1801/2 (1209 Amali) was 
Rs.1,015,0^9• But the jama of 1816/17 (122^ f Amali) exclusive 
of Hhurda was Rs.1,382,*+09* This shows an excess of 
Rs.301,639 over the Maratha jama of 1802/3 (1210 Amali), 
of Rs.366,501 over the average of the twelve years of the 
Maratha government and of Rs.201,539 over the British jama
1 (1)of 18CV5.
It may be argued that some deductions should be made 
from the above amount as several lands before held at quit 
rent had been brought by the British under regular assessment; 
at the same time it should be remembered that many portions 
of land held rentfree under the British had been included in 
the maratha rent roll. The sayar duties and a variety of 
small taxes called Bazi Rakam, amounting altogether to a lakh 
of sicca rupees, together with the collections at the Balasore 
custom house averaging Rs.30,000 per annum, have been rejected 
from this account in considering the Maratha assessment. The
(1) 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General
in Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol. V,
pp.3^ 2, 350.
Maratha sayar duties which comprehended collections at
markets, ferries and bazars on every species of merchandise,
operated as a general tax on consumers. They were not
collected by the British. But the consequences of the
salt monopoly should be set off against whatever remission
was allowed by the British Government on account of sayar
because the operation of the salt monopoly took in effect fifon
five to .six lakhs more than hitherto from the whole community
(1)
in the shape of a tax on the consumption of salt.
The main difficulty was that the basis of calculating
the jama was mistaken. moreover, such surveys and investiga-
(2)
tions as were carried out were exceedingly limited.
Again lands previously free of tax were now brought 
under assessment. During the rule of the Hindu kings Orissa 
was divided into a number of mahals, the holders of which were 
military chiefs known as Rajas, Hahgnayaks or xhandaits.
They claimed to be Ilshatriyas and enjoyed hereditary jagirs. 
Every estate or hereditary jagir possessed its principal garh 
or fortress of brick, stone or mud, the residence of the
(1) 13 May I8l8>Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consulta­
tions 17 July 1818 No.15.
(2) 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General in 
Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol.V, pp.3*+5-^8.
chief, besides smaller garhs sometimes dispersed over the
interior. Bv the terms of his tenure, every chief was
" • „ (1)liable to hold some office in the Court of the Raja of Orissa.
These military chiefs collected a tax known as chaupani
from among the people living in their mahals to cover the
expenses of maintaining law and order. They also held as
(2)
rentfree certain portions of lands called Biswali.
Every garh occupied by a military chief had a band of 
paiks or native militia. Ewer and Stirling thought that the 
paiks were devoted to their immediate head and were ever ready 
to follow his command. The paiks received some remuneration 
for their duties as soldiers. In some cases they held land 
free of assessment, in others they were assessed at a Tanki
(3)or light quit rent.
Under nuslim rule the old military chiefs were allowed
to enjoy their jagirs as under former rulers. The Marathas
generally did not interfere with them, though troops were
occasionally sent to chastise or collect revenue from
(*0troublesome chiefs.
(1) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 19 May 1820 No.25; 13 May 1818, Ewer to 
Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No.15*
(2) 29 Febryary 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 19 May 1820 No.25.
(3) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consulta­
tions, 17 July 1818 No.15; 29 February 1020, Stirling to
Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1820 No.25. 
(!+) Ibid.
The British revenue authorities generally did not follow 
the old Maratha policy of permitting the military chiefs, with 
their naiks under them, to enjoy their service lands.
Insofar as the Maratha precedent was followed, it was 
restricted only to a^ery few with fixed rent. The British 
held that as the services of the military chiefs were no 
longer required by the state, therefore their service lands 
should be liable to regular assessment. The ;chaupani tax 
previously collected by many Rajas and jkhandaits from the 
people of their estates was prohibited. The Biswali lands 
in the Mughalbandi were brought under assessment. The 
holders of small kilas like Golra, Rupasa, Jopye, Rorang and 
Bohla were required to pay a regular assessment and their 
paiks, whose military services were no. longer required, were, 
similarly made to pay a regular assessment. On the same 
principle, after the annexation of Khurda to the Mughalbandi, 
the paiks there whose number was formerly 10,000 were assessed 
at the same rate as the raiyats. The DalbO.heras and Dalais 
who were in charge of them were similarly treated. The 
British Government did not pay any compensation to those who 
had thus been deprived of their privileges.
(1) Ibid.
Ik,I.
Again, the amounts assessed on several estates were not 
adjusted on equal principles. For example, the assessment 
fell more heavily on IChurda than on other estates. After the 
imprisonment of the Raja on account of his rebellion, ilhurda 
was annexed to the Mughalbandi. It was placed under the 
management of Major Fletcher, an army officer from Madras.
His Hastobud papers whow that it was a populous and in many 
resuects a well cultivated country as late as 180*+. The 
regular assessments made from the raiyats prior to that date 
were, he thought, light - seldom, in his opinion, exceeding a 
sum equivalent to five annas per bigha.^^
In a Hastobud which Fletcher made for the whole estate 
by taking into consideration the land in cultivation, the 
nature and value of the produce and the size of the population, 
the assessment was fixed at Rs.106,000, or on an average about 
seven and a half annas per bigha> But as the following table 
will show, the assessment was as high as Rs.138,27*+ by 1815/16 
(1223 Amali).
(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consulta­
tions 17 July 1818 No.15.
l*+2.
Table showing the jama of Khurda 
from lS0b/5 (1212 Amali) to 
1815/16 (1223 Amali)
(1)
Y e a r Jama in rupees
180V? (1212 Mali) .... 106,000
1805/6 (1213 Amali) .... 107,8^1
1806/7 (121*+ Mali) .... 116,^7^
1807/8 (1215 Mali) --- ioV,*+7*+
1808/9 (1216 Mali) .... 10*+,*+71+
1809/10 (1217 Mali) ... 119,001
1810/11 (1218 Mali) ... 118,33*+
1811/12 (1219 Amali) ... 115,818
1812/13 (1220 Mali) ... 11*+,915
1813/1*+ (1221 Mali) ... 11*+,915
l8lVl5 (1222 Amali) ... 119,555
1815/16 (1223 Mali) ... 138,27*+
The increase in the jama of Khurda was a regular 
complaint of the Raja1 s. vJlien he was released from 
imprisonment in 1807, an option was given to him to engage
(1) 23 May 1817? Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 2b October 1817 No*38.
1^3.
for Khurda at a permanent settlement of Rs* 9^*37*+ - which,
according to the commissioner of Cuttack, was calculated to
leave him a profit far exceeding ten per cent on the sadar
jama. As the Raja declined such a proposal, Khurda was
(1>farmed to suitable bidders at a Jama of Rs*118,000. The
demand of the Government was limited to Rs.95?OGO. The
difference between the sadar jama and the amount payfeble
bv the farmers was assigned to the Raja; it was estimated
(2)
to afford him an annual provision of Rs.23,000.
The Raja said that he would engage if the sadar jama
of Khurda were reduced to Rs*30,000* If we examine the
Raja’s noint of view we shall see that the amount of tribute
he raid to the maratha Government was stated by Imp ey to
have been Rs.l^CCC nominally, whereas the net payment was
only Rs.10,000; the rest was deducted annually in lieu of
khilat and other presents. Moreover, it seems that this
light payment was often withheld till enforced by the
(3)
military power.
(1) 27 October 1808, Buller to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 28 October 1808 No.l^f; 2 February 1809, 
Buller to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations
28 October 1808 No .Ih-.
(2) Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P., 2$ April 1818 
Ko.39 (Resolution 2b October 1817)*
(3) 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General in 
Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol.V.,
According to Fletcher’s assessment the jama of Khurda
was fixed at Rs.106,000, at seven and a half annas per bigha..
Fletcher thought that prior to 1803, the whole assessment
on Khurda was about five annas per bigha, which would produce
Rs.70,666. Out of this amount the tribute paid to the
Karatha Government was its. 15,000. The remainder, which was
retained in the country for the expenses of the Raja’s own
establishment and those of the feudatory iagirdars, Oalbeheras,
(l;
Calais and paiks, was Es.55,666.
The system of short settlements and the manner in which
the jama was increased was a source of embarrassment to the
zamindars. It may be supposed that the mainfreason why they
insisted on a permanent settlement was that it would stop
that increase of the government’s demand which was called by
(2)
Trower a fallacious ’’system of anticipatier:”. But a
permanent settlement if executed then would probably not 
have solved the problem at all, not only because the assessment 
was calculated on a mistaken basis, but also because the 
revenue authorities had as yet no adequate knowledge of the 
land tenures in the district. As the Court of Directors
(1) Ibid.
(2) 26 November 1818, Trower to Stirling, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 13 Kay 1819 No.22.
1^5
rightly observed, ”if there be any-condition of a country 
to which a permanent settlement is more inapplicable than 
another, Cuttack was in that condition, if there ever 
a case that required its postponement, this i;as that case11*
The collection of revenue from the zamindars was strictly 
enforced. Prior to the British conquest, in the event of 
sudden .‘inundation, excessive rain, drought or other calamities, 
tahsildars were sent to make enquiries as to the extent of 
loss sustained by the raiyats, and agreeable to the accounts 
which they submitted some remission was usually allowed to 
the zamindars. Cuttack, a land of many rivers, was subject 
to occasional inundation. Trower later wrote that 1 this 
district suffered severely from inundation; the rain had been 
heavier than had been experienced for many years and the 
crops of 1217 (1809/10) were greatly injured. I am informed 
many petitions written and verbal were presented to the 
commissioner praying for suspension and remission but the 
commissioner declined making enquiries on the plea of his
(2)
having concluded a permanent settlement of the district.’*
(1) 19.July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General in 
Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol.V, p.321+«
(2) 26 ITovember 1818, Trower to Stirling, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 13 hay 1819 No.22.
This "invariable refusal" to grant any remission on
account of natural calamities was noticed by the Court of
Directors "as one of the most unfavourable points of
comparison between our revenue system and that of our
predecessors". Of course there was provision for remissions
in the British revenue system. In the words of the Court
of Directors, "the discretion entrusted to the collectors by
our Regulations of suspending demands and reporting cases of
failure or injury of crops for the consideration of the Board
of Revenue might have been expected to have been exercised
(1)
by the collector".
Another instance of the strict enforcement of the full
Government demand occurred during the building of the new
Jagannath Road. Rwer stated that, much.of .the. lands, on which-
the road was being constructed had been in actual cultivation
before. They were acquired without regard to the hardship
which this caused. No compensation or remission was granted
(2)
to the proprietors. Alien this matter was brought before 
the vice president in Council, he regretted that the civil 
authorities should have thwarted the rights of individuals
(1) 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General in 
Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol.V,ppAo^f-5.
(2) 26 March 1818, Swer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consul­
tations 2*+ April 1818 No.1*;?*
l*+7
and have acted contrary to the government’s instructions.
On this the Court of Directors commented that the "claims
of remission’’ which should have been attended to ’’were
(2)
entirely disregarded”.
The over-assessment led generally to heavy arrears
(3)
of unpaid revenue at the end of each year. ..The. 
following table will show the arrears standing against 
the ^ublic revenue from 1805/6 (1213 Amali)to 1815/16 
(1223 Amali).
(1) 2h April 1818, Government to Stirling, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 2h April 1818 No.^7*
(2) 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General 
in Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820, Vol.Vy 
pp.*+09-11•
(3) Resolution, Bengal Revenue Consultations lh November 
1812 No.23; 16 December l8l*+, Richardson to Government, 
Bengal Revenue Consultations 23 December l8l*+ No.17;
6 September 1815? Government to Board of Revenue,
Bengal Revenue Consultations 6 September 1815 No.3^.
l>+8.
Table showing arrears of revenue in Orissa 
from 1805/6 (1213 Amali) to 1815/16 (1223 Amali)
Kear
Recorded 
jama 
in S.Runees
Total 
collection 
in the vear
Arrears 
at the close 
of the vear
1805/6 
(1213 Amali) 1,239,397 1,165,71^ 73,683
1806/7 
(121!+ Amali) 1,239,397 1,117 A 63 121,93^
1807/8 
(1215 Amali) 1,2^0,137 1,157,168 82,969
1808/9 
(1216 Amali) 1,2^2,980 1,177,2^3 65,737
1809/10 
(1217 Amali) 1,36^,700 ' 1,165,807 198,893
1810/11 
(1218 Amali 1 Ace, 535 1,218,673 189,862
1811/12 
(1219 Amali) lA53,827 1,168,391 285 A 36
1812/13 
(1220 Amali) 1 ,A51+, 900 1,027,09’+ ^27,806
1813/IV
(1221 A; ali) 1,*+69,501 1,0^2,O63 >+27A38
181s!/15 
(1222 Amali) l A S ^ o g s 1,109,526 37^,572
I815/16
(1223 Amali) 1,515,526 988,106 527 A 20
(1)
(1) 26 November 1818, Trower to Stirling, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 13 Hay 1819 No.22. From 1809/10 these 
figures include Khurda.
1^9
When the zamindars could not pay their revenue from 
the resources of their estates and fell into arrears, they 
might borrow from the mahajans. The mahajans found that 
when estates changed hands the money they lent could not 
always be recovered. To cover this risk they applied 
to the court to be allowed a higher rate of interest 
than was normally recognised. They obtained permission 
to charge from 25 to 36 per cent with compound monthly 
interest where the land was made over in mortgage as 
security for the payment of the debt.^^ In 1819 Trower 
remarked that zamindars ’’borrowed the funds from the 
Mahajans and the debts then incurred have been yearly 
increasing, by interest and fresh loans till between 
the dues of government and the demands of Bankers, a state 
of Bankruptcy has ensued. . To satisfy the demands of the 
latter, a portion of each year’s Revenue has been 
appropriated to them, and a consequent increase of arrears 
to the former have /has/ been going on.”^
(1) 5 October 1813, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 16 October 1813* No.22; 3 May 1817, E.
Watson, fourth judge of the court of circuit (deputed by 
Government for enquiries into the causes of the rebellion 
of 1817) to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consul­
tations L.P. 23 May 1817 No. 2.
(2) 26 November 1818, Trower to Stirling, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 13 May 1819 No.22.
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Various revenue authorities held different views 
regarding the cause of the unpaid balances in Orissa.
Webb early in 1806 attributed it to the temper of 
the people who were not habituated to the revenue system 
of the British Government and still pursued the methods 
of procrastination which they had learnt under the 
Warathas. In 1807/8 when a number of estates were sold 
for arrears Webb was still convinced that it was caused 
not by any deficiency of resources but by the disposition 
of the people to avoid payment. In 1809 Fauquier wrote 
that the produce of the district was equal to the last 
three years1 assessment but that the majority of the 
landed interest were in great distress on account of 
the pressure of heavy loans which they had been compelled 
to take up at an enormous rate of interest by oppression 
and calamity of season.^ In 1810 the Board of Revenue 
explained uThe balances are no doubt ... ascribable to 
what we call a want of good faith on the part of the 
landholders. - That is, they expended the .rents as fast 
as they could collect them, and left them entirely 
destitute of the means of fulfilling their engagements
(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 17 July 1818, No.15*
with g o v e r n m e n t . I n  1815 Warde as an explanation for 
numerous heavy arrears stated that it was not want of 
means which compelled the zamindars to he thus backward 
but sheer indifference on their part.^^ In l8l*f Richardson 
wrote ,fheavy arrears annually occur in this district by 
the landholders be?’n g  in the habit of withholding the 
payment of their Kists till they are threatened with the 
sale of their Estates, on which they generally liquidate 
the demands against them. 11 ^ 3) Trower was of opinion 
that not only was Orissa fairly and moderately assessed 
but that it could bear a large increase.^)
These revenue authorities thus thought that over­
assessment could not have been a cause for the heavy out­
standing arrears that occurred every year. Such remarks 
must all the more have confirmed the belief'of the Government 
that the only rightful policy for realising the revenue
(1) 18 September 1810, Board of Revenue to Government,
Bengal Revenue Consultations 16 October 1810, No.15.
(2) 13 hay 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 17 July 1818, No. 15.
(3) 30 March l8l*f, Richardson to Government, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 9 April 1817, No. 1*+.
(*+) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue
Consultations, 17 July 1818, No. 15*
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from zamindars who fell into arrears was to put their 
lands to sa l e . ^  Though this , mode of procedure was 
in some respects new, yet it was not an unusual thing 
in Orissa because under the Maratha 'Government the. estates 
of defaulting zamindars were either sequestered or 
transferred temporarily to others without any adequate 
provision for the excluded proprietors or any return to 
them of the surplus proceeds after the liquidation of the 
public demand. The peculiarity of the new mode of sale 
was that estates below the jama of Rs.5*000 were sold 
at Cuttack collectorate while estates above that jama 
were sold at the office of secretary to the Board of Revenue 
in Calcutta. The idea underlying this arrangement was 
that the Oriyas were in want of capital and were unwilling 
for speculation while Bengalis had abundant capital, were'
(2)
heavy speculators and so were likely to bid the highest prices.
(1) 23 February 1810, Buller to Government, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 2 March 1810, No. 18; 7 June 1811, Board
of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 
25 June lPll, ITo. 22; 1 Kay 1813* Richardson to Govern­
ment, Bengal Revenue Consultations lb May 1813, No.35*
28 April 1807, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 7 Nay 1807 No. 13*
(2) 23 May 1817* Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 2b October 1817 No. 3 8; 3 May 1817*
Matson to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations 
L.P. 23 May 1817 No.2.
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When estates were put up for sale, the uroprietors
must have faced two difficulties in retaining them if
they had had means to do . so. First, in many cases the
amlas in their influential positions either in the court
or in revenue offices manipulated matters so as to deprive
the zamindars of their estates in their own interests. For
example, by section XXVI Regulation 1793 the publication
of the notice of the sale of an estate was to be displayed
in the zila court for a term not less then one month before
the sale. When an enquiry was made it was found that this
procedure was not generally adhered to.d) Secondly the
zamindars of Orissa, because of the long distance, neither
found it convenient to be present at the presidency at the
time of the auction sale, nor could they have their agents
there. Naturally, many estates fell into the hands of
Bengali speculators without their proprietors1 knowledge.
Some of thes.e perhaps might have been retained by the
(o)
original proprietors.v '
In 1806, 1807 and 1808 estates paying a jama of 
Rs. 152,019 were sold for Rs. 72,M+8 - less than one half 
of the amount of the annual jama. Trower remarked !la vast
(1) 3 May 1817, Watson to Government, Bengal Criminal
Judicial Consultations L.P., 23 May 1817 No.2.
(2) Ibid; 23 May 1817, Trower to Board of Revenue,
Bengal Revenue Consultations 2k October 1017 No.38.
proportion of landed proprietors were deprived of their 
estates without receiving a fair equivalent; many of 
those with large families were reduced to a state of 
beggary, gaining a miserable pittance for a cultivation
of a few bighas of land in the sane estates of which they
had been recently proprietors. 11 d )  In 1809, 1810, 1811 and
■
1812 estates paying a jama of Rs. 205,580 were sold for 
Rs. 2^8,009, or at an advance of twenty per cent on the 
sadar jama; in 1813, I81V, 1815 &nd 1816 estates paying j
a jama of Rs. 7^, 121* were sold for Rs. 103,957 or for forty 
per cent more than the sadar jama.^^
The sale of estates at higher rates was chiefly due 
to the increased number of Bengalis in the district, who 
competed to buy them. This gave a fictitious appearance
to the resources of the country and misled the Government.......
because a great portion of the revenue of every year was 
paid not from annual produce but from imported capital.
This removed the limits which the resources of the country 
would have set to the increase of the assessment.^)
(1) 26 November 1818, Trower to Government, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 13 Nay 1819, No.22.
(2) 13 Hay 1818. Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultatio
17 July I8l8 No.15.
(3) 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General
in Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol. V, 
pp. *+57-8.
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The private transfer of property was also common 
between 1803 and 1817* Transfer of property by private 
contract amounted to Rs* 1,070,397* In one day a certain 
police darogha sold mahals with a jama of Rs. 50,000 which 
he had himself purchased for Rs. 21,000, and this was only 
a small portion of the landed property of the district 
that passed from his hands.
Many adventurers made a practice of speculation in 
estates. Mussumuddin, the diwan of the collector of Cuttack, 
marchased in one year estates paying a jama of Rs. 53,000 
for a sum of Rs. 23,000 and later on disposed of them to other 
speculators.^
Within a period of ten years (from 1806 to 1816) the 
number of estates sold by public auction amounted to 1,011 - 
an average of 101 yearly. Of these 350 were purchased by 
foreigners, the jama of whose purchases amounted to Rs. V*n-2,80l. 
The principal estates passed into the hands of foreigners 
while 235 estates were purchased' by persons holding official 
situations either in their own names or indirectly through 
their relations.^3)
(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultatienis
17 July 1818 No.15.
(2) 23 May 1817, Trower to Beard of Revenue, Bengal Revenue
Consufetions 2b October 1817 IIo.38.
(3) Ibid.
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Out of 2,3^0 Oriya proprietors whose names were 
registered in the first settlement for the payment of the 
revenue of Cuttack ontyl,1^  remained at the end of I8l6.
In the llughalbandi which had an annual revenue of Rs. 1,393?000 
the original proprietors were only left with lands worth 
rs. 30,000.( n
Thus the zamindars who were pressed hard by over­
assessment probably transferred some of their burden to the 
raiyats living in their estates. The raiyats were pressed 
to pay more than they used to do. They therefore avoided 
payment, and numerous applications were made to the court 
for the confinement of defaulters for arrears. Even 
imprisonment helped neither the zamindars nor the collectors 
to realise the arrears. It happened that on many occasions n
1
the collector was compelled to move:j the Government that the 
defaulters in confinement should be released because there was 
no hope of recovering arrears. Fauqhier wrote tfthe
continuance of their confinement will only be productive 
of an exnense to the government without affording a prospect 
of receiving the balances and therefore ... the defaulters
(1) 13 May I8l8 , Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations
17 Euly 1818 IIo. 15.
(2) 12 April 18C8, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal
Revenue Consultations 6 May 1808 No.16.
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may with propriety be released from confinement.11^
Similar appeals were made by other collectors from time
(?)to time and were granted by the Government.v ' The 
confinement and subsequent release of defaulters led Waton 
to remark "what end was proposed to be answered tty this 
measure? It could not be Revenue - a Gaol is not the 
place to look to for that - no, it was to prevent the 
escape of the people who were flying in crowds out of the 
Count ry."^^
The fate of the raiyats in the Khasmahals was more 
distressing than in zamindari estates because the pressure 
of over-assessment was heavier in the khasmahals. Khurda
(1) 2b l-'arch 1809 5 Fauquier to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 7 April 1809 No. 32 (vide also No. 3&).
(2) 21 September 1811, Waring to Board of Revenue, Bengal
Revenue Consultations 15 October 1811 No. 22; Resolution, 
Bengal Revenue Consultations 16 April 1811 No. 19; 1*+
January 1812, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 21 January 1812 No. 22; 9 January
1813? Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 9 January 1813 No. 3^; 29 Narch 1811,
3ulleg;,j$^$pvernment, Bengal Revenue Consultations 16 April 
1811?/ "Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 16 April 1811 NoJL9*
(3) 3 Hay 1817? Watson to Government, Bengal Criminal 
Judicial Consultations L.P. 17 July 1818 No. '15*
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in particular was much affected* Because many raiyats 
could not pay the enhanced revenue, they left the country 
for the neighbouring Garjat where the people lived in the 
conditions prevailing before the British conquest. Ewer wrote 
"at least 5?000 to 6,000 houses of ryots were deserted. 11 
MThe miserable remnant" lived in desperate conditions "after 
disposing of their little all, their clothes, furniture, 
bullocks, cooking utensils and sometimes their wives and 
children.
Stirling, secretary to the commissioner of Cuttack, 
who examined voluminous records of both Hughal and Maratha 
rule and submitted a minute on the subject, stated that the 
resident raiyats were less thought of now than formerly 
by the ruling power. In his opinion, during the Hughal 
and iiaratha rule, one of the special duties of. the zamindar . . . 
was to keep the raiyat "happy, contented and prosperous. 11 
If he failed to execute this trust renosed in him h., 
he could be severely punished by the ruling authority.
But there was no such provision in Cornwallis!s system.
Its underlying principle assumed that, "it was the clearest 
interest of the landholder in the long run to treat his 
tenants well." The Diwani Adalat was of dourse open to
(1) 13 Hay 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 17 July 1818 Ko.15*
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those who could seek redress for their grievances* But 
the expense, delay and vexation of a regular suit was a 
deterent factor against a poor raiyat!s securing justice.
The new notion of proprietary right led the zamindars 
generally to appropriate the whole produce of the jungle, 
furnishing the firewood and grass and so on. . Thus the
(2)
raiyats lost their customary share in these gifts of nature.
Whoever bought an estate at an auction enjoyed uncontro­
lled liberty to manage it according to his own interest.
This led to the practice of farming out villages for one 
or two years to the undertennants who bid highest. No 
preference was given to the llukaddam or sarbarahkar connected
with the village community. Thus the raiyats were exposed
(?)
to the evils of a farming system.
In zamindari estates.the new zamindars from Bengal 
appointed their own gumashtas for the collection of the 
revenue. In the khasmahal, the tahasildars often appointed 
their own accountants. Consequently the old system of 
maintaining accounts fell into disuse. The internal economy 
of village subordination was much a l t e r e d . S t i r l i n g
(1) 15 October 1821, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 1 August 1822 No.5*
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(^ f) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Con­
sultations 17 July I8l8 , No.15*
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wrote MIt is my decided opinion that the operation of 
British laws has been, generally speaking, in Cuttack fatal 
to the rights and privileges of a numerous class of middle 
tenantry or heads of villages standing between the talookdar 
or chief of a number of villages and ^ots. Nor is the 
possession of muquddums the only point in which the 
constitution of village communities has been changed or broken, 
up by the new landed proprietors. They have dispensed with 
the services of the hereditary village accountant to a great 
extent, substituting in his stead a gomastah of their own or 
one of their brethren in whom the ryots can of course have 
little c o n f i d e n c e . T h e  same officer further observed 
that "from the circumstances of their being liable to annual 
settlements and from the ignorance and helplessness of the 
undertenants11 the . khasmahals were exposed to .suffer . from 
"the prevalent disposition to excessive demand. 11 v '
In short the British revenue policy proved satisfactory 
neither to the zamindars nor to the raiyats nor to the 
nersons in between them. The raiyats complained of the 
zamindars and the zamindars of the revenue authorities.
(1) 15 October 1821, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 1 August 1822 No.5*
(2) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 19 May 1820 No.2J?*
l6l
The old military chiefs deplored the loss of their old 
privileges and some of the very f e w  who held their estates 
at a fixed rent could not retain them either because of 
the pressure of assessment or because of the intrigues 
of the amlas. In 1817 when Jagabandhu, who had been 
fraudulently dispossessed from his own zamindari, excited 
a rebellion, the people thus discontented joined hands 
with him against the British authority* .
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SECTION II 
CURRENCY PROBLEM
During the Maratha povernmBXit and in earlier times
also kauris were the chief medium of exchange in Orissa.
(2)
They were mainly imported from the Maldive islands.
The assessment of the country was always calculated and 
chiefly collected in kauris. Those who preferred paying 
in specie were permitted to do so. The system followed 
in this respect is given below.
Agents of the great mahajanas at Cuttack and Balasore 
were to be found throughout the interior. They received 
the amount of the jama from the raiyats, the Mukaddams 
or the zamindars i;h kauris. They deposited it at the 
sadar stations to account of the mahajans. From these 
places it was received by the AmiIs in payment of revenue
(1) Kauris were used in monetary transactions from an early 
time in Orissa. TJiey were the chief currency in the 
country. On one occasion Narasingh Deva, the Raja
of Orissa (l622-l61+6 A.D.), granted 91?538 kahans of 
kauris for whitewashing the temple of Jagannath 
(Iladalapan.il, p.67). From the dairies of Streynsham 
master it appears that merchants used kauris for their 
business. (The diaries of Strevnsham master. Vol.II.
pp.*+5? *+8 .).
(2) C.R.Wilson, Early annals of the English in Bengal Vol.II, 
Part I, No. 101*+, Vol.Ill, Nos.1523) 1668; Indian Historical 
Records Commission Vol.XIX, Dec.19^2, pp.86-89.
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and transmitted by them to the subahdar or faujdar at 
Balasore. A discount or an allowance was deducted by 
mufassal. merchants to set against the cost and trouble 
of transporting the kauris. They were collected at stated 
periods in immense heaps. Then they were put into circula­
tion for the payment of the large army and the establish- 
ment of the Maratha Government/1^
A study of the value of kauris in relation to silver 
during the first fourteen years of the British rule in 
Orissa shows that kauris almost maintained the government 
rate of exchange of four kahans and two pans to the rupee 
in the market until 1807/8 (the end of 1215 Amali) and then
fell as low as seven kahans ner rupee in the bazar of
* (2)
Cuttack in 1811/12 (1219 Amali).
VJhy did the kauri currency maintain its value in ' 
relation to the silver up to 1807/8 (the end of 1215 
Amali.)? At the time of the British conquest of Orissa 
kauris were scarce in relation to the demand for them.
This is evident from two letters of Earcourt. In one, 
he informed Morgan in 180^, MIt would be advisable that
(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consul­
tations 17 July 1818 No.15.
(2) 28 July 1817, Sherer, Accountant General; to Government, 
Bengal Revenue Consultations 2b October 1817 No.^2.
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the scarcity of cowries in the Town and District of Cuttack
should be made known to the Pilgrims wrhilst passing Kidnapur
that they might there provide themselves with cowries and
small coin.fl^ ^  In another he wrote to M. Shawe, private
secretary to the Governor General, "'He are very much distressed
for want of small coin or cowries. I know not how the troops
can be raid by their respective officers or how they can
procure the small articles of daily consumption from the
bazar. You cannot conceive what inconvenience arises in
(2)
consequence of this d e f cior.cy. n The deficiency in
the usual stock of kauris operated in raising their value
in relation to silver. Moreover, between l8G*+/5 and 1806/7
there was an influx of silver jnto Cuttack because the amount
collected at J'agannath particularly in 1806/7 was at the
high rate of Rs.117,000, while it usually varied between
(3 )
As.38,^00 and 70,^10 in other years. Again a -large
quantity of rice was exported from Orissa until 1808/9,
which attracted some specie Into the country in return.
(*+)This diminished the value of silver to a great extent.
(1) 13 May 1818, Twer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consulta­
tions, 17 July 1818 No.lj.
(2) 9 August 180^, liarcourt to Shaw9,Add.!ISS.No.l36lC,p.33.
(3) 8 January l8lM, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 5 February l8 lb  No.295 16 August 1813, Trower 
to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 Feb.181*+,No.30.
(*+) 13 May 1818, Bwer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 
17 July, 1818 No.15.
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In spite of their deficiency kauris appear to have 
been in sufficient quantity to answer the purpose of a 
circulating medium in the interior. It is also to be 
remembered that no fresh extraordinary importation of 
kauris from the Maldives made up the deficiency* In 
l808 Fauquier, collector of Cuttack, remarked that flno 
large quantity was either to be bought or sold in the 
Bazar and it appears at present the fact that no more are 
generally in circulation than required as change for silver 
and for all the petty dealings and transactions in the 
interior where alone they can be said to be current.1
By Regulation XII, 1805, zamindars were given the option 
of paying their revenue in kauris at the rate of four kahans 
aer rupee. But the zamindars generally were not much 
interested in the payment of revenue in kauris, for the 
bazar rate for kauris remained nearly the same until 1807/8 
(the end of 1215 Amali). The raiyats did not lose much 
in buying silver for kauris. The zamindar found it neither 
profitable nor convenient to carry kauris from the interior 
to Cuttack for the payment of revenue when he would not be 
granted any remission from the Government, unlike the
(1) 1 December 1812, Trower to U. Ggerton, Accountant
General, Bengal Revenue Consultations 23 January 18135 
No.36.
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Maratha nractice.^
The wide variation in the rate of exchange between
silver and kauris was felt from 18C8. It appears that
this altered relation came about for two reasons. First,
the British after giving due notice stopped receiving kauris
in payment of Government revenue from 1808 for reasons of
convenience. Consequently there arose a diminished demand
for the quantity in circulation, resulting in a depreciation
(2)
in their value. Secondly, there was a scarcity of silver
compared with the demand for payment of rents to the land­
holders. This may be attributed to two reasons. One 
was a gradual diminution in the importation of specie. The
other was the increasing exportation of specie compared 
with the previous period.
Formerly a profitable trade was carried on with the 
territories subject to Madras. Merchants exported grain.
In return they received different sorts of coins commonly 
known as Arcot rupees. The British recognised only six of 
them to be valid. Their value was fixed at the rate of
(1) Ibid.
(2) 23 May 1817, Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 2k October 1817 No.38.
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(1)
107i- Arcot rupees per 100 Calcutta sicca rupees, When
the Government decided that the revenue would be collected
only in sicca rupees, the merchants exporting grain to
Madras suffered both inconvenience and loss. As a result,
a considerable decrease took place in the export of grain
to Madras from small ports like Golra, Harishpur, Bish£$pur
and Ilaniknatna. This grand channel through which specie
(2)
flowed into Orissa gradually narrowed.
Formerly a lucrative commerce was carried on in salt
from Orissa to Bengal and more particularly to the Raja of
Berar!s dominion. But with the British conquest and the
introduction of a salt monopoly this commerce was closed
to Nagpur except for some smuggling carried on with the
(3)countries to the west of the Chilka lake.
Another principal channel through which specie entered 
Orissa was the annual influx of pilgrims from various parts
(1) 5 February 1811, Egerton to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 6 March 18.11 No.335 6 March 1811, Government
to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 6 March 
1811 No.33.
(2) 21 September 1810, R.Milford, Collector to Buller, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 16 October 1810 No.19.
(3) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 17 July 1818 No.15.
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of India. But it was later found that the annual amount 
of collections during the period was not as much as had been
4* a (1)expected.
On the other hand, we see that no great influx of
kauris took place under the British Government as would have
materially increased the whole quantity in circulation. The
quantity annually imported to Balasore, the chief resort of
Maldive vessels, never exceeded the value of four or five
thousand rupees. That amount was too small to produce any
effect in the general market and hardly sufficient to maintain
(2)
supplies in this or neighbouring countries.
The British levied a higher assessment than the 
: arathas had done, excepting the abolition of a few trifling 
duties, and at the same time they established a heavy tax 
on salt which gradually extended to the whole of the district. 
Offices and emoluments were taken from the people of the 
district; the expenditure on account of the local government 
was much below that of the Karatha establishments. Therefore 
silver began to be annually sent out of the country. During 
the karatha period the annual amount which was sent to ITagpur, 
usually did not exceed four lakhs. That was almost-.invariably
(1) 8 January l8l*+, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 5 February 181*+ No.29; 16 August 1813*Trower 
to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 Feb. 181^,110.30.
(2) 13 May l8l8, Twer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 
July I8l8 No.15.
169
remitted by bill of exchange. But the average amount
annually remitted by the British Gollector alone to Calcutta
was equivalent to upwards of Rs.(sicca) 75*000 from the year
of acquisition; moreover, in 181^/15 (1222 Amali) and I8l?/l6
(1223 Amali) the amount rose to about Rs.1,000,000.
Cne may question how so many lakhs could be collected
from Cuttack in silver. It produced occasional complaints
from the people. Cn one occasion 3. S. Waring, when he was
collector of Cuttack, forwarded some complaints from zamindars,
he wrote, "They complain of the heavy loss they sustain at the
high rate at which they receive rupees from the ryots and the
(2)
low rate they pay them into the Companyfs treasury". In
reply W. Bgerton, the accountant generals remarked that if it 
were a real depreciation they would require seven kahans of 
kauris for each runee when disposing of their produce instead 
of four. This "would enable them to exchange their cowries
(3)for rupees and pay their rents without sustaining any loss".
Cn another occasion the fall in the value of kauris drew the 
attention of Fauquier. But he attributed this to the tactics
(1) Ibid.; 5 February 1811, 3gerton to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 6 larch 1811 ho.33.
(2) 2V December 1811, Waring to Board of Revenue, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 21 January 1812 Bo.21.
(3) 28 July 1817, Sherer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consulta­
tions 2b October 1817 No.^2.
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adopted by the mahajans. In the words of Ewer, r,the
question of the cowrie currency escaped altogether the
notice of the commissioners, Messrs, Buller and Richardson,
or was not thought by those gentlemen worthy of any consider-
(1)
ation’1 . It appears that this matter did not receive
adequate attention from the Government. Perhans looking
to the prevalence of the sicca over the Arcot runees, it was
natural for the Government to take the view that the silver
(2)
currency was sufficient in Cuttack.
The six kinds of Arcot rupees receivable by the Government
(3) n ,
were known as rupees of sorts. From 1806 to 1810 the
quantity of Rs.1,600,000 of sorts paid into the treasury 
was remitted to Calcutta. The proportion of Arcots in 
circulation does not appear to have been replaced by siccas.
The amount of Arcot rupees sent out of this district from 
the collectors office washbout Rs.270,000. Further, it
(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consulta­
tions 17 July 1818 No.15*
(2) Ibid} 21 September 1810, Milford to Buller, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 16 October 1810.
(3) 30 June 1806, Webb to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 31 July 1806 No.30; 13 November 1811,
Egerton to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 
November 1811 No.17.
(h) £1 September 1810, Milford to Buller, Bengal Revenue Consul­
tations 16 October 1810 No# 19; ^ ^Sgut^^Sll^ Board of Revenue 
to Government, Bengal Rev. Cons\/.;''^ '%1May 1818 Ewer to Govt. 
Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No.15*
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may be added that from the time Regulation XII, 180J 
declared sicca the currency in which all bonds were to 
be specified and thereby the Government attached preference
(1)
to it all became anxious to procure siccas in place of Arcots.
In consequence of the fall in the value of kauris there
was a rise in the kauri price of commodities, particularly
throughout the mufassal. Eauri prices in Cuttack bazar
rose JO per cent between 1807/8 and 1816/17. In the
(2)
interior they went still higher.
But the quantity of kauris was not sufficient to enable 
the raiyats to purchase rupees even at the rate of five 
kahans and twelve pans, which was the lowest market rate 
in the period between 1808/9 and 1816/17. Price lists 
of rice in various years during Maratha rule show that with 
only one or two exceptions the cost of rice retained some 
relation to the value of rupees in kauris, and was always 
cheapest in those years when the rupee could be exchanged 
for the greatest number of kauris. Comparative statements
(1) 21 September 1810, Eilford to Buller, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 16 October 1810 No. 19; *+ September 1811,
Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue Consulta­
tions; 13 Kay I8l8,Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 17 July 1818 Ko.lJ.
(2) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consulta­
tions 17 July 1818 No.lJ.
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of the cost of grain in the pargana of Lembai from 1797/8 
(120? Amali) to 1807/8 (1215 Amali) and from 1808/9 (1216 
Amali) to 1817/18 (122k Amali) show that the kauri price of 
rice in the latter period was twenty per cent above that of 
the former.
The Government rate of exchange was fixed at four kalians
and two pans to the rupee. But the market rate of exchange
varied usually from six to seven kahans and sometimes as much
as eight kahans. The Government rate,,in other words, did
not fluctuate with the market rate. This state of affairs
made the mahajans demand from the zamindars a high rate in
exchanging silver for kauris. The accountant general stated
that if the zamindars needed money to pay the Government revenue
this was readily granted, provided the mahajans were allowed to
make their own terms, which were exorbitant; for example, in
advancing ten rupees to a zamindar, the mahajans would enter
kauris; but they would not receive back the runee at the
(2)
Government rate of exchange of four kahans and two pans.
Originally the zamindar*s rent was fixed in kauris at 
the rate/>f four kahans uer rupee. He now pursued the same
(1) Ibid.
(2) 23 hay 1817, Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 2b October 1817, Ho.38; 28 July 1817*
Sherer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations,
2k October 1817 Ho*k2.
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course as that of the mahajan; because if he accepted the
revenue in kauris at the former rate he incurred loss; so he
required a further increase in kauris nar runee proportioned
(1)
to the Government demand from him.
Thus the ultimate burden fell upon the raiyat. To
this difficult situation was added the unfeeling attitude 
in general and the Bengali zamindars 
of the zamindars/in particular, which was described by Bwer
in the following manner
"Were the samindar in general disposed to be
lenient, merciful and considerate wowards his Ryots, I have
no doubt but that the produce of many estates i.s such, as
/sic/ that by dividing his Kofussil assessment in cowTries by
say, or /sic/ instead of four kahanans, he might still receive
from his Ryots sufficient to pay the public demand and the
authorised profits besides". lie further added, "Had the
original uroprietors, natives of the different estates born
and bred up among the Ryots, forming a part of one large family
as it were, retained possession of their lands, this might
frequently have been arranged in a manner conducive to the
interest of both parties but under the unfeeling and rapacious
management of strangers, speculators and adventurers, who have
(1) 23 Hay 18175 Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 2h Cctober 1817 No.38*
17^
now acquired the possession of so large a portion of the 
lands in this district, no spontaneous remedy of this great 
evil to the hulk of the peoule is to he expected hy a 
temporary sacrifice on their parts /sic/ of the profit which 
they are entitled to wring from the Ryots arising from any 
consideration of the ease, the happiness and prosperity of 
the under tenants.
In short, kauris were the principal currency in Orissa 
during the haratha rule. They were the medium of calculation 
and of exchange. The British desired to rerlace them by 
sicca rupees. They therefore collected the revenue in 
silver rather than in kauris. This resulted in a diminishing 
demand for kauris. The British enhanced the iama of the 
district. At the same time they sent a great amount of 
silver to the Calcutta treasury. Consequently silver was 
scarce; the value of kauris depreciated. Prices of things 
rose high in kauris. The Government rate of exchange was 
four kahans and two pans to the rupee. But the. market rate 
of exchange was about seven kahans to the rupee. Thus the 
raiyats suffered a loss from the exchange of kauris for
(1) 13 hay I8l8, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 17 July 1818 No.15*
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silver. This state of affairs brought hardship to the 
people more particularly to the raiya.ts in the nufassal. 
Probably this discontent was one of the reasons why the
people joined in the rebellion of lF>17*
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SECTION III 
SALT MONOPOLY
During the Maratha rule in Orissa salt was manufac­
tured in plenty in the Aurangs on the shores from the 
Chilka lake on the south to the Matatha enclosures east 
of the river Suvarnarekha on the north. It was the 
usual practice in the .country for the Beparis or merchants 
to advance money to the Malangis for the manufacture of 
salt in the Aurangs. When the salt was ready the 
Beparis purchased it; after paying duty to the Government,' 
they either sold it in the province or exported it to 
Bengal, Berar, Sambalpur and other places.
The profits of.the Beparis and the extensiveness of ■ 
the salt trade may be understood from the following 
instance. Sambhu Bharati was a mahajan of Cuttack who 
had kothis (salt golas) in different parts of the IChurda 
Raja's territory. He stood security for the payment 
of the Raja's peshcash to the Maratha Government throughout
(1) Caldndar of Persian Correspondence Vol. IX, No. 605.
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the Maratha period on condition of heing permitted to 
carry on his commerce duty free*
■ ■ IThe amount of salt exported to Berar was three lakh .y
(?)  ‘maunds per annum. The whole amount of salt exported
to Bengal is not known. The Company was in the habit of 
importing salt from Orissa at the average rate of 
68,269 maunds per annum during a period of ten years prior 
to its conquest; that was at the cost of sicca Rs. 55-1-8 
per hundred maunds.^3) From a statement made by Raja 
Ram Pandit, the Maratha governor of Orissa, it appears 
that the income of the Maratha Government from the salt 
sold in Bengal amounted to two lakhs of rupees per annum. 
After the introduction of the British monopoly of the 
manufacture of salt in Bengal every attempt was made to 
prevent the, smuggling■of Maratha salt into Bengal. When ■ 
this failed, in 1790 Forster was sent to the court of 
Nagpur in order to secure the exclusive right of purchasing
(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 17 July 1818 Ho. 15*
(2) Encl., *+ May 180*+, Government to Melville and Earcourt, 
Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 5 September I805 
Ho. 26; (no date) August 1805, Melville and Earcourt 
to Government, Add. MSS. I36II, p . ■
(3) 9 December 1817V Board of Trade to Government, Bengal 
Salt and Opium Consultations 26. December 1817 Ho.3*
(b) C.P.C. Vol. VI, Ho. 12*+2.
1 7 8
salt in Orissa, but the Raja of Nagpur declined the
(1)
proposal on the plea that it would, ruin the Beparis there.
The amount of salt exported from the Aurangs in the 
Chilka lake is not known. During the Maratha period the 
duty of the Maratha Government upon salt exported from 
these Aurangs alone into the western region amounted to 
?,s. ^,?00.(2)
During the Maratha rule, salt was sold at four and a 
half maunds per Arcot rupee .at the place of manufacture.
The Beparis who purchased salt at the place of manufacture 
at the rate of from three and a half to four annas per 
maund or less than one kahan of kauris might have sold 
them to the consumers at one and a half kahans allowing 
50 per cent for profit besides their expenses. But it 
is said that a sayar duty was collected on the transit of 
salt which consequently enhanced the nrice to nearly three 
kahans per maund in the interior. From a statement
(3)
collected from the Nirkhi of the bazar of Cuttack under 
the Maratha rule it was found that in 1799/1800, 1800/1801
(1) C.P.C. IX, No. 605.
(2) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 17 July 1818 Ho.. 1?.
(3) An officer who records the prices of articles.
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and 1801/1802 (1207, 1208, and 1209 AnaLi) salt averaged 
22 seers K a t k i ^  or 28 seers Balasore or Calcutta^) 
weight for a chaupani rupee, an imaginary coin equivalent 
to two kahans and four pans.kauris. Consequently the 
rate per Calcutta maund was between three and three and 
a half kahans under the four last years of the Maratha 
Government* Ewer wrote that under Maratha rule the average 
sale price of salt was from two and a half to three kahans 
per maund particularly in. the mufassal. J. Melville, 
when commissioner for the affairs of Cuttack said that the 
price of salt under the Maratha Government seldom exceeded 
five annas per maund* 3^)
In Bengal, the administration of the salt revenue had 
undergone various changes in the early days of British 
rule. During the time of Warren-Hastings several civil 
officers were appointed Salt Agents of the Company. They 
advanced money to the Malangis who manufactured salt at 
their direction. The Agents stored the salt and sold it 
to the wholesale dealers at a price fixed by the Government* 
The difference between the price which was paid to the
(1) Katki seer weighs 10? tolas.
(2) Calcutta seer weighs 82 tolas.
(3) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 17 duly 1818 No. lj.
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Nalangis and the wholesale price paid by the salt merchants ■
constituted the revenue of the Company. Cornwallis
introduced a system of auction sales instead of selling
at a fixed price. Thus the Government had a monopoly
both over the manufacture and over the sale of salt.
Regulations were made to prevent smuggling and the illicit.
(1)manufacture of salt.
When Orissa was conquered the Naratha territories 
on the east of the Suvarnarekha with the salt Aurangs which 
produced a good amount of salt were annexed to Hijli. Early 
in l80*f the Governor General in Council made a declaration 
that the Government reserved to itself the exclusive, 
privilege of manufacturing salt in Orissa. The same system ,
as had been introduced in Bengal was gradually introduced
n , n . (2) all over Orissa.
After the British conquest, under the collector of the
Northern division there was an officer in charge of customs
and salt at Balasore. After the introduction of the salt
reguktions in Orissa in 180*+, the officer in charge of salt
and customs at Balasore was made the Salt Agent of Orissa. ■
(1) S.C. Aggarwal, Salt Industry in India; nn.2^1-2:
N.K. Sinha (ed.), Nidnarur Salt Paners«n. 5.
(2) Encl., b Nay 180*+, Government to lielville and Harcourt, 
Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 5 September 1805 
No. 26.
He was responsible to the Board of Trade, salt and opium 
department at Fort William. The duties he had to perform 
comprised the management of the manufacture of salt, the 
management of the sales for local comsumption and the export 
of the surplus to Sulkia, and also the prevention of 
smuggling.
According to the regulations formed for the conduct 
of the salt department in Orissa, the export of salt by sea 
was strictly prohibited; any salt attempted to be smuggled 
was to be confiscated together with the boat on which it 
might be laden. The export of salt by land to Midnapur 
or any other district was'-subject to the control of the 
Bengal Government. 7
Any one wishing to buy salt for consumption or resale 
was to approach the gurnashtas in'charge of the golas. The 
gumashta when the money was paid was to grant a char chitthi 
(a delivery order) which was to be shown to any jamadar or 
peon in the various chaukis established in the jurisdiction 
under salt regulation. If the salt was required for sale 
or consumption in any part of the province beyond the
(1) May 180*+, Government to Melville and Harcourt, Civil 
Judicial Consultations 5 September 1805 No. 23 (vide 
also No. 26.)
(2) Encl., b May 180^, Government to Melville and Harcourt,
Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 5 September 1805
No. 26.
chaukis, the merchant, after giving a char chitthi to the 
jamadar or the peon of the chauki through which the salt 
might pass, received in exchange a pass which enabled him 
to take salt to whatever part of the province he thought
Any merchant who was desirous of purchasing salt for 
export from Orissa had to apply to the Salt Agent, who 
issued two Rawanas, of which one was to be delivered at 
either of the.chaukis established near the salt gola and 
the other was to be delivered to the darogha stationed at 
either the Baumani or the Barmul pass or other passes . 
controlled by the Government daroghas.^^
When the salt department was placed under the control 
of the cibmissioners the salt Aurangs or manufacturing tracts 
spread in an-unbroken line along the shore of the Bay of 
Bengal from the Suvarnarekha river, the north boundary of 
Orissa, to the Debi river, the south boundary of central 
Orissa, and skirted the Chilka lake, on the east and south 
east* The British divided all the salt Aurangs into three 
divisions. Balasore, or the north Cuttack division, extended 
from the Suvarnarekha on the north to the Dhamra on the south 
along the western shored of the Bay of Bengal for a distance
(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid.
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of some 80 miles, and comprised eight A u r a n g s . T h e  
central division occupied the Qentral portion of Orissa, 
extending along the coast for about 70 miles from the 
Dhamra to the Debi which separated it from the southern 
division. It comprised seven A u r a n g s . ■ The southern 
division occupied the southern portion of Orissa, extending 
along the coast for about 90 miles from the Debi on the 
north to the southwest extremity of the Chilka lake. It 
comprised seven Aurangs.^3)
Each Aurang was divided into subdivisions called Bhowris, 
comprising a convenient number of chattis, which consisted 
of chulhas or boiling houses. Each Aurang had an establish­
ment of one darogha, two or three muharrirs, some overseers
( b )of chattis, a few chaprasis and so on. '
■ The salt manufactured in the Aurangs was of. two 
descriptions viz. jpungah or boiled salt and karkach or solar 
evaporation salt. The latter was properly called abrah
(1) Rattai, Sartha, Chanova, Dusmolung, Panch-molung, Ankura, 
Churamun and Dhamra.
(2) Mundamolung, Sathbhaya, Northern Kanpur, Southern Kanpur, 
Rankud, Southern Dholya and Harishpur. •
(3) North Astrang, Bhusandpur, Karidas, Parikud, South 
Astrang, IfsAM, Gurbai and Southpara; Parliamentary 
Papers 1856 Ii.C. Vol. 26, part.Ill,/Bengal, (Report: *., 
upon salt in British India) p p :
(V) Ibid.
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being a superior article to ordinary karkach.U) .
The British cleared the jungle when necessary and ex-' 
cavated communications with the sea which from long neglect 
had been gradually filled. Thus they, brought a number of 
chatti lands into a productive state.
(1) Ibid., g.^93* The system of pungah manufacture in
most of the Aurangs in Orissa was similar to that of 
Bengal agencies. The manufacture of karkach in the 
Chilka lake was facilitated by local circumstances.
!1The salt is produced on the tracts of the Chilka lake, 
left dry in February and March, on its southern margin 
where the water is at all times shallow, and where 
from the vicinity of the sea and the influence of 
the tides, the brine appears stronger than in other 
quarters. The process is extremely simple; the 
brine is confined for a few days in a large pan 
or field enclosed or prepared by the moltinghees, 
whence after partial evaporation, it is admitted into 
smaller pans 6 or 8 feet square to the depth of two 
or three inches; it is let in at night, and by the 
following afternoon, a thick crust of salt is formed 
on the bottom of the pan which is then raked up and 
stored in heaps.1! (Ibid. pp.1+93^1+91+) ♦ .
(2) 29 October 1812, C. Becher, Salt Agent of Cuttack,
to Board of Trade, Bengal Salt and Opium Consultations 
2J November 1812 No. 15*
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The introduction of manufacture under the exclusive 
management of Government officers was gradual# It was 
first introduced in 180*+, in the northern division. It 
was subsequently extended to the central division# In 
1812 the Salt Agent and the Board of Trade recommended to 
the Government of Bengal the extension of the salt monopoly 
to the Aurangs in the southern division on the ground that if 
the management cost one lakh of rupees, it would bring in 
upwards of five lakhs to the revenue# This was approved.
Thus by 181*+ the monopoly of manufacture was extended to 
the whole of Orissa.
At the time of the British conquest the manufacture of 
salt was in the hands of the Rajas and zamindars whose 
estates bordered on the coast. It was considered equitable 
that they should continue to have an interest in. the 
manufacture# J# king, the Salt Agent?was accordingly 
authorised to enter into agreements with them# In return
for receiving one and a half annas per maund on all salt
manufactured in their estates, they made over to.the 
Government their salt and fuel lands and divested themselves
(1) 2 September 1805? Earcourt and Melville to Government,
Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 5 September l805 No#275'
11 February 1813? Government to Board of Trade, Bengal
Revenue Consultations 20 February 1813 No. *+2; Bengal 
Salt and Opium Consultations 25 October l8lb No. 8 
(Regulation of 181^); 10 January 1855 E.A. Samuels,
Commissioner of Cuttack to Board of Revenue, Report on the 
administration of the Salt Department of the Revenue of 
Bengal (1852-53) pp.*+1-2.
of all right to interfere with the Malangis. In 1811
i •
King recommended that the Rajas and zamindars should 
receive a certain quantity of sallt under the designation , 
of khoraki or diet allowances for the use of themselves
(1)
and their families# . That was also granted by the Government# 
The price paid.to the Kalangis for manufacturing salt 
varied at different times. At the time of the British 
conquest the usual rate allowed by the zamindars was four 
annas a maund or 25 rupees per 100 maunds. The British 
Government considered that this price was responsible for 
"unlimited smuggling", and at the recommendation of King
(2)the price was consequently raised to Rs. 35 per 100 maunds.
The net profit of the Government from salt, in lSO^ f, 
from an account of the collector of Balasore amounted to 
Rs. V3A35* In the following year the net profit increased 
to Rs# 10^,89^.^^ King, who succeeded Brown as Salt Agent 
of Orissa, fixed the price of salt in 1806 at two rupees 
per maund in all the northern Aurangs perhaps to show a 
further profit to the Government. When! British conquered
_________________________________________________  ;_______________ :___________ J L ____________ — ______________________________:
(1) Parliamentary papers 1856, H.C. Vol. 26, part III,
Bengal (Report ... upon salt in British India) pp.If8)+-5*
(2) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15*
(3) 2 September 1805, Earcourt and Melville .to Government, 
Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 5 September 1805 
No. 27; (no date) August 1805, Harcourt and Meliville 
to Government, Add. MSS. '13611, pp.58-59•
Orissa the sale price of salt in the central Aurangs of
Kanika and Kujang was one and a half rupees. When the
salt monopoly was extended over them the price of salt
was raised to two rupees. From the time of the British
conquest to 181*+ the price of salt in the southern Aurangs
was still low; a rupee purchased 32 seers. But when
the salt monopoly was.extended in 1811* to the whole of the
district, the price of salt in these Aurangs was also fixed
at two rupees per maund.
In 1813, when.the Government rate of salt In the
central Aurangs was equalised with that in the northern 
the retail price of salt supplied from the Aurangs 
Aurangs/in Kanika and Kujang was increased by nearly 50 per
cent. But the price rose still higher in the country in
general. Ewer wrote, "From all the enquiries I have made
relative to the price of salt in the southern part of the
district, the cost of that essential article of consumption
rose suddenly and instantaneously from 5 to 6 times its
former rate on the passing of the Regulations of l8l*f.!|(2)
In 1818 E. Impey, as magistrate of Cuttack, reported "its
(1) 13 May l8l8. Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations
17 July 1818 No. 15; Bengal Draft Despatches (1806/7)
Vol. 19, para 5? p.*+26.
(2) 13 May 1818. Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations
17 July 1818 No. 15.
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inhabitants /of Khurda/ procured the necessary article 
of life at the low rate of about 32 seers per rupee.
Since then its price has risen exorbitantly, and the 
difficulty of procuring it has become great.'^*^
The average retail price of salt in Orissa rose to 
three rupees and four annas (or upwards of 2V  Kahans of
(p)
kauris ). Trower thought that the reasons for the 
rise of the price of salt to such an extent were that the 
Government sold it at a h:gher rate than the rate prior to 
the conquest; the merchants who purchased salt at the 
Government price retailed it at an exhorbitant increase.
The chauki daroghas levied a duty on the passage of. salt 
through their Bespective chaukis.^3) ,
Although the rise in the price of salt was generally 
felt all over the couhtry it was felt less in the towns 
than in the interior because in consequence of the rise in 
urban wages labourers by earning more could somehow adapt 
themselves to such a rate. But in the interior of the 
country where the raiyats were poor and had no other means
(1) 2 May 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial 
Consultations L.P. 23 May 1818 No.l.
(2) 13 May 1818, Bwer to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15*
(3) 23 May 1817, Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 2b October 1817 No. 38*
of income except cultivation, it was very difficult for a
raiyat to purchase the salt necessary for his consumption
during the whole y e a r . ^
In assessing the total amount of salt manufactured we
notice that according,to C. Becher, the Salt Agent of Orissa,
the number of Kalan^is employed in 1815/16 (1223 Amali) was
16,8^7; the quantity of salt which one man could manufacture
in a favourable season was about 50 maunds; the total
manufactured in a year averaged 8*+2,350 maunds. The yearly
average of salt exported to Sulkia was ^59?392; about ,
33)800 maunds were purchased.at Government stores. Since
the extension of the Regulation generally the sale of salt
in the ilughalbandi did not average more than 113,000 maunds
(2)a year.v '
This amount does not seem to have been sufficient for the 
consumption of the inhabitants of the Hughalbandi. Ewer 
conducted an enquiry on this point. He estimated that the 
total population of the Hughalbandi was 1,200,000. In his 
opinion one ^ u l 1 of salt was required for two days for a
(1) 13 Hay 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 17 July .181.8 Ho.lJ.
(2) 6 November 1817) Becher to Board of Trade, Bengal Salt
and Opium Consultations 26 December 1817 Ho. *+; 13 May
1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultitionsi:
17 July 1818 Ho. I?.
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person in Orissa; there were fourteen 'nuls1 in a Calcutta
seer; about thirteen seers were necessary for a year or
rather more than half a chhatak for a day* , The same view
was also held by Becher* On the basis of these calculations
Ewer concluded that while the whole consumption of the
Hughalbandi required an annual supply of three and a. half
lakh of maunds, it was supplied with only 113*000 maunds
which was sufficient to a population of only 396,000 sould.^-^
In addition to the calculations of Ewer there is other
evidence to indicate that the population of the Kughalbandi
had an inadequate supply. There is the experience of Trower,
for example, on 23 hay 1817 he wrote, "during my tour of
the district it was with the greatest difficulty I could
’ (2)
procure sufficient salt for the daily consumption of my camp."
How .had this happened? V/hen the salt monopoly was . ■ . . 
enforced, there was no means for estimating the supply of 
salt for Orissa. Yet the Board of Trade presumed that 
50,000 maunds of salt had uerhaps been required for internal 
consumption during the Iiaratha rule. This according to its
(3)
own words afterwards was based on"a very erroneous calculation.11
(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consul-' 
tations 17 July 1818 No. 15.
(2) 23 May 1817, Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 2b October 1817 No. 3 8*
(3) 9 December 1817, Board of Trade to Government, Bengal Salt 
and Opium Consultations 26 December 1817 No. 3*
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But in the opinion which Ewer expressed in 1818 people could 
only afford one fourth instead of a half chhatak per day. .
He thought that a large number went unsupplied from Govarrment 1
stores. This was to some extent supplied by smuggling, 
notwithstanding checks established to restrain it and the 
activities of chauki daroghas and chaprasis who had the 
credit of "being by no means idle in preventing others from 
benefiting by illicit traffic in salt."^ \
Vast quantities of salt were smuggled by the salt amlas; 
some was supplied to a class of dealers in Orissa; the salt 
so sold was disposed of at a rate very nearly or quite as 
high as that procured regularly from Government stores.(2)
In regard to the complaints of the people, Trower
iI
reported, "Whatever the real causes may be or where the fault i
jj
may be, I confess myself quite unable to decide, but certain it • 
is that the cry for salt is generally throughout the district, 
not only is the high price complained of, a price which is said 
to preclude the lower classes of the people from purchasing it, 
but the difficulty of procuring it even by those who can afford 
to pay for it.u 3^  ^ Impey stated, "thus deprived or curtailed
(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue
Consultation^ 17 July 1818 Ho.15.
(2) 6 November 1817, Becher to Board of Trade, Bengal Salt and
Opium Consultations 26 December 1817 No.4; 13 May 1818
Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 
1818 No.15.
(3) 13 May 1817, Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 24 October 1817 No.38.
i
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In the use of an article of life essential to their
comfort the Inhabitants of Khurda experience in a
greater degree than almost any others in the District,
« (1)the operation of this salt monopoly.” Ewer after
due enquiry remarked, ”1 certainly believe the salt
monopoly to be a real and unexaggerated grievance to
the inhabitants of a large part of the District and that
the introduction of it with its consequences has materially
curtailed the already scanty comfort and circumscribed
enjoyments of the Ooriah Ryot*” He further added, ”it must
be admitted that the advantages thus far derived by the
Governnent by the extension of salt monopoly but poorly
compensates for the privation and discontent occasioned by
„ (2)
that measure to their subject in Cuttack.” This
discontent of the people may indeed have been one of the 
causes of the rebellion in 1817*
(1) 2 May 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal
Judicial Consultations L.P. 23 May 1817 No.l.
(2) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Governnent, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15.
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SECTION IV;
EliBAIuQOTTS.
Orissa, a land of many rivers, was subject to
occasional innundation* This made the upkeep of the
embankments a chief consideration of the Government in all
ages. The enormity of the problem can be easily understood
from the following statement of Trower: "The bunds in this
^ (1)
district extend if taken in each direction upwards of lpO miles.1
During the Maratha rule, the management of the embankments 
was placed under the zamindars who were either supplied with 
money by the Government or granted some deductions from their 
revenue on that account. When the British took over the 
administration of the- country thej same system was continued 
till 1806. By Regulation VI, 1806, the general charge of 
the embankments was entrusted to a committee known as the 
Committee of Embankments, consisting of public officers 
nominated by the Government. Generally it consisted of three 
members. The senior civil servant of the Company at Cuttack
(1) 18 January 1813, Embankment Committee to Government,
Bengal Revenue Consultations 20 February 1813 No. 36.
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acted as the president; the register of the zila court was 
the secretary*
The whole district was' divided into two divisions known 
as the northern and southern divisions, each under a super­
intendent for the management of embankments. The super­
intendents were appointed by the Government. 'When'the 
management was not found satisfactory, a surveyor of embank­
ments was appointed in 1813*^^
It was the duty of the committee to furnish to the 
Government an annual estimate of the expense of repairing 
the embankments. It was aLso to look to the general adminis­
tration of the embankments. Its members were individually 
and collectively responsible for bringing abuses to light. 
Under the superintendents were a number of bund daroghas 
appointed by the committee., It was their duty to be careful 
that the sum advanced for the repair of the bunds was 
properly expended and that the work was solid and substantial. 
The surveyor was to survey and report upon the works when 
finished previous to the accounts being submitted to the
(1) 31 December 1812, Trower to Embankment Committee, Bengal
Revenue Consultations 20 February 1813 Ho. 375
18 January 1813* Embankment Committee to Government, 
Bengal Revenue Consultetions 20 February 1813 No. 38.
(2) Ibid.
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Government by the c o m m i t t e e . T h e  average annual 
estimate of repairs including establishment charges, the 
cost of the surveyor and that of the two superintendents 
for 1811, 1812 and 1813 was Rs. 1fO,?l'+.(2)
The measures taken by the Government generally brought 
some improvement in many embankments. One of the 
embankments which drew the special attention of the Government 
was that at the Kathjuri* Its repair was indispensable 
for the preservation of the town of Cuttack and Qantonment.
It appears that during the llaratha Government the ruined 
parts of this embankment were to some extent strengthened 
with piles and earth a n n u a l l y . B u t  by the time the 
British conquered Cuttack the condition of the embankment 
was precarious. In 1805 G. Steel, who was in charge
of bunds in the southern.division of Cuttack remarked........
"The Bund running from the Banks of the Mohanuddy, to the 
Banks of the ICutjoory is completely broken, and in many
( if)
places no traces' are to be found of the original Bund.’*
(1) 20 April 181*+, .Embankment Committee to R. Becher, 
Superintendent of the embankments,.northern division, 
Bengal Revenue Consultations 8 July l8l*f No. 53*
(2) in 20 December 181*+, Richardson to Government, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 18 March 1815 No. 29.
(3) Encl., 20 January 1806, Melville to Government, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 23 January 1806 No. *+8.
(b) Encl., 1 October 1805* Board of Revenue to Government, 
Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 October’1805 No. 36.
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He stated "that the Bunds round the Town of Cuttack are 
in such a state as to require an entire and thorough 
renair." His recommendations were carried out- In 
consequence of repairs from time to. time the embankment 
became both stronger and higher than before- In■ 1811* Richard­
son stated "The large and solid embankments which now exist 
at the station of Cuttack itself and which for the greatest 
part are faced with cut stones ... are essential to the 
preservation of the town of Cuttack and contonments which 
would undoubtedly be annually innundated and overflown 
in many parts, were it not for the embankments.
Generally however the conditions of the embankments 
did not improve as much as had been expected. That was 
chiefly because at many places repairs were neglected or 
not taken up. in ,time,, with the result .that river water broke 
the bunds, washing away cultivated lands and causing damage 
to crops.(2) jn 1813 gage^3) wrote "During my late survey
(1) 20 December 181^, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 18 I-iarch 18.15 No. 29*
(2) 26 July 1813,. Embankment Committee to Government, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 7 August 1813 No. 295 Encl.,
18 January 1813? Embanlonent Committee to.Government,:
Bengal Revenue Consultations 20 February. 1813,, Ho. 385 : .
17 September 181*+, F. Sackville, Superintendent of 
Jagannath Road to.Government, Bengal .Revenue Consultations 
7 October 181*+ No. 15-
(3) I.k. Sage, President of the Embankment Committee.
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of the Bunds to the northwards of Cuttack I found hut few 
in good repair dthough immense sums have annually' been 
expended.1 He further added, "Many of the Bunds do not 
exceed three feet in height and have not, to all appearance, 
received any repair for a length of time while others are 
hardly perceptible owing to their being covered with 
impregnable jungle.1
Investigating the reasons for this neglect Sage wrote,
"In two places where I expected to find bunds not a vestige 
remained and I am thoroughly convinced the public money has 
been grossly misappropriated."^ He also added, "that 
the expenses have and under the present system must increase 
is to be attributed solely to the practice of advancing money 
to the daroghas who instead of appropriating it for the 
purpose.intended, exert.their utmost-to lay up a fortune for 
themselves, making zemindars, furnish coolies, who are', it is 
feared, never paid."(3) Trower stated "In more than one 
instance it has been reported that those officers /bund 
daroghas/ have forced the villagers to work and afterwards , 
refused to pay them. The salary of each Darogah amounts
(1) Encl., 17 February 1813, Embankment Committee to Govern­
ment, Bengal Revenue Consultations 27 February 1813 No.25«
(2) Ibid.
(3) 18 January 1813, Embankment Committee to Government,
Bengal Revenue Consultations 20 February.1813. Ho. 3b.
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to 16 rupees per mensem and they are employed only six months
of the year, most of them keep their, palanquins and ...
servants and one of them'in particular who had the charge
of Rahang division has become a zemindar of some consequence
in the district and I believe it is pretty well known that
he purchased his lands with the money advanced to him for
the repairs of bunds.”
E.G. Sandy, the surveyor of the■embankments said that
the daroghas ,!have profited by receipts of public money
from the Committee in superintending of embankments.” In
support of his opinion hhe stated that on his arrival at
Cuttack the daroghas sought his approval for a deduction of
sixteen ner cent from the advance made to them. YJhen they
were asked to explain their reasons they replied as if it was
(2)
a normal practice under the superintendent. Richardson wrote • 
”these men (bund daroghas) have long been in the same place, 
held the same situations and practised every sort of fraud, as 
there is every reason to believe and it may be reasonably 
supposed have from habit, brotherhood and communion of interest 
reduced their mode of fraud to a system, which it would be
(1) 31 December 1812, Trower to Sage, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 20 February 1813 No. 37.
(2) lV February 181^, Embankment Committee to Government, 
Bengal Revenue Consultations 26 March I81V No. 33.
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difficult to (i)
/discover or trace.11'1 }
Though the corruption of the bund"daroghas was brought 
to light, they were not dispensed with because it was 
considered, that their dismissal would involve greater 
difficulty in the management of the bunds than their 
presence. However from 181*+ they were no longer given 
advances for the repair of bunds. An attempt was made to 
check their works in a more careful way. Yet there is 
little evidence of improvement. It continued so up to 1817.
(1) 20 December l8l*+, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 18 March 1815 Ho. 29#
(2) Enel*, 10 May l8lV, Embankment Committee to Government, 
Bengal Revenue Consultations 8 July 181*+ Ho. 53;
20 December 181^; Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultatons 18 March 181? Ho. 29; 29 February 1820,
Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 
19 May 1820 No. 25.
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CHAPTER VII 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM
During Marat ha rule the Amil was empowered to 
investigate and try "both civil and criminal cases# Minor
cases were decided by the zamindar in his revenue jurisdiction 
or when referred to him hy the Amil# The popular mode 
of disposing of cases was to refer them to arbitration» 
Harcourt, the commissioner of Cuttack observed ”Even in 
felonies as in civil disputes all was arranged by compromise.” 
The arbitration court or Panchayat generally consisted of 
five or more members chosen by the parties themselves or 
by the officer to whom the matter was referred# More 
serious cases were brought before the subahdar of Cuttack#^) 
There was no distinction between civil and criminal 
cases# Proceedings were simple# Ewer, the acting judge 
judge and magistrate of Cuttack wrote ”all proceedings were 
summary, no written deposition taken and no form of trial
(l) 27 February 1818, Ewer, Acting ' J u & g e  of Cuttack to
Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations 
L#P# 28 April 1818 No# 37; 22 March 1805 $ Harcourt
to Shawe, Add# MSS# 13610, p#223*
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observed# Even an Ooria could understand how to seek 
redress where nothing but clamour was necessary to make 
his complaint heard without a prospect of incurring a 
loss either of time and money#” He thought that under 
the Maratha government "Heinous offences were exceedingly 
rare#”^1^
Generally the time-old customs were followed in 
determining the nature of the punishment# A person 
committing a petty offence like stealing firewood was often 
punished with a small fine#(^) For serious offences the 
offender was generally imprisoned or mutilated#(3) in 
default of hilman evidence the Panchayat sometimes resorted 
to trial by ordeal like holding a red-hot iron or putting
a hand in boiling ghee#^)
The Amil was responsible to the Government for 
maintaining law and order in his revenue jurisdiction* The 
zamindars or other revenue officers exercised police powers 
under the Amil* The fchandaits were responsible for main­
taining law and order under the zamindars# One of their
(1) 27 February 182)8, Ewer to Government, Bengal Criminal 
Judicial Consultations L#P# 28 April 1818 No# 37*
(2) Resolutions of Government, no date, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations January-April 1791 pp* 626-7*
(3) C.P.C. Vol# V, No# 1977*
{h) Resolutions of Government, no date, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations January-April 17919 pp* 626-7*
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chief duties was to seize offenders and produce them 
before the zamindar. Under the khandait were a number 
of chaukidars. (1)
On Hi- October 1803 the British conquest of Orissa 
was complete and Orissa was placed under the commissioners 
for the affairs of Cuttack* The commissioners did not 
interfere with the old system except that they took into 
their hands from the Amil thh power of superintending 
the police and hearing criminal cases* The control of 
the police was vested in the magistrate* There were 
two magistrates, one in the northern and the other in the 
southern division of Cuttack under the c o m m i s s i o n e r s * ^ )
On 5 September 1805 a regulation was passed declaring 
that all former and future regulations established in 
Bengal and Bihar should have effect in Cuttack* (3)
In otherwords, from 1805 Orissa was brought under the 
system of administration established by Cornwallis in Bengal*
(l) 15 October 1821, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 1 August 1822 No* 5*
£2) Enel*94 May I80h» Government to Commissioners for Affairs 
of Cuttack, Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 
5 September 1805 No* 2h; 27 February 1818, Ewer to
Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L*P*
28 April 1818 No. 37.
(3) 27 February 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Criminal
Judicial Consultations L*P* 28 April 1818 No* 37.
It was designated the district of Cuttack* It was then 
placed in charge of only one magistrate and was brought 
under the court of circuit for the division of Calcutta 
for criminal justice* (i)
The magistrate had limited powers of fine and 
imprisonment* He had to apprehend all disturbers of 
the peace and persons charged before him with crimes and 
misdemeanours* It was his duty to ascertain from the 
prisoners committed of held to bail, the evidence they 
might offer in their defence and to cauBe the attendance 
of witnesses before the court of circuit* He was required 
to submit to the court of circuit calendars of those 
apprehended, of those discharged, and of those tried and 
of those convicted* The court of circuit was supposed 
to hold its sessions twice a year, and its procedure was 
also complex*^)
The Marat ha judicial system had been simple; there 
was no codified law; the procedure was not fixed* There 
was no professional lawyer; the provisions of law written 
or unwritten were not always clear and definite* The 
British judicial system was more organised; the procedure
(1) W* Blunt and H* Shake spear, Regulations for the 
administration of police and criminal justice in the 
provinces of Bengal Bihar and Orissa, p*5U"
(2) Ibid., pp. 1, 15, 5U*
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was fixed; the law was codified* Mutilation was replaced 
"by imprisonment, which the British considered to he more 
humane* The sudden introduction of so new a system was 
somewhat bewildering to the people* At first the settled 
code of procedure was considered as an unnecessary innovation* 
According to many British officers, heinous offences were 
rare in Cuttack* Harcourt observed WI must say however this 
in favour of the natives of Cuttack that they are in general 
very peacably inclined*”  ^^  The reports from the fudges of 
the circuit court for a series of years contained statements 
to the effect that dacoity was unknown and that other heinous 
crimes were of rare occurrence; the district was in a quiet 
and peacable s t a t e d E w e r  stated that the people of Cuttack 
“required little of the penal*,f(3)
It is only at the end of the first decade of the British 
rule that there were some violent affrays attended with wounding
and loss of lives* But that was due to the hopelessness 
of civil redress because all who had claims to property
(1) 22 March 1805# Harcourt to Shawe, Add* MSS* 13610, p*225«
(2) 20 April 1811, W*E* Rees, officiating Judge dh Midnapur (he
held sessions for Cuttack) to Government, Bengal Criminal 
Judicial Consultations L*P* lh May 1811, Ho* 32; 19 July
1820,Court of Directors to Governor General in Council, 
Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol. V, p. 513-6*
(3) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 
17 July 1818 Ho. 15.
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invariably attempted to obtain possession of it by forced1) 
Ewer thought that because there was a smaller number of 
heinous crimes in Cuttack than in any other of the Company* s 
provinces, therefore the administration of criminal justice 
was neglected* The sessions were to be held twice in a year* 
But in actual practice they were held only once* Later on 
the judges of circuit "for their personal convenience" applied 
to the Government to hold them once in a year. That was 
granted by the Government* On the one hand this infrequency 
of the session courts failed "to familiarise the natives to 
an institution they were so little likely to understand*
Because of their ignorance of the proceedings of the criminal 
courts people were entirely left in the hands of the vakils 
and amlas who exploited them*(3) On the other hand the 
hearings of the courts were delayed, as a result, sometimes 
innocent prisoners were unnecessarily detained* The witnesses 
also suffered from hardship and expense*^^
(1) 11 January 1822, Governor General in Council to Court of
Directors, Judicial Letters from Bengal 1820-22, Vol* VII, 
p*L(42; 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General
in Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol* V, p*5l6*
(2) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 
17 July 1818, No. 15*
(3) 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General in 
Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol. V, pp*519-20*
(U) 28 September 1816, Watson to Nizamat Adalat, Bengal
Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P* 7 February 1817* No*37*
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The magistrate was empowered to appoint police daroghas*
If they were found guilty of misconduct, they were removable 
only by the order ;of the Government^1)
It was also provided that according to the established 
usages within their respective estates, the principal zamindars 
and other landholders were to be constituted police officers 
within their respective possessions; the inferior zamindars 
or talukdars were to act as subordinate officers of police 
subject to them* The zamindars were to be subject to the 
authority of the police daroghas who were in turn subject to 
the orders of the magistrate* But these provisions were never 
carried out* In 1806 police thanas were established in Cuttack 
excluding the sixteen tributary states exempted from the general 
regulations*(2)
The police administration shows that generally the daroghas 
were corrupt* R* Ker was the magistrate of Cuttack from 1805 
to 1807* As long as he was in this office occasional measures 
were taken to check corruptions*^) But owing to the want of 
vigilance on the part of his successors it seems that corruption
(1) W* Blunt and H* Shakespear, Regulations for the administration 
of police and criminal justice in the provinces of Bengal 
Bihar and Orissa, p*56*
(2) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 19 May 1820 No*25*
(3) 6 January 1807 » Ker to Nizamat Adalat, Bengal Criminal 
Judicial Consultations L*P* 22 January 1807 No*l*3*
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prevailed to a very great extent* In 1817 Trower 
reported ,fI believe I am the first and only Officer of the 
Government that has hitherto visited the interior of the 
district, I have travelled through the greatest part of 
it, conversed with all classes of the people from the 
highest to the lowest and certainly the complaint against 
the police ••• exceeded anything I could have supposed*"
He further added "the oppression exercised by the police is 
by no means of late date* I have always considered, and 
expressed it publicly as well as privately, that the district 
of Cuttack was, in this respect, the most unfortunate in the 
Company's provinces•"(l) Ewer wrote "in the place of the 
mild and parental authority of the Raja ^of Khurda/ was now 
substituted that of the judge and collector •** and the
(2)unfeeling and oppressive sway of a *•• police Darogha*,,v> '
The corruption affected both the higher and lower 
classes of the people* G* Martindell, the military 
commissioner of Cuttack wrote "the difficulties under which 
the landholders are said to labour are so much to be ascribed 
• •• to the enormous exactions and extortions of the Native
(1) 23 May 1817* Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue
Consultations, 2h  October 1817 No*38*
(2) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue
Consultations, 17 July 1818 No*15»
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officers of the District, both judicial* Police and Revenue#"^^ 
Richardson mentioned "excesses and oppressions committed by 
the police Darogahs, the Tehseel&ars1 Omla and parties of 
sepoys and (da by continual seizure of Begars, talcing firewood, 
pots, milk, eggs and ca and ca and ca all of which acts are 
strictly prohibited by the regulations of the government” and 
reiterated the emphatic words of Trower that the system "proved 
ruinous to this once flourishing country ^Khurda/ by consequent 
desertion of a great portion of the cultivators#”^
Consequently the daroghas grew rich# Trower wrote 
”We all know what the salary of a police Darogah is, and we 
know generally speaking from what class of natives they are 
selected and it is therefore impossible #•• to account for 
the sudden rise of these people to riches and consequence, 
unless by giving credit to their unwarrantable exactions»”(3 ) 
Here is an example of police oppression# Mirza Mehdi 
was the police darogha at Puri# A large number of people 
complained against his exactions before the. magistrate# They 
also declared that if they could not be relieved from this
(1) Enel#, 3 March 1818, Mart indell to Government, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 21+ April 1818, No#Ul^
(2) 3 January I8l4> Richardson to Government, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations, 5 February 1811+ No# 37*
(3 ) 23 May 1817 > Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 21+ October 1817 No#38#
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tyranny "by the local authorities they would proceed in a 
hody to Calcutta to petition the Council.^1) So the 
darogha was immediately removed by the order, of the magistrate, 
and transferred to Khurda where he was later said to have 
flcarried on a merciless system of exaction#11^ ^
(l) 29 August-:1812, Government to the Magistrate of Cuttack, 
Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 29 August 
1812 No. 27.
/ \ (t{2) •Phe collections on account of the Darogah in the village 
of Trumoo in Khoorda were as follows:-
1st Salamee 2as /2 annas/; 2nd on account of 
village collections 8 as; 3rd numbering the houses 
3 as; 4th boundary assessment 4 as; 5th assessment 
for supplies 6 as; 6th assessment for Bhangu Bindars
1 anna 2 pice; 7th coolie assessment 2 as; 8th 
assessment on Darogah1 s loss in purchasing grain 3 as; 
9th for honey, wax and etc., 1 anna; 11th for Khuokhur 
in hot weather 1 anna 2 pice; 12th fowls and kids 2i as 
13th for each soonthal 12 as; 14th if any body fell 
into well his house was plundered and 6 annas were 
taken from each house in the village; 15th for any 
person dying from the bite of a snake the same as last; 
16th for a burglary 3 rupees from the master of the 
house: when any body whom the Darogah did not like
he was fined 2 rupees.”
13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15#
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While Oriya was generally spoken in the district of 
Cuttack, the regulations were only translated into the 
Persian and Bengali languages which were understood by 
few# Ewer wrote, "Hot a single Regulation has ever 
been translated into the great vernacular language of the 
province and the means elsewhere adopted of imparting some 
knowledge of laws by which they are governed by distributing 
copies at every thana and mufassal cutchery have here 
either never been resorted to, or if followed, would of 
course have been nugatory from the contents being locked 
up in languages wholly unknown to the bulk of the people#,|(1) 
At the time of the British conquest, a complete body 
of Oriya native officers were available# Many of them 
were Amils each with a large number of tahsildars under 
them# As their method of business was widely different 
from that about to be introduced in the district, it was 
considered impracticable to retain their services# Owing 
to their ignorance of the rules and practices of the British 
courts and other Government offices, Oriyas were appointed 
in none but the lowest positions# The idea of selecting 
some of the Oriyas first to fill the secondary posts and 
then after training to rise to more important offices was
(l) rbid.
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completely overlooked#^^
The exclusion of the natives of Orissa from all offices 
of trust and responsibility in the courts, in the police and 
in the revenue and salt departments led to serious consequences# 
It created a wide gulf between the British iGsvernment and 
the natives of Orissa# Ewer thought that the Oriyas felt 
that the British showed special favour to the amlas from 
other provinces#^)
It appears that the judges of Cuttack perceived little 
difference between the natives of Orissa and those of Bengal# 
They did their duties according to law ”without enquiring 
or caring whether those who came before th&m were aware or 
not of the measures necessary to be adopted in the conduct of 
a suit#” This left the people entirely in the hands of the 
vakils who ’•plundered” them under the plea of money being 
required for the court expenses and thus ”the propriety of 
these demands could not be disputed by those who knew nothing 
of the nature and amount of fees and cost#” This practice 
was so common in the court that once the Government felt the 
necessity of dismissing one Muhammad Feiz, a Government pleader, 
from his office because he was deeply involved in this 
questionable means of acquiring money#(3)
(l) Ibid# (2) Ibid#
(3) 22 January 1814, Government to Acting Judge of Cuttack,
Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P# 22 January 
1814 No. 21#
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The amlas too took full advantage of their situations#
They made fortunes either by exacting money from the parties 
in a suit or hy using the influences of their authorities# ,
One Salim Ali came to Balasore at the time of the British 
conquest in the capacity of a raunshi to Morgan, who Became 
acting collector of the northern division of Cuttack# Morgan 
conferred on Salim Ali a high situation in the salt department. 
But in the following year he was removed hy Ker, Morgan1 s 
successor and prosecuted for embezzling money, smuggling 
salt and selling an appointment. It seems the prosecution 
was conducted in a careless manner; nothing was proved.
When King was appointed Salt Agent, he wrote in 1807 that 
he "was strongly impressed with an idea of the enormity of 
Salim Alifs guilt and of the necessity of making a public 
example of him in order to deter others from similar practices." 
By the time Impey took charge of the district afc the judge 
and magistrate of Cuttack, Salim Ali was known as an extensive 
purchaser of land in the name of his nephew, Buzul Hussain 
and as a merchant; he also had acted as a defendant in 
criminal cases of various descriptions.(^)
In 181*4- he was appointed to the office of favtjdari 
sarishtadar. When he held that office charges of corruption
(l) 7 February 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Civil
Judicial Consultations 3 March 1818 No.l#
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were 'brought against him. In one of them the magistrate 
punished the accuser and in others committed the accusers 
and witnesses to the court of circuit which acquitted them 
for want of proof
Impey later on felt the pernicious consequences of 
retaining such a person in office whose landed property 
and responsible position were utilised to exercise an undue 
influence over the minds of the natives.(2) He recommended 
his dismissal. By the time Salim Ali was dismissed, the 
annual sadar jama of the lands he had acquired in his 
nephew's name was Rs. 26,1 6i+.(3)
Another example which may he given here concerns the 
family of Sahe'fe' Zeman, a darogha of Cuttack consisting 
of his brothers Ali Zeman, a faujdari sarishtadar and Kiden 
Ali, darogha of Pipli, their nephew Nukram Hussain, a 
faujdari sarishtadar and Tufil Ali, a faujdari muharrir.
Soon after the British conquest Sahefee Zeman came here in 
search of a livelihood. He held the office of a darogha 
at several thanas for about nine years. Ali Zeman was a
(1) Ibid.
(2) 9 April 1818, Rees to Magistrate of Cuttack, Bengal Civil 
Judicial Consultations 3 March 1818 No. 2.
(3) 7 February 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Civil Judicial 
Consultations 3 March 1818 No. 1.
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record keeper in the court for some time# In 1810 he 
was appointed a faujdari sarishtadar. In 1812 he held 
that situation in both the civil and criminal courts#
He continued so till Impey took charge of the office of 
judge and magistrate of Cuttack# On Salim Ali1 s resignation 
Ali Zeman was appointed to succeed him, hut before he 
could take charge he was dismissed from Government service 
for corrupt practices committed when he had been a 
sarishtadar in the Twenty Four Parganas. He was succeeded 
by his nephew Mukram Hussain who had been darogha at the 
thanas of Mutro and Soro# These brothers utilised the 
influences of their offices to acquire wealth# This is 
evident from their own statements at an enquiry made by 
Ewer# Sahebo Zeman petitioned ,fmy younger brother Ulley 
Zeman resided with me during the time he was Dewanny and 
Foujdarry Sheristadar and as we found that our salaries 
were not sufficient to maintain us, we took advantage of 
the confidence inspired by our high offices and connected 
ourselves with the ETahajans of the Tov^n# They lent us 
money to a very large extent and we commenced trading in 
various articles such as cloth, horses, elephants etc; 
we also bought and sold several Estates, At one time we 
sent an investment, the value of 15,000 Rupees towards the 
Deccan, part of which was plundered by the Raja of Goomsur#
I cannot produce all the papers connected with our concerns, 
hut beg leave to submit a number of redeemed bonds to the 
number of I4-3,14U Rupees which will shew that the above 
statement is correct#M Other members of the family became 
considerable landholders connected in interest with the 
two chief
The corruption of the amlas made them rich at the 
sacrifice of many zamindars who were ruined by selling 
their lands# But when complaints were made against their 
oppression, they were almost always dismissed because of 
the nature of the. proof required in the court# Ewer 
thought that this left an impression that the amlas, more 
particularly the Bengali amlas, were under the protection 
of the court and that those who brought charge® were more 
likely to be punished than vindicated# Consequently there 
was a general loss of confidence in the justice of British 
laws and in the impartiality of the British courts#(2)
For example, Salim Ali was appointed by the Government 
to the salt department# In consequence of charges of
(1) Encl., 19 February 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Civil 
Judicial Consultations 3 March 1818 No# 6; 7 February
1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Civil Judicial Consultat­
ions 3 March 1818 No# 1#
(2) 7 February 1818* Ewer to Government, Bengal Civil Judicial 
Consultations 3 March 1818 No#l#
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corruption against him he was dismissed* A decision on 
a charge against him, for extortion in the name of a 
judge of the circuit was pending* Yet he was reappointed 
to his former situation*(1)
Again the appointment of Ali Zeman hy the same 
magistrate who had caused his dismissal is another instance 
which may he cited here* When Ali Zeman was dismissed a 
second time he was succeeded hy one of his nephews namely 
Mukim Hussain*^2) It appeared to Ewer that such things 
might uhave excited a belief that though criminality might 
deprive one member of his office, yet it could not operate 
to diminish the power and emolument of the family in general•" 
Again a muharrir who had been dismissed by Impey for 
incapacity was made afterwards a darogha, on account of his 
experience and ability; another person who had been convicted 
by the court of circuit was appointed as acting naib nazir*^) 
In considering the popular opinion of the courts Ewer 
wrote that the people of Orissa wfor some years looked on
(1) 9 April 1818, Rees to Webb, Bengal Civil Judicial
Consultations 3 March 1818 No* 2; 3 October 1816,
Magistrate of Cuttack to Court of Circuit, Bengal 
Civil Judicial Consultations 3 March 1818 No* 4*
(2) Enel*, 19 February 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal 
Civil Judicial Consitations 3 March 1818 No* 6*
(3) 7 February 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Civil 
Judicial Consultations 3 March 1818 No*l*
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the Regulations not as a source of redress for the injured 
and of punishment for the oppression hut as a means of 
introducing into Cuttack a herd of needy rapacious strangers 
and enabling them to make rapid and large fortunes and 
acquire possession of a greater portion of the district*11 
He further added "the above opinion is founded on a 
knowledge of the sentiment of the people in general acquired 
by unreserved communication with all ranks during my late 
tour through the district* On every occasion of referring 
a complaint to the court I received the answer that nothing 
but expense was to be gained by following my direction*"^)
In short, in the words of the Court of Directors, "the 
access to civil justice was tedious and difficult to all 
classes of the Native Population, ••• the Native Omlah 
were corrupt and extortionate to a degree •*• the adminis­
tration of Criminal Justice was also attended with vexations 
and difficulties to Prosecutors and Witnesses, and with 
hardship to innocent prisoners;11 "the judicial system in
Cuttack was by no means adapted either to promote the efficient 
administration of justice among the people of that province in 
thdr material dealings with each other or to protect them 
from frauds and exactions of the Amlah, which the Regulations
(1) Ibid.
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themselves had introduced and that it thus acted not only 
to the withholding of the right, hut to the fruitful 
production of the wrong# «(1)
(l) 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General in
Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol# V, pp#522-4*
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CHAPTER VIII 
REBELLION OP 1817*
The Orissa rehellion of 1817 had its origin in wrongs 
towards an individual of rank and consequence, who exercised 
powerful influence over those sections of the people, "reduced 
hy long suffering and oppression to a condition of extreme 
and desperate wretchedness*"(1)
Jagahandu Bidyadhar Mahapatra Bhramarahar Ray, popularly 
known as Jagahandu, inherited the office of Bakhshi, the 
Military Commander of the Raja of Khurda* He was next to the 
Raja, hoth in rank and in authority, because of his influence 
over the military of the country* He was regarded hy the 
Garjat Rajas and the people of the Mughalhandi as second to 
the representative of the ancient royal family of Orissa*
He had matrimonial alliances with the Raja of Shergarh on the 
Ghumsar frontier and the Raja of Baramha in Orissa*
(l) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations
17 July 1818 No. 15*
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For many generations, his family possessed an estate 
known as v<ila Rorang, which had been acquired “by purchase 
and was held at a quit rent* It was in the possession of 
the family of Jagabandhu at the time of British conquest* 
So the settlement of Rorang was made with him "by Harcourt 
at the end of 1803* In 1801|/5 a settlement was also 
concluded with him* In the following year he entered 
into engagements in G* Webb*s triennial settlement*^1^
A. rich Bengali named Kishen Chunder Singh was the 
diwan in the office of the collector, C* Groeme* His 
relation and dependent, Chunder Prasad Singh was the 
collector* s sarishtadar. When Wehh "became collector, 
Kishen Chunder Singh resigned hut Chunder Prasad Singh 
continued to hold his office until 1811, when he was 
dismissed on a charge of dishonesty (and peculation}*
His brother named Gaur Hari Singh was a tahsildarat Puri 
from 18014/5 ut least until 1809/10* He was entrusted 
with the collection of revenue from some khasmahals and 
zamindari estates. It appears that at Puri a scheme for 
dispossessing Jagabandhu from Rorang was prepared by Gaur 
Hari Singh, in communication with Kishen Chunder Singh,
(1) Ibid
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who had settled at Cuttack#^^
Several large and valuable parganas in the southern 
division of Cuttack, including the sacred town of Purusottam 
(Puri) had been taken from the Raja of Khurda, and placed 
under the direct management of the Maratha Government#
As these parganas were not claimed by any proprietors, after 
the British conquest the commissioners at Cuttack considered 
them to be "awkward incumbrances#” It was decided to 
get rid of them by sale# The amlas were probably them­
selves the first advocates of this measure with the intention 
of taking advantage of the situation# Rorang was no longer 
held at a peshkash# It was a valuable estate; it was 
very lightly assessed# It adjoined the pargana of Rahang 
in the vicinity of Puri# The object of Kishen Chunder 
Singh was to take this with other parganas such as Purusottam 
and Rahang to add to the intended zamindari#^^
In the second year of Webb’s triennial settlement,
Chundar Prasad Singh 1 insidiously1 pointed out to 
Jagabandhu the expediency of paying his revenue into the 
hands of the tahsildar at Puri, instead of into the collector’s 
treasury# By doing so, Jagabandhu fell into a snare# It 
was easy for the tahsildar to represent in his accounts the
(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid.
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collection of Rorang as “belonging to the pargana of Rahang#^1)
In 1807 a proposal was submitted to the Board of Revenue 
by the collector of Cuttack for the farming of the parganas 
Serain, Chabishkud and Rahang, which were for the first 
time in the English correspondence termed Rahang Ogrey#
It appears that the jama of Rorang was added to that of 
Rahang and was advertised for sale for the recovery of 
arrears of revenue as with others# (2) But no list of the 
mauzas and mahals was detailed in the Ishtihar-nama or 
public notice# Lukni Narayan ”a creature of Chunder Prasad 
Singh” took the farm of these parganas in 1807/8 (1215 Amali)# 
Another instrument of Chunder Prasad Singh purchased it in 
1808/9 (1216 Amali)# In the following year, when the 
parganas of Rahang Ogrey were put to sale, they were
purchased by Kishen Chunder Singh at a high price# The
........................................    . . .  ■ ■ (3 )
new estate was designated the zamindari of Purusottam Chhattar#
Jagabandhu1 s engagements for the triennial settlement
were still unexpired in 1807/8 (1215 Amali), and in the
following year# Perhaps that is why he was not interfered
with during this period, lest the truth might be exposed
and the scheme frustrated. It appears that the revenue
(1) Ibid#
(2) 2 April 181J+* Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 2 April 18li+ No# 32#
(3) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 17 July 1818 No# 15*
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paid by Jagabandhu into the tahsildar* s treasury in 1807/8 
(1215 Amali) was misappropriated#^^
As soon as Rorang passed into the hands of Kishen Chundar 
Singh, his servants attempted to take possession of it; 
Jagabandhu violently resisted; a riot took place; petitions 
were submitted to C# Buller, the commissioner of Cuttack#
R# Milford, the collector of the district, was directed to 
submit a report on the matter# But owing to the artifice 
of Chundar Prasad Singh, the sarishtadar, the truth was 
concealed* Such was the effect of the opposition of 
Jagabandhu that the new purchaser was for a long time unable
(2 )to obtain complete possession#^ '
It appears that Kishen Chundar Singh meanwhile thought 
it expedient to pacify Jagabandhu for some time by paying 
his malikana. Jagabandhu let Rorang in farm for the three 
years of Bullets settlement to Dip Chand, the record keeper 
of the Diwani court* But with the connivance of Kishen 
Chundar Singh, Dip Chand destroyed the old patta and took a 
new one from the f o r m e r # ^ )
In 1813* when Kishen Chundar Singh felt that the plot 
was matured, he came forward to enter into engagements for 
Rorang, as a part of his purchase. Jagabandhu found that
(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid.
(3) rbid#
now he was on the point of being wholly ousted* He therefore 
presented a petition to Richardson, the then commissioner of 
Cuttack, in which he stated that he paid the revenues of 
1806/7 (121U Amali) and 1807/8 (1215 Amali) into the hands 
of Gaur H3*i Singh, the tahsildar; in 1808/9 (1215 Amali), 
during his absence from home, his agents, who had been 
instructed to deposit the money with the farmers, paid it to 
the Raja of Khurda and obtained a receipt from him# In the 
same year, his estate was indluded in the farm of Rahang#^) 
This petition was investigated* It was proved beyond question 
that the annexation of Rorang was fraudulent* An order was 
passed for the separation of the two estates* But on
behalf of Kishen Chundar Singh it was pointed out by a 
representation in the court that the original right of 
jagabandhu to Rorang was questionable# Consequently an order 
v/as issued by the Government forbidding any engagements to 
be taken from him, until he should have established a title 
to the lands in the regular course of law or at least have 
satisfied the revenue authorities that he had a strong 
presumptive right to the property#(3)
Ewer wrote: "When the final orders of Government were
(1) Ibid.
(2) Ik January, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 29 January 181U No# 35•
(3) 28 May 1811)., Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 28 May 1811+ No# 20#
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co known on this subject, the complaints of Jagabandhu were 
loud and vehement* His language is said to have been almost 
threatening*” "He became in fact a beggar and for nearly 
two years derived his maintenance from voluntary contributions 
made by the people of Khurda for his support* His time was 
chiefly spent in wandering over the scenes of his former 
consequence and authority* Even in his fallen condition he 
continued to cling to those insignia of state to which his 
rank and titles as a principal servant of the Raja of Khurda 
entitled him and although a beggar, was constantly attended 
by a ragged tribe of followers bearing staves, morchuls, punkas 
etc." He added that when a darogha who found Jagabandhu in 
this condition advised him to institute a suit for the 
recovery of his estate f,he ever testified an invincible 
repugnance, pleading his want of means, the degradation of 
suing as a pauper and the uncertainty and inutility of any 
reference to the court by an Oriya when a rich Bengalee was 
to be his d e f e n d a n t )
to avenge his own injuries, were explained by him in the 
following manner in reply to a question put by the Raja of 
Khurda*
"The Inhabitants of Khuorda have sustained in the Mofussul
(l) 13 Mgcy 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consul­
tations 17 Jiy 1818 No. 15*
which Jagabandhu exploited
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a variety of injuries and oppressions from the Bengallees who 
are in office under the English Government, and who consider 
and declare themselves to he our Masters while no redress is to 
he obtained at the Suddur (meaning probably Cuttack) by the 
poor and oppressed from the Gentlemen in power in consequence 
of this influence of those Bengallees, and the favour shown to 
them, as an instance of which a seer of salt which used to be 
sold for 1 pun of cowries cannot at present be procured for 
12 puns - moreover where one Rupee was once taken, on account 
of revenue ten are now exacted and after all there are after 
[sic ? often] demands and balances* By the injustice of the 
judges the oppression of the wicked Thanadars, and the 
tyranny of the officers of the Salt Mehals, the people are 
altogether overwhelmed and being unable to leave their loved 
native lands, are grown desperate and careless of life* They 
have accordingly with the intention to avenge their injuries 
appointed me Jugbundhoo Bhomebur their leader.1 (■*•)
Y/hen Jagabandhu was trying to incite a rebellion, the alarm 
of an invasion of Orissa by the Pindaris was at its height in 
the month of January and February 1817* A leading 
sarbarahkar of Khurda who was at enmity with Jagabandhu reported
(l) Encl., 15 July 1817 > C.A. Molony, Persian Secretary to
Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 2k October 1817 
No. 1+9 (A letter of 26 April 1817 from the Raja of Khurda 
to Government)
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to the darogha of Khurda that a messenger had arrived from the
Pindari camp, Jagabandhu seemed to be conspiring with him
to incite disturbances in the country. The darogha without
delay attempted to seize Jagabandhu. He tried for some days
to do so. Jagabandhu was apprehensive for his personal
safety and took the earliest chance of executing his sdheme^1^
His plan was, first, to remove the British administration
from Khurda. He intended then to proceed to Puri to place the
Raja of Khurda at the head of his rebellion, for two main
reasons. First, the very name of the Raja would give strength
to his cause. Secondly, in the event of his restoration, the
rebels would easily receive assistance from the Garjat chiefs,
who still revered the representative of their ancient sovereign.
Letters of invitation to various important persons of the
district were issued by the rebels in the name of the Raja of
Khurda and chiefly written on Talapatras or palm leaves. It
appears that such invitations had some effect in the minds of
(2 )many persons like the Raja of Kujang and the Raja of Kanika. 1 
The rebellion started in the last week of March 1817 when 
a body of Kandh chohars to the number of 1+00 from Ghumsar 
territory entered Khurda, joined by Dalbeheras and paiks and
(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultation! 
17 July 1818 No- 15.
(2) Ibid; 29 April 1817> Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal 
Judicial Consultations j,R 12 August 1817 No. 23*
228
headed by Jagabandhu. They looted treasuries from the 
tahsildar*s kachahris at Banpur and Khurda. They carried off 
one of the Barkandazes and killed another; a servant of the 
darogha of Khurda was slain; another person was wounded when 
the Kachahri was b u r n t . O n  30 March 1817 Impey reported to 
the Government "I have had communication with several persons 
who were present when the Police Tannafa;Moonsiff1s cutchery, 
and Tehsildar’s cutchery at Khoorda were burnt and plundered; 
they all agree in stating that no Houses were destroyed, no 
property plundered and no one Individual touched, excepting those 
connected with the Government.ft (2)
Impey marched from Outtack with a detachment of 6k sepoys 
under the command of Lieutenant Travis of the 18th Bengal 
native infantry. He reached Gangpur pass, on his way to 
Khurda, which was surrounded on both its sides by the 
insurgents in large numbers. Here he learnt that Lieutenant 
Prideaux, who was at the head of a force at Khurda, was no 
longer there. By this time, the sepoys had been much harassed 
by exposure to the sun. Moreover they were running short of 
provisions. It was apprehended that, should the party be 
forced to return after going through the pass, it might suffer
(1) 29 March 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal
Judicial consultations L.P. 11 April 1817 Ho. 1.
(2) 30 March 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal
Judicial Consultations L.P. 11 April 1817 No. 3-
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great loss, even if it were not routed. So Lieutenant Travis 
was ordered to return to Cuttack. The British force reached 
Cuttack on h April 1817 > after being occasionally attacked 
by the insurgents on the way.^*^
Meanwhile, the rebellion spread. A body of paiks entered 
the village of Rathipur within five coss of the pargana of 
Lembai and murdered Charan Patnaik.^^ 0n 7 April 1817,
300 paiks with arras of various descriptions were Joined by 
RaJ^ballava Chhottaray, the khandait of Garh Padmapur. They 
surrounded a village known as Hariharpur, to which the 
tahsildar of Kothdesh sent an agent with a peon for the 
collection of revenue. The paiks beat them, took away their 
clothes and destroyed the revenue papers. They also searched 
the tahsildar. They plundered ten or twelve houses. They 
searched the bund darogha, looted his house and seized his 
uncle. Rebellion spread to the vicinity of Puri. The 
purchasers of the estates of Balrampur and Budhakera were 
violently dispossessed by the former proprietors.(3)
Now the insurgents attempted to execute the second part 
of their plan, to occupy Puri. On 12 April 1817 about 200
(1) 5 April 1817> Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial
Consultations L.P. 11 April 1817 No. 13*
(2) 30 March 1817> Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial 
Consultations L.P. 11 April 1817 No. h*
(3) 10 April 1817> Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial
Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 11.
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chohars assembled at Sukal village, at the south of Puri.
In the same evening another body of chohars, amounting to 
2,000, arrived at Lokanath ghat at Puri. The kachahri at 
Lokanath ghat was set on fire at 9 o'clock at night. Several 
other houses were set on fire in the town including the house 
of the police darogha. About 150 persons, variously armed, 
marched to the judge's bungalow by the sea shore, while a 
party of insurgents consisting of about 3 or U,000 stood at a 
distance from that bungalow. There was an exchange of smart 
firing for two hours between the troops stationed for the 
protection of the judge’s bungalow and the insurgents. By 
the time the insurgents came near the sepoys, the latter 
rushed forward, charged them and dispersed them in every 
direction.
A large body of insurgents including some Kandhs from 
Ghumsar and many paiks of the district, amounting to between 
5,000 and 10,000 and headed by jagabandhu, entered Puri on 
lk April 1817. The people of Puri joined hands with the 
i n s u r g e n t s . T h e  insurgents had an action near Jagannath in 
which an European and some sepoys were killed. The situation 
there became so serious that Captain Wallington who was there
(1) 15 April 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial
Consultations L.P*. 12 August 1817 No. 15.
(2) Ibid.
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with about 180 troops, could not stay any longer. He and his 
detachment, J. King and R. Becher, two salt officers, S. Rusby, 
the collector of the pilgrim tax, together with some public 
treasure, retreated from Puri to C u t t a c k . S o m e  pandas 
in collaboration with the insurgents pillaged the treasure 
left behind in the tax treasury, taking away about Rs. 3*900-. 
They also burnt the bungalows.(2) The retreat of the British 
detachment made the insurgents master of the place for some 
time. They attempted to make the Raja of Khurda, now living 
at Puri, the acknowledged leader of the rebellion. But it 
appears that the Raja was not willing to take any active part 
in it, because of his fear of the punishment which might be 
inflicted over him in case of failure. The town of Puri was 
strongly barricaded; various defences were thrown up in its 
vicinity and on the roads leading to it.(3)
More than 500 paiks under the leadership of two khandaits, 
who were followers of Jagabandhu, marched from Khurda to ]Kila 
Rupasa. They instigated insurrections in both Gope and Kujang. 
The khandaits of this part of the country assembled their 
respective paiks under the encouragement of the former
(1) 16 April 1817* Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial
Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 Nos. 17 & 18.
(2) 19 September 1817* Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal 
Revenue Consultations 19 September 1817 No. 15*
(3) 15 April 1817* Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial
Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 15* 16 April 1817*
Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations 
L.P. 12 August 1817 Nos. 17 & 18.
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zamindars of Marichpur, Harishpur and Golra; they extended 
their depw&ations into the villages situated within the 
thanas, Asureswar and Paharajpnr; they also plundered several 
zamindar s.
A body of Malangis who joined hands with the insurgents 
seized a darogha and an arala of the Rennah salt gola. They 
plundered them and carried them off. They seized the salt 
darogha of Bankud and Astrang. They plundered the kachahri 
of the zamindar of Purroah. Other persons who were seized 
and plundered were the aralas of the zamindar who had purchased 
kila Rupasa and the amlas of the zamindar of T a l a p a d d a . )
In the meantime there was a rumour of the intended attack 
of the insurgents on Outtack. The situation appeared so 
alarming that Colonel J.O. Halloran, commanding officer at 
Cuttack, thought it expedient to remove the collector's 
treasury to the Mahanadi and the Salt Agent's to the Kathjuri, 
for the sake of safety.(3)
Meanwhile Captain P. Le Pevre, at the head of a troop, 
searched for Jagabandhu in Khurda. But he could not find any 
trace of him. He marched to Ba^apur, then through Tirpini
(1) 29 May 1817* Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial 
Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 28.
(2) 22 April 1817> Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial 
Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 22.
(3) 1 May 1817> J.O. Halloran, Lt. Col. Commanding at Cuttack
to Impey, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P.
12 August 1817 No. 25.
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to Kanas and to Nagun-nala. At 9 o’clock in the morning of 
17 April, he reached the village of Dobunder where the 
insurgents to the number of 1,000 occupied a strong position 
on the bund. But on the opening of fire by the British force, 
they fled away in confusion. When Le Fevre reached Puri, 
he soon drove away the insurgents there. Then he kept an eye 
on the Raja of Khurda.
Meanwhile the Government had been informed of the outbreak 
of the rebellion and immediately directed an advance of five 
companies of native infantry from Midnapur to Cuttack. It 
also appointed Major General G. Martindell^2) to be the military
(j)
commissioner of Cuttack for the suppression of the rebellion.
The functions of the ordinary courts of law were suspended. 
Martial law was enforced, first at Khurda and Puri and then at 
Gope. Special care was taken to prevent the spirit of 
insurrection from spreading to the Garjat states in the 
vicinity of Khurda. Rewards were offered to all who helped
(1) 19 April 1817* Le Fevre to Impey, Bengal Criminal Judicial 
Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 21.
(2) He was born about 1756; Cadet in 11 the select picket”
corps 1772; Ensign in the Bengal N.I. 1776; in the
Maratha war of 180^-5; commanded the troops in 
Bundelkund in 1809» 1812; captured the fort of Kalingir 
1812; Major General 1813; commanded a division in the 
Nepal war 1811*^15; K.C.B. 1815; held a command in Pindari 
war 1818 (Buckland, Dictionary of Indian Biography p. 277; 
V.C.P. Hodson, List of the officers of the Bengal Army
vol. Ill, p. 24577" ; ;
(3) 8 April 1817* Government to Impey, Bengal Criminal Judicial 
Consultations L.P. 11 April 1817 No. 12.
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to capture the insurgents.^)
Martindell took his post at Khurda, the chief centre of 
the rebellion* He employed his forces in destroying 
stockades and in dispersing insurgents wherever they assembled 
in parties. As a result, he was able to control the situation 
within a short period. Prom this place he directed the 
movements of other troops to places where insurrection spread.^2) 
Major Hamilton, in command of the second "battalion, the 
18th Bengal native infantry, was ordered to secure and convey 
to Cuttack the person of the Raja of Khurda and such members of 
the Raja’s family as he might think proper. A party of 
insurgents under Dhararau Harichandan who were collected in the 
neighbourhood of Sarangagarh, about three and a half coss 
south of Cuttack, dispersed at the sight of the British force.
On the arrival of Major Hamilton at Puri, the persons of the 
Raja of Khurda and his son were secured. They were sent to 
Cuttack under the custody of a force commanded by Le Fevre.
A party of insurgents amounting to 2,500 collected at Pipli
(1) 26 April 18175 Government to Impey, Bengal Criminal Judicial
Consultations L.P. 2 May 1817 No. 5; 19 April 18175 Impey
to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations <  f.
12 August 1817 No. 20.
(2) 2 June 18175 Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial
Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 29; Secretary's 
(W.B. Bayley’s) report regarding Cuttack, 10 August 18175 
Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 16 September 
1817 No. 76.
(3) 29 April 1817 5 Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial
Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 23*
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to rescue the Raja. But they did not dare to attack the
"big force under Le Fevre. They attacked a comparatively
small force under the command of Captain Armstrong at Pipli,
who successfully dispersed them "by killing 19 and wounding
( t )"between 80 and 100. J It was stated that a body; of
insurgents had set fire to the thana at Nimapara. J. Pearson^2^
was directed to march with 80 firelocks to apprehend the
(a)
insurgents. But he could find no trace of them.
In consequence of the movement of troops to various parts 
of the country it appears that towards the end of May 1817 the 
insurrection was almost put down in Khurda, Puri and Pipli.
But the situation in Kujang and its neighbourhood could not be 
brought under control because the rainy season did not permit 
the march of troops in that direction. Taking this 
opportunity a body of 200 paiks attacked the thana of 
Patamundai and wounded four of the Barkandazes. Another body 
of paiks belonging to the Raja of Kujang rushed into the 
kachahri of one Ramprasad who had the duty of transporting salt 
from Kujang to the cha>vki. They plundered it. They seized
(1) 19 May 1817* Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial
Consultations L.P. 12 August, 1817 No. 26.
(2) James Pearson, Major, 65th Bengal Native Infantry.
(3) 1 June 1817> J. Pearson to Captain, R.C. Faithful, Major
of Brigade, Khurda, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations 
L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 32.
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all the amlas and carried them to Paradip. Eight Barkandazes 
who came to the assistance of the amlas were similarly seized 
and carried away. Consequently the salt "business of that 
part of the country was stopped. These paiks also destroyed 
the thana of Tirun.(l)
When the rainy season was over, a detachment under the 
command of Captain Kenneth) marched to Gope. Then he moved 
towards Kujang. On the approach of the British force the 
paiks and khandaits fled.(3)
Several persons who had taken an active part in the 
insurrections in various parts of the country, either in 
dispossessing the purchasers of estates or in attacking police 
thanas or in other ways, were apprehended. But Jagabandhu, 
the principal leader of the rebellion, together with some of 
his followers fled into the jungle and evaded capture.
However the season for carrying on active military operations
(1) Encl., 29 May 1817 > Ramprasad, a salt darogha to Salt Agent, 
Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 
No. 30.
(2) Charles Robert Kennet, Lieutenant Colonel, 68th Bengal 
Native Infantry.
(3) 1^ June, 1817> Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial
Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 31A; 26 July 1817/
G.W. Barnes, commanding at Gope to Faithful, Bengal Criminal 
Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. UU*
237
was over by July 1817*^^
Thus the rebellion to some extent subsided for a time*
It broke out afresh in Khurda and its vicinity early in April 
l8l8. This time the disturbances lost the character of open 
opposition to the troops of the Government. But a great 
amount of robbery, burhing and massacre somewhat depopulated 
Khurda, prevented the collection of revenue and spread'dismay 
and disorder into the neighbouring parganas. The state of the 
nolice was unsettled from the beginning of April until about 
the end of the rains of 1818. The paiks of Pipli and Gope 
thanas again showed a very unruly spirit. Many dacoities 
were committed within their limits by parties of armed men.
In view of this situation W.L.- Melville and Milliam Forrester 
were vested with the powers of joint magistrate and posted at 
Puri and Khurda respectively to bring order into the thanas of 
Puri, Gope, Harishpur, Tirun, Pipli and Khurda. In the tract 
of country within the jurisdiction of the former officer, 
things relapsed to a state of perfect quiet by the close of 
the rains in 1 8 1 8 . ^
(1) 10 April l8l8, Stirling to Government, Bengal Criminal
Judicial Consultations L.P.- 28 April 1818 Mo.^2; 19
August 1817* Resolution, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consul­
tations L.P. 16 September 1817 No. 77; 12 June 1817,
Martindell to Impey, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations 
L.P. 12 August 1817 Mo. 32B.
(2) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 19 May 1820 Ho. 25*
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In Khurda matters began to assume a somwhat favourable 
aspect only towards the beginning of November 1818, in 
consequence of measures taken by the joint magistrate and 
the Brigadier commanding the troops at Cuttack. Yet the 
situation was not free from anxiety there.
Many of the leaders of the rebellion had not yet been 
apprehended. According to official proclamations they were 
not entitled to any pardon. Ker however thought that the 
disturbances were kept alive :r a great ; ea sure bp icnnecess- 
arily continuing in force the proclamations exempting from 
benefit of amnesties several principal Delbeheras and servants 
of the Raja of Khurda. Many of those who were in despair of 
pardon and lacked the means of subsistence continued, to 
arouse i.nrcst. Ee thought that several leaders who had 
disbanded their gangs were likely to throw themselves.at the, . 
mercy of the Government if they were encouraged to do so. 
Secondly, the natural difficulties of the country rendered
(o}
their seizure almost hopeless.
In view of these considerations Ker recommended, in 
April 1819* the issue of one general proclamation of pardon 
throughout the district, for all offences connected with the 
disturbances which had been committed between 1 April 1817 
and 1 March 1819« Accordingly the Government granted a full
(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid.
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and free pardon# It declared a general amnesty throughout 
the Hughalbandi for all offences connected with the distur­
bances, inviting the people to return to their families and 
usual occupations with the fullest confidence# This amnesty 
was rot extended to the persons actually in confinement# 
Jagabandhu and some principal leaders were also excluded from 
general pardon*
This proclamation produced two effects. First, it closed 
forever the opportunity for individuals to gratify private 
animosities by making accusations of complicity in the 
insurrection. Secondly it gave confidence to the rebels to 
return to their homes#
The Court of Directors suggested that martial law should 
be administered with as much forbearance as circumstances 
might admit of, so that the affection of the people.might not 
be alienated from the Government.(2) Hartindell transmitted 
to the Government the names of 268 prisoners, the greater part 
of whom were confined on general charges of rebellion or 
plunder without any specification of the date when or the 
place where the offence was committed#^3) He took so liberal 
a view of affairs that he commuted all sentences of death.
(1) Ibid.
(2) 29 July 1818, Court of Directors to Governor General in 
Council, Revenue Letters to Bengal 1818-21, Vol.VI, p#l6#
(3) 18 llarch 1818, Ewer, Acting Magistrate to Government, 
Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L#P# 31 llarch 
1818 Ho#10#
ITnen this matter was brought before the advocate general, he 
remarked 1 the humanity in the chief and-military commissioner 
of the district has led him to commute all sentences by which 
death was to be inflicted, so that if these proceedings be 
irregular, the consequences are not irreparable.r|(l) The 
Government did consider the proceedings taken under martial law 
to have been illegal. It was decided that the accused should 
be brought before the ordinary criminal courts.^) The Governor 
General in Council instructed the magistrate of Cuttack, !,that 
individuals charged with minor offences should not be brought 
to trial or subjected to punishment and the Government will 
be disposed to receive into their favourable consideration any 
suggestions which you may wish to offer for the pardon of more 
serious offenders either on ground of policy of of any circum­
stances in favour of such offenders.!,0 )  Although the matter 
was taken up by the ordinary courts, in the light of the above 
instructions, yet Gopal Chhottaray and four of his followers 
were executed and more than 70 inhabitants of Khurda or its
<*0
immediate vicinity were either imprisoned or transported for lifa
(1) 27 April 1818, R. Spankie, Advocate General to Government, 
Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 28 Anril 1818 
No. 31.
(2) 28 April 1818, Government to Nizamat. Adalat, Bengal Crimin' 
al Judicial Consultations L.P. 28 April 1818 No. 32.
(3) 31 March 1818, Government to Magistrate of Cuttack, Bengal 
Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 31 March 1818 No. 11.
(*+) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 19 May 1820 No. 25*
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The rebellion, in short, was conducted by the head of the 
military of the old Government of Orissa, actively backed by 
almost all the paiks, Delbeheras and Dalais of the Bughalbandi. 
Secondly the other class of active rebels who joined hands with 
them were the dispossessed proprietors of many estates; for 
example, the ancient proprietors of Harishpur, Karichpur, Golra, 
Balrampur, Budhakera and Rupas, which had passed into the hands 
of the new p u r c h a s e r s * T h i r d l y ,  the political authority of 
the Raja of Khurda, who remained discontented, added to the 
unity and strength of the rebels, although there is no proof 
that the Raja took any active part in the rebellion. Fourthly, 
the encouragement of some hill Rajas and the very active part 
played by the paiks belonging to the Raja of Kujang made the 
situation still worse* Lastly, there was the general support of 
the people either because of their fear of the rebels or because 
of their miseries or difficulties arising from some defects in 
the British administration.^^
The significance of the rebellion of 1817 lies in the fact 
that until the outbreak, the British Government failed to detect 
many legitimate grievances. . It was only when the rebellion had
(1) Secretary*s (II.B. Bayley*s) report regarding Cuttack, 19 
August 1817, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations
lo September 1817 Bo. 76.
(2) 19 April 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal 
Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 Bo. 20; 29 April 
1817? Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial 
Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 Bo. 23.
2kZ
broken out under the leadership of Jagabandhu, "a man
whose name has acquired and will long remain such an . 
unfortunate celebrity in the district,1* that the Government 
tried to find out what was wrong with the administration.
(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 17 July 1818 No. Ij.
CHAPTER IX 
REMEDIES.
Soon after the outbreak of the rebellion of 1817, the 
Government directed Impey to make enquiry into the causes of 
the disturbances. Hot content with Impey*s report, the Govern­
ment sent Watson to make further investigations. The reports 
of these officers suggested different causes. One ;of them was 
the unfitness of the existing laws to the character of the 
people and to local circumstances. Then there were grievances 
arising from the misconduct of individual officials. There 
were also complaints of the intrigues of individuals possessing 
local influence.^
For a more -detailed account the Government appointed a . 
commission of two members - G. Martindell, the Military 
Commander of Cuttack, and Walter Ewer, whose efforts had already 
been successful in reforming the police and suppressing dis­
orders in Myminsing, Ra;jshahi and Kidnapur. The commission 
was directed to make enquiries regarding those evils which were 
stated to have existed in various departments of the Government*
(1) b July 1817, Governor General in Council to Court of Direc­
tors, Board*s ’ Collections Vol. 582, 1^ +178, pp. 19-23;. 26 April 
1817, Government to Watson, Bengal Criminal Judicial Con­
sultations L.P. 2 May 1817 Ho. 2; Resolution, Bengal 
Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 16 September 183>7 Ho*77.
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The attention of Martindell was chiefly limited to matters
connected with security against external enemies and the final
suppression of the insurrection* As the civil commissioner,
Ewer was specifically directed to enquire into the general state
of the country and more particularly of those parts of it in
which disturbances prevailed* Ke was also ordered to.direct
his attention to the redress of grievances, the detection of .
abuses, the punishment of offenders and the maintenance of
public order. He was also appointed acting judge and magistrate
of Cuttack in succession to Impey*^
Hartindell left Orissa when the rising had subsided. After
due enquiry intothe causes of the disturbances,Ewer submitted
a report to the Government. This report is a landmark in the
history of Orissa because it opened the eyes of the Government
to the negligence of the local officers, explained the whole
situation in an able manner and thus prepared the way for
reforms. It suggested a radical change in both the economic
and the judicial policy of the Government, on the ground that it
had not hitherto paid enough attention to the character of the
people, the resources of the country and the historical legacy
(2)left by the former Government.
(1) Resolution, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P.
16 September 1817 Ho. 77; Resolution, Bengal Public 
Consultations 28 October 1817 Ho. 13*
(2) 13 Nay I8l8ii Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations
17 July I8l8 No. I?.
In his report, Ewer suggested some remedies for the defects 
of the revenue system. He first recommended a limitation of 
the revenue demand for a number of years. He thought it 
necessary to secure the landholders generally against an 
increase of the public demand and to give them confidence to 
introduce improvements of which they could enjoy the benefit, 
so that the Government might eventually expect an increase in 
the revenue. Secondly, in view of the acknowledged uncertainty 
of all former settlements and in view of many complaints of 
actual overassessment, he suggested that a readjustment of the 
existing settlement should be undertaken as speedily as possible 
bn the principle of correcting errors and equalising the dis­
tribution of the whole demand rather than with a view to any 
material increase,
Pie therefore recommended that the existing settlement should 
be extended to 1820/1821 (the end of 1228 Amali). Pie asserted 
that it was only after an accurate enquiry into the resources 
and capabilities of the district that a settlement for nine or 
eleven years could be made. At the same time he warned^that all 
promise of, or even allusion to, a permanent settlement should be 
cautiously abstained from in any future regulations until the 
time when the Court of Directors decided to confer that "important 
advantage" on Orissa,
(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid.
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He discussed the question of restoring the khandaits and 
paiks to their former condition and also the reinstatement of 
the Raja of Khurda. The former, he thought, would be a source 
of trouble. If a vigorous police were established to punish 
their petty aggressions, the khandaits would lose their power; 
the paiks would mingle with the bulk of the agricultural popu­
lation and give up their peculiar habits. He also thought 
that to restore the Raja might bring further political trouble* 
But he suggested liberal treatment for him.^^
As we have seen, there had been popular complaints that
the supply of salt had been too small and the price too high.
Ewer recommended an adequate supply of salt, lie took into 
consideration the circumstances of the inhabitants of different 
parts of Orissa and the rates at which salt used to be sold.
He therefore suggested that the sale price should be restored'
to two and a half rupees in the central Aurangs of ICanika and
Huja-ng and that one rupee per maund should be the rate at all
(?)places of manufacture south of the river Debi. '
We have already noticed the hardship of the raiyats owing 
to the fall in the value of kauris. As a remedy Ewer suggested 
that the experiment should be tried for the next two or three 
years of receiving a portion of the revenue in kauris; he 
remarked UI cannot conceive that any serious evils would result
(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid.
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from the adoption of the measure.
Ewer also suggested some Judicial reforms. Ue have
seen that the judge did not seem to inspire much popular confi­
dence. Ewer recommended that in selecting a person for that 
office disposition should be as much attended to as ability. In 
order to win the confidence of the people, the judge should pass 
the cold season of every year in.visiting every quarter of his 
district attended by as many officers as.necessary who should be . 
©riyas. These Oriyas should encourage the people to submit 
petitions. The judge in his enquiries should prove himself
anxious toascertain their real condition and redress their 
(2)grievances.
We have also seen that Oriyas were not employed in any 
office of trust and responsibility, and that this gave rise to 
some discontent. ' Ewer suggested that Oriyas if possible should 
hold every government post in Orissa. He remarked "although it 
nay be difficult to procure immediately persons properly qualif­
ied to fill up the higher situations, yet b$r supplying every 
vacancy the Oorias in time will acquire all the requisite
knowledge.1 (3) . ■.
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In view of Ewerfs report the Governmend deluded to change
the nature of the administration in Orissa. In order to cayry
(1) Ibid.
(2) 27 February 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Criminal 
Judicial Consultations L.P. 28 April 1818 No. 37*
(3) Ibid.
out active measures of reform, Pi". Her, the second Judge of
the Court of Cedar Diwani Adalat, Ma civil servant of high
rank,, great weight of’character and extensive experience
both in the Judicial and Territorial Departments11, was
nominated, in April 1818, ■ Commissioner of Cuttack-. He
was vested with a general control.over the civil adminis- .
tration of the district.^
In the superintendence of the land revenue and customs
and in the control of the salt department within the local
limits of Cuttack, the Commissioner was authorised to assume
the functions of the Board of Revenue and of the Board of
Trade. Us was also authorised to discharge the duties
hitherto entrusted to the Committee of embankments in
Cuttack and to assume the immediate superintendence of
(2)
the tributary states. .........................  , ..........
The Commissioner was also vested with the powers and 
functions hitherto exercised by the provincial Court of 
Appeal and circuit for the division of Calcutta. His 
decisions and orders in ail suits coming under his 
cognizance was to be final.
(1) Regulation V, 1818, 28 April; Government to Her,
Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations. L.P. 28 Anril 1818 
Ho.kk.
(2) Ibid. , . ,* ;
(3) Ibid.
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The concentration of such extensive, rover into the
hands of a single authority necessitated the passing of a
special regulation - regulation V of 1818 - and thereby the
exercise of the functions of the hoards and other authorities
mentioned above vas suspended* These functions the divil
dommissioner was authorised to exercise. It vas also
decided that further special powers might he thereafter
delegated to the commissioner, if after taking charge of
his office, he found them necessary to the success of
(1)
his mission.
The placing of the administration of Orissa under a 
commissioner with special powers brought radical changes 
both in economic and judicial affairs.
luring kerfs rule an attempt was made to set the 
revenue .system in order. The arrears for 1815/16 (.1223 , . 
Amali) and for 1816/17 (122b Amali) together with previous 
years were Us.660,617. By the time her reached Cuttack 
the arrears for 1817/18 (122? Amali) were Rs.1,263,953 
on a jama of Rs.l,51+1>953 at the time when the last instal­
ment was due. Thus the total arrears stood at Rs.l,92*f,570* 
Ker announced a general sale of estates because at that
(1) Ibid.
moment it was considered difficult to find out any other way
for the collection of arrears. .."The melancholy spectacle
was exhibited of a sale of .Mf estates paying a jumma of
Rs. 50,301+,t; still a balance of Rs.£72,822 remained due for
that year besides heavy balances for former years.^
Ker thought that if some of the arrears were relinquished,
it would enable the zamindars to discharge the dues of the
Government with punctuality. Koreover, in his opinion,
it was preferable to make this sacrifice rather than to have
recourse to measures involving an almost entire transfer of
the landed property of the country. According^ at her!s
recommendation the Government authorised the collector to
write off various sums. The largest portion of the arrears’
relinquished was either nominal or was due from persons who
possessed no means whatsoever to, discharge the debt. , ,The
(2)
arrears thus relihquished amounted to Rs.58l,9^*
her died at Cuttack before lie submitted the final report. . 
Stirling, the secretary to the commissioner, wrote on his
(1) 29 February 1820j Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 19 Hay 1820 No.25; 30 llarch 1821, Governor-
General in Council to -h Court of Directors: Revenue 
Letters from Bengal 1820-21 Vol.X, p.l9*+*
(2) 30 N.arch'l821, Governor General in Council to •: .. Court
of Directors, Revenue Letters from Bengal 1920-21 Vol.X,
-0-0 .197-8.
behalf. He stated that in Tier's opinion Mthe annulment
of the process of confining defaulting samindars was one of
the few material defects which he conceived to exist in the
Bengal Code*/ but to this he attributed nthe sweeping sales of
the landed property’1 in Orissa. As a remedy against this
defect some extension of the collector!s power of coercion
appeared to him indispensable. He stressed the issue of
Dastaks to remind them in time. A draft of a regulation
to that effect was submitted to the Government in August I8l8,
and was promulgated with some alterations in November as
(1)
Regulation X, 1818.
(1) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 19 hay 1920 Ho.25.
This regulation stated that every proprietor or farmer 
of land was to pay the instalment at the appointed tine 
without delay.  ^ If he fell Into arrears the collector/ 
either issued a Dastak by a peon or sent a written notice 
requiring payment within a given period. If the arrears 
were not discharged within thetime stated, the peons brought 
the defaulter or his surit^ to^collectorfs kachahri. If.. 
the arrears were not pajufr'udia defaulter was kept under the 
charge of peons for fifteen days. If security was not given 
and the arrears were not paid by the end of fifteen days 
he was sent to jail on the order of the collector. The 
collector was also authorisedto attach the estate of a 
defaulting proprietor or farmer of land without personal 
arrest.
(vide RegulationBH, I8l8).
Ths above measures had an immediate effect in stimulating
the samindars to pay the amount demanded from them out of
their immediate resources and in enabling them to raise money
(1)
in the market when relieved from the burden of old balances.
Consequently the revenue of 1818/19 (1226 Amali) could be 
collected within the Amali year with a balance of only about 
Rs.hG,0C0. This result was attained with a very limited 
recourse to the measure of a public sale. Only thirteen 
mahals were sold up leaving a jama of Rs.8,li-68. The year 
1819/20 (1227 Amali) showed a still better result. The revenue 
of that year was realised with the exception of a balance of 
ds.39,CCO. This result was attained without any public sales 
except in the casebf four estates bearing an aggregate jama 
of ^
In referring to the improvement in collection under the 
new system the Governor General in Council stated f,the above 
improvement is in a considerable measure to. be ascribed to the 
operation of Regulation X 1018...still more however is doubtless 
to be ascribed to the immediate supervision of the commissioner
(1) 29 February 1820 , Stirling to . : Government, Bengal Revenue
Consultations 19 Hay 1920 No.25*
(2) 30 March 1921, Governor General in Council to Court of Direc­
tors, Revenue Letters from Bengal 1820-21 Vol.X, p.2CG; 29 
February 1920, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consul­
tations 19 Bay 1920 No.2?.
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and to the nersonal character of the officers to whom the
revenue administration has for some time past been confided
and by whom the more extensive powers vested in them by the
above law anrear to have been exercised with great tenderness
(1)
and discretion11.
VJe have already discussed over-assessment as one main
reason for the heavy arrears outstanding. The relinquishment
of some arrears now gave a temporary relief to the landholders.
hut it was apprehended that unless the . jamas of some over-assessed
estates were not reduced, heavy balances of a similar nature
would be repeated. Go settlements were made with many estates
at a reduced jama. For example, the following table will show
(2)
the reduction of the jama of some estates.
hame of the Jama of Jama of the
estate the rear 1817/18 year 1819/20
(1225 Amali) in (1227 Amali)
run e e s______________ inrun e e s
hhurda ......... . . ll!r,27!! ... . ..52, 09 ..
Delang-Lembai .. 18,27.1 ...... 29,627
Rahang-Chabishataid 
and 8arain 66.175 W . 8C)tf
Cordats .. ... 1C9A08 ... . 97,087.
Horans ... ... _ . . 7,268 if, 000
(1) 30 harch 1820, Governor General in Council to Court of 
Directors, Revenue Letters from Bengal 1820-21 Vol. X.,p.2Cl.
(2) Ibid.
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As a natural consequence of these settlements the jama 
of Orissa was reduced. The following table shows how the -jama 
of Orissa continued to be reduced both in 1818/19 (1226 Amali): 
and in 1819/20 (1227 Amali).
Year Jama in runees
1818/19
J J. / • • •
(1226 Amali) ... 1,7^0,97.3__________
1819/20 (1227 Anali) ... l.*+08.082
Excluding the tributary states the settlement of 1819/20
exhibited an aegregate of 2,362 mahals assessed with a jama of
. (2) '
'Is . 1, 299 512b.
hre have seen that the British revenue policy, prior to 
the rebellion, dispossessed about two thirds of the original 
Oriya proprietors. They were replaced by outsiders. The 
rebellion showed that they had no power to check disorder; 
rather were many of them dispossessed by the old proprietors 
backed by the raiyats. ITow the Government decided against 
alienating further the sympathy of the old landed aristocracy. 
The new policy was to secure the Iranquility and prosperity of the 
country by "attaching the leading men to our Government and 
leaving to all classes the enjoyment of their lands on terms
(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid.
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(1)of moderation11.
In accordance with this policy settlements were made 
with many of the original proprietors;, in some cases the Govern­
ment purchased the estates of defaulters and restored then to 
the original proprietors. Hereafter the Government began to 
deprecate the extended use of the system, of khas management on'.
the ground that it tended to dissolve the.connection between the
(2)
agricultural community and their natural leaders.
Also, the khandaits were now confirmed in their personal 
rights. In other words, they were permitted to retain some 
jagir lands. But the ordinary raiks were not afforded any 
peculiar privileges, first, because the attempt to find out the 
individuals among them who formerly enjoyed the jagir lands was. 
unsuccessful as they were generally confounded with the raiyats; 
secondly it was considered that the maintenance of such a 
’mischievous’ class might disturb the peace of the country. J
Forbearance was shown to the Haja of Hhurda. He received 
a fixed stipend of Ids 2,^00 per annum as zamindar of hhurda, 
without any reference to the reductions made In the jama of that 
estate. Soon after the death of Kukunda heva, an advance of 
us• 10,000 was made to m s  son i>o the expenses of the funeral
(1) Ibid. - pr>.2>+2, 2 5 h
(2) Ibid.. d: r?.210.
(3) Ibid.. n.2b-l.
ceremony. This amount was later qn declared to be a free 
gift of the Government. : 'At. -the same time'.he- was released from ■. 
any further demands on account' of the balances due from'his ; 
father which amounted to Rs.7,685* ^ "^D
Popular complaints about: salt received the attention.of the. 
Government. The Government'first supplied'more salt.and on ' 
easier terms than before. . The following table shows that for ■ 
the three years l8lh/15, 1815/16 and I8I6/I7, the quantity of., 
salt annually sold by the Agent averaged 1^9, M+2,maunds. In
1818/19 and 1819/20 the annual quantity sold averaged 235,^ -60
. (2) mauncis.
year  maunds  year maunds
iBlVl? .. 1^9,539 1818/19.. 2l6,b-l6
1815/16 .. 166,008 1819/20.. 25^,505
1816/17 .. 132,779
Secondly, the price of salt was reduced. In 1819 the 
price of salt in the town of Cuttack was two rupees and eight 
annas uer maund - more than 36 ner cent below the' average'of 
preceding years. The Governor General in Council remarked ,!bv 
this means, a considerable increase of revenue has been, obtained
(1) Ibid.- p.212.
(2) 29 February 1820, Stirling-to ■■Government. Bengal Revenue Con­
sultations 19 Hay 1820.Ho.25; 36 March 1820, Governor General 
in Council to Court of Directors, Revenue Letters from Bengal 
1820-21 Vol. X, p.221.
and the comforts of the people appear to have been essentially
promoted”. He further added 1 the facility and regularity with
which the article has been procurable will have further proved
f (1)
a source of essential convenience'1.
The Government now took notice of the popular inconvenience
which had arisen from the disturbed relation of kauris and silveu
It felt that receiving kauris as revenue would have afforded.a
partial and unequal relief to those affected. Butin view of
the immediate inconvenience and ultimate embarrassment to all
commercial dealings, such an idea was abandoned. However the
revenue demand had already been much reduced. The .demand for
silver was therefore less felt then before. Consequently
(2)the complaints were no longer heard.
Before the rebellion, the condition of the embankments 
had been unsatisfactory. They were considered ”to be almost 
universally in a very decayed and precarious state”. her' 
judged it expedient to place the superintendents of the bunds 
on a more respectable footing than hitherto and to give them 
effectual control over the bund daroglias. Considering the 
importance of the embankments he represented to the Government 
that ”an ill-judged restriction of the estimates must be pro­
ductive of most extensive mischief” in Grissa. The official
(1) Ibid.
(2) 20 march 1821, Governor General in Council to h 3 Court of 
Directors, Revenue Letters from Bengal 1820/21 Vol. X, pp.
2k9-50\
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sanction he secured for the disbursement of the bund department
uas for an amount as high as Rs.y^OCO, exclusive of the cost
(1)
of sstablishment.
Several new bunds were built with a view to the improvement 
and extension of cultivation* The system was generally to 
construct ,Dobundheest (double bunds) at some distance in cases 
where the old embankments were much decayed or washed away and 
from their position close to the rivers were exposed to further 
constant dilapidation. The !Dobundheesf were generally solidly 
formed and promised to stand for years without requiring any but 
the most trifling repairs. Stirling later wrote that her's 
measures 1 secured the due and fair expenditure of the greater 
portion of his heavy amount and the advantages likely to be felt 
from it have been very generally and gratefully acknowledged by 
the landlords11. ^
Reforms were also made in the police and judicial system as 
in economic nolicy. her recommended the suspension of the 
chaukidari regulation in Cuttack, chiefly on the ground that the 
tax was oppressive and that the number of burglaries committed 
in the town of Cuttack was always inconsiderable. In his words, 
1 the greater portion of the inhabitants of the town of Cuttack 
are certainly poor and the tax no doubt bears heavily upon them
(1) 29 February 182C, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 19 hay 1820 ITo.25*
(2) Ibid.
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and is a real grievance. It is vain to tell the people 
that the object of the regulation is to ensure their safety 
and promote their happiness* They cannot comprehend how 
their happiness is to he promoted hy taxation nor can they 
he convinced of the necessity of an establishment to ensure 
their safety from dangers which they do not fear and which 
do not and never did exist to an extent to create alarm*” 
Accordingly the Government suspended the operation of Regulation 
XXII, 1816, on 28 August 1818 J 1*
When Ker reached Cuttack the state of the police was 
’disorganised1, consequent upon the disturbance© of 1817, 
in the southern part of the Mughalhandi, particularly in the 
smaller kilas and in the thanas of Pipli, Gope, Tirun and 
Hariharpur* Por the efficient control of the police,
W*L* Melville, and active and considerate officer, was 
appointed joint magistrate and deputy collector in those 
areas* As a result, these thanas were no longer troubled 
by the paiks or any other plunderers*
Complaints against the corruption of the police gradually 
died out in consequence of the vigilance and regular tours 
of the magistrate and c o m m i s s i o n e r * ^ )
(1) Ibid*
(2) 11 January 1822, Governor General in Council to Court 
of Directors, Judicial Letters from Bengal 1820-22 Vol*
VII, pp.U!+l-2. '
(3) Ibid, p*W+*
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The vexations and hardships of prosecutors, witnesses 
and prisoners were obviated to a great extent, first, because 
the session courts were held more frequently than before; 
secondly because 1 superior1 regularity was maintained in 
trying cases within the competency of the magistrate*^ ^
The civil branch of judicial administration was improved 
to a great extent. Many of the amlas indulging in corruption 
were dismissed and punished* Stirling thought in 1820 that 
a healthy atmosphere prevailed under the watchful eye of the 
judged2)
Moreover as a result of judicial decisions passed since 
1818 in cases of disputes about land many of the former land­
holders were restored* Amongst these were the iChandaits of 
Harishpur and Bishenpur who held lands at a fixed jama* Similar 
privileges were awarded to many of the proprietors of smaller 
kilas subject to variable assessment* Moreover, a Khandait 
Raja who had been dispossessed was reinstated in the enjoyment 
of his hereditary right by an award of the zila court *(3)
There had been many affrays arising from disputes 
respecting the right of succession to estates or other contested
(1) Ibid. p.1445
(2) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue 
Consultations 19 May 1820 No* 25*
(3) 11 January 1822, Stirling to fovornmcnt, Bengal Revenue 
Governor General in Council to Court of Directors,
Judicial Letters from Bengal 1820-22 Vol* VII, pp*U56-7*
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claims of land prior to the arrival of Ewer to enquire into 
the causes of the rehellion. These contested claims drew 
the ready attention of the Government; they were settled 
by either summary or regular courts*^^
The Government adopted the policy of appointing Oriyas 
to all posts for which they were qualified*^)
In fact within so short a period very appreciable 
reforms could be effected in the judicial administration*
This may be summarised in the words of the Governor General in 
Council* He stated that "the state of police throughout the 
district has greatly improved, that civil justice is adminis­
tered with efficiency and the confidence of the people in 
our judicial administration has beeen restored*" This success 
was due to the change in policy and to greater vigilance on the 
part of the officials* In the words of the Governor General 
in Council, "these benefits appear" "to be mainly ascribable 
to the establishment of the special commission and to the 
exertion of the individuals who have so ably and zealously 
conducted the administration of the province*"(3)
(1) Ibid* p*U43*
(2) Ibid* p.U®2-3
(3) Ibid* pp*i+66-7#
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CHAPTER Xj.
conclusion
The period from 1803 to 1819 was a period of rapid 
transition in the history of Orissa. Political changes 
were followed by administrative changes. Prior to this 
period, the British had attempted for nearly four decades 
to secure Orissa through diplomacy, because they wished 
to complete the line of communication between the terri­
tories under the Bengal and Madras Governments. They 
apprehended that the possession of Cuttack by the Raja 
of Nagpur would enable him to interrupt communications 
between Calcutta and Madras; that would facilitate the 
invasion of Bengal and the Northern Sarkars; that also 
would help the French or other European powers to land in 
that country. But British diplomacy failed to persuade 
the Raja to cede Orissa. When Wellesley became Governor 
General he thought that force would have to be used. Thus 
in 1803 the conquest of Orissa formed an important part 
of the war against the Maratha confederates.
Wellesley desired a peacable surrender of the cotintry 
so that people's minds would not be disturbed by the panic 
of the war. But the Marathas did not agree to this 
proposal. However, the British forces that went to occupy
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Cuttack received opposition from the Marathas only at 
a few places. In particular, Maratha resistance was 
bolder at Balasore and Barabati than elsewhere# The 
Maratha force at Cuttack was weak; the Raja of Nagpur 
was busy fighting the British elsewhere and was unable 
to reinforce it# Thus the Marathas were completely 
overwhelmed by the British well-planned attack and 
superior military skill. They were defeated and fled 
to Nagpur through the Barraul pass# The British won an 
easy victory# This was due not only to their superior 
plan of attack but also to their diplomacy in alienating 
the sympathy of the tributary Rajas from the Maratha 
Government by offering them hopes of liberal treatment#
To this should be added the proclamations and promises 
made by the British, which envisaged a better government 
in the interests of all#
The conquest was followed by a rebellion. The 
British policy of conciliation and liberal treatment was 
looked upon with great satisfaction by the tributary chiefs. 
The Raja of Khurda went to the extent of taking it to be 
a weakness. At the time of conquest the British asked 
the Raja for some help for which he was paid. During
i
Maratha rule four parganas had been taken from him and 
added to the Mughalbandi. Now he thought it a suitable
26k
time to bargain with the British for the restoration of 
those parganas. But the British, who claimed the 
sovereign authority over the country, were not willing 
to cede territories to a subordinate chief# The Raja 
rebelled. He was helped by some other tributary chiefs 
because of his influence over them. The British sent 
troops against them and put down the rebellion# The 
Raja of Khurda and the Raja of Kanika were imprisoned#
Their territories were brought under the administration 
of the British. When they were afterwards released, the 
Raja of Kanika was restored to his own state by paying 
a tribute as before# But the British did not give the 
Raja of Khurda that privilege because as the leader of 
the rebellion he seemed to them to deserve more punishment 
than anybody else. Because he was asked to pay a regular 
jamaa to the ^Government if he wanted the restoration of 
Khurda, he declined. Here one can remark that if Khurda 
had been restored to the Raja in return for payment of 
the original tribute, there might not have been another 
Jagabandhu to excite rebellion in 1817#
At the time of conquest and soon after it the British 
entered into agreements with the hill chiefs. Sixteen 
of them were exempted from the general regulations# This 
policy was based on both political expediency and the precedent
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left by the Marathas. These chiefs were treated as 
subordinate allies. They enjoyed freedom in the internal 
administration of their territories. But the British 
reserved the right to interfere if they thought it 
necessary. When charges of murder and other crimes 
against some of the tributary chiefs were brought before 
the British Government, enquiries were made; if feuilt was 
proved, punishment was inflicted. When murders were 
oommifcted in some states in connection with the succession 
to the throne, the British, in order to avoid violence, 
passed a regulation to control the decision of claims 
relating to succession to the sixteen states. All this 
shows that the British Government pressed upon the Rajas 
not to indulge in crimes and to improve their methods of 
Government for the benefit of the people. But at the 
same time the Government was cautious to abstain as far 
as possible from all gratuitious and unnecessary inter­
ference with the Rajas which might move them to create 
discontent against the British authority.
Again British religious policy in Orissa during the 
period under review seems to have been as acceptable to 
the people as that of the Marathas had been. Indeed, the 
British were more anxious than their predecessors to reform 
the management of the temple of Jagannath£to make the
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collection of the pilgrim tax more systematic and to 
provide more facilities for the pilgrims than before.
Of course a similar policy was followed in the collection 
of the pilgrim tax at other places like Gaya and Allahabad 
and in the management of many Hindu religious institutions 
in other parts of India. But the temple of Jagannath was 
a particularly celebrated religious institution in India 
to which a large number of pilgrims from different areas 
resorted every year. It therefore drew the special 
attention of the British.
Under British patronage the temple of Jagannath 
prospered. Soon it became an eyesore to people influenced 
by Evangelical ideas or missionary zeal. They vigorously 
attacked the policy of the government as encouraging 
idolatry. On the one hand they pleaded that the Government 
should not patronise any idolatrous institutions. On the 
other hand they expected an active help from the Government 
for the spread of Christianity. The Court of Directors 
under Evangelical influence opposed the patronage of 
native religious institutions. But the Board of Control 
held that the British government had obligations to support 
them as the successor of the native Government. Political 
expediency demanded that the ^Government should not actively 
encourage the preaching of Christianity because it might
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result in popular re sent we-vi*
On the other hand unlike their policy towards the 
tributary states and towards religion, the new administrative 
system introduced by the British encountered sane diffi­
culties . Pram 1803 to 1805 Orissa was placed under the 
administration of two canmissioners. These first 
commissioners were not fettered by any regulations. They 
enjoyed wide powers. They could easily adjust matters to 
suit local needs while paying due respect to the practice 
and precedent of the Marathas. This period may be 
called a period of observation. But it was inadequate.
If it could have been extended for a few years more it 
would probably have done much good.
Prom 1805 to 1817 Orissa entered into a different 
type of administration. Cornwallis*s judicial, revenue and 
salt regulations were introduced. But it appears that 
they were somewhat hastily enforced without adequate 
investigation into the usages of the country. It seems 
that in enforcing them the British made no difference 
between Bengal, a country which had already adjusted itself 
to British regulations after a good deal of experiment, 
and Orissa, a country which was until very recently ruled 
by a quite different set of rules and practices under the 
Marathas •
The Bengal Government objected to any criticisms issued
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by the home authorities against Cornwallis's system. 
Moreover, particularly for Orissa, the criticisms came too 
late •
The period between 1803 and 1819 was as important 
for the rest of India as it was for Orissa. The two 
Maratha wars were important among wars which were made by 
the British against the native states. The Maratha war 
that took place in 1817 considerably extended British hold 
on India. In fact it established the British authority 
on a firm footing.
Equally important with the expansion of the British 
power in India was the question of administration. The 
period under review saw two kinds of efforts which corres­
ponded to two schools of administrative thought. One 
was represented by Cornwallis and his supporters. The 
other was represented by Munro and later on by Malcolm
and Elphi stone•
KThe school of thought deriving from Cornwallis's 
ideas tended to ignore local institutions, old usages 
and traditions. It emphasised the introduction of western 
institutions and methods it their place. This approach 
seemed to its critics to be hasty, sudden and even reckless. 
The second school respected the ancient institutions
of India. It believed that they were valuable for the
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foundation of British rule. It avoided innovations.
It tried to give more scope to individual discretion 
to avoid a rigid separation of powers, to give more power 
to Indian officials, to make use of institutions like the 
Panchayat, a Raiyatwari settlement and so on. The whole 
approach was slow but appeared steady and sure.
From the beginning of the nineteenth century criticism 
against the Cornwallis system of revenue administration had 
been steadily accumulating. The home authorities gradually 
became interested in the Raiyatwari system, which had 
attracted the attention of Lord William Bentinck during his 
administration in Madras and of which Munro was a great 
advocate. From 1812 the home authorities, particularly 
the Board of Control were averse to the principle of a 
permanent settlement. The Raiyatwari system ibased an 
annual settlements with the cultivators was considered more 
consistent both with individual rights and with the govern­
ment’s interests. In 1813 the Court of Directors
instructed the Bengal government to intorjiuce such arrangemerts
v .-
where practicable. But the Bengal Government objected.
It argued that in the territories under the Bengal Presidency, 
which had not been placed under the permanent Zamindari 
settlement lands were jointly occupied and cultivated by 
numerous owners. The community of tenure was imperfectly
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understood* If engagements were made with the individual, 
the right and privileges of landed proprietors would be 
overturned. A separate arrangement with the cultivators 
would tend to dissolve the village communities. Again 
if it was enforced numerous subordinate collectors and 
assessors would be appointed. It would be impossible to 
check or discover their exactions from the people.
The Bengal Government adhered to its own principle 
of permanency. It held that the previous promises and 
regulations and the expectation of the people demanded 
that a permanent settlement should be effected after an 
interval.
Criticism was also levelled at the Judicial and 
police system established under Cornwallis. In this 
respect, the Munro system advocating a more extensive 
use of native agency appealed to the home authorities.
So they considered the Cornwallis system an unwise departure 
from the established usages of the country. They 
expected that great benefit would be derived from giving 
fresh vitality to the native institutions of the country. 
They, in 1813, issued instructions to the Indian Government 
for the immediate adoption of these measures. They 
suggested the employment of village headmen and Panchayats 
in the adjudication of suits.
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The instructions of the home Government were soon 
implemented in Madras • But as in the case of the 
Raiyatwari system the Bengal Gove rnnent objected to it*
They argued that the presidency was divided into an 
immense number of villages. They had no reliance on the
av
integrity of the village headmen. judicial powers
were vested in so many individuals it would be impracticable 
to exercise any adequate superintendence. They further 
added that the village institutions had been destroyed 
where permanent settlement had been made. The agents 
of the zamindars had taken the place of the headmen. Hf
they were given power, they would act in the interest of 
the zamindars. Thus the raiyats would be subject to 
oppression. Moreover, very little was known of the 
existing local institutions in the provinces not under 
a permanent settlement. Under such circumstances they 
thought that it was neither expedient nor just to recognise 
any set of individuals as public functionaries. The 
Bengal Government therefore suspended compliance with 
the orders from home.
Thus the instructions from hone had no effect on the 
Bengal Government. In Orissa, in particular, the Corn­
wallis system of administration continued after 1813 just 
as It had before. In economic and judicial matters the
272
framework of the Maratha system was set aside and the 
established institutions to which people had been 
accustomed were neglected*
Owing to the want of proper investigation into the 
land tenure system and the resources of the country, there 
was over-assessment* Every year heavy arrears were 
outstanding. As a measure against this the sale law was 
rigorously enforced. As a result the original Oriya 
zamindars were displaced by persons from Bengal who had 
enough capital to pay the government revenue. Yet the 
arrears began to increase year by year. The ultimate 
burden of over-assessment fell upon the cultivator.
The monopoly of the manufacture and sale of salt that 
was enforced in Bengal was extended to Orissa. Here also 
the supply of salt, particularly to the Mughalbandi, was 
based on erroneous principles, perhaps because the British 
misunderstood the Maratha system. The supply was therefore 
inadequate, and the price was greater than it had been 
under Maratha rule.
Under Maratha rule kauris were regarded as the chief 
currency in which revenues were naid. Under the British, 
silver was the only currency in which revenues were collected. 
The major portion of whatever was collected was sent to 
the Bengal treasury. In addition, the country was
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over-assessed. All this went to increase the value of 
silver. This together with other reasons disturbed the 
ratio between silver and kauris. Consequently the 
prices of conmodities in kauris rose high*
There was some evidence of popular dissatisfaction 
wi th the s e change s.
Under the Maratha Government the people were accustomed 
more to usage and custom than to a system of regulations.
Now many regulations were enforced within a short period.
This may have led to popular confusion. Moreover the 
regulations were not translated into Oriya. Even those 
which were understood through interpreters must have seemed 
new and foreign. Moreover all responsible offices held 
by Indians were entrusted to persons from Bengal. During 
this period the British officers appointed for the adminis­
tration of Orissa relied upon these amias. The latter 
seem to have taken advantage of the Oriyas1 ignorance of 
the regulations. There was evidence of corruption In 
the revenue department, in the salt department, in the 
courts of justice and in the management of the embankments • 
When an influential person like Jagabandhu fell a victim 
to conspiracy of the an las to deprive hhn of his estate, 
it was easy for him to exploit the situation to incite a 
rebellion.
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The rebellion is a turning point in the history of 
Orissa. From 1817 to 1819 it enters into a new phase.
This might be called aperiod of active vigilance on the 
part of the government. When adequate enquiries were 
made some real popular grievances were brought before 
the Bengal government. The Cornwallis system of regulations 
as administered in Orissa was found unsuitable. A special 
regulation was passed in 1818. It vested vast power, 
similar tothat conferred on the first commissioners of 
Orissa, in one officer called the commissioner of Cuttack.
The years 1818 and 1819 in particular saw considerable 
changes in the nature of the administration. Many estates 
which had passed into the hands of outsiders were restored 
to the original holders. This helped in the reinstatement 
of the old landed aristocracy. Many persons who had 
enjoyed Jagirs under Maratha rule were restored to their 
former privileges. The jama of the country was considerably 
reduced. This reduction of the jama ultimately helped 
in restoring the disturbed rationof silver and kauris.
More salt was now supplied than before. The price of salt 
was lowered so that the people could get it cheaply.
More money was spent in the repair of embankments than 
before, and adequate measures were taken to remove 
corruption from the management of the embankments.
Amlas found guilty of corruption were punished.
More attention was paid to popular complaints. Justice 
could be obtained more quickly in civil suits either 
by summary or regular courts. A greater frequency in 
the circuit courts lessened the difficulties of witnesses 
and prosecutors in criminal cases. A regular tour by 
the magistrate and collector into different parts of 
Orissa removed corruption in the police. Vigilance and 
direct contact with the complaints of the people gave 
scope to improve the efficiency of the administration.
Again it seems that the Orissa rebellion of 1817 
had a bearing on the contest between the Cornwallis and 
Munro systems. It constituted a signal defeat for the 
Cornwallis system and thereby opened the way for the 
universal acceptance of the Munro system. It is perhaps 
significant that after the conquest of Maharastra in 1818, 
a system of administration more in accordance with Munro*s 
ideas was encouraged there. Again, the Bengal Government 
which had so stubbornly objected, some years earlier to 
those instructions from home for the establishment of a 
Raiyatwari system, took steps to introduce a Raiyatwari 
system into Assam after its conquest in 1826.
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Abra
Abvab
Adalat 
Amali 
Ami a 
Arzi
Aurang
Bakhshi
Banya
Barkandaz
Bazar
Bazi
Begar
Bepari
Bhog
Bhowri
Bigha
Glossary
- a superior description of Kurkuch salt..
- miscellaneous.cesses levied by the zamindar 
or public officers.
- tourt of justice.
- an era current in Orissa.
- a native officer of a judicial or revenue court.
- petition.
- a manufacturing district, a division of an 
Agency.
- commander in chief.
- a trader, a money changer.
- a matchlockman, but commonly applied to a 
native armed with a sword and shield who 
acts as door keeper, watchman, guard or 
escort.
- market.
- several, miscellaneous.
- a forced labourer.
- a trader, a dealer, merchant.
- offering.
- a house for boiling salt.
- a measure of land varying in extent in 
different parts of India. In Cuttack 
the bigha is generally considered to be 
an English acre.
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Biswali - a type of land assigned to the military
chiefs*
Cada, Kada - one fourth of a ganda, the number one;
a piece of Kauri*
Chakla - a large division of a country comprehending
a number of parganas.
Chaprasi - a messenger or courier wearing a badge,
most usually a public servant.
Char Chitthi - a delivery order*
Chatti or Chattee - a name given to a collection of Chulhas.
Chauki - station of police or of custom, a guard,
a watch or the post where they are placed.
Chaukidar - a watchman.
Chaupani
Chauth
a tax formerly levied by the military 
chiefs in Cuttack to cover the expense 
of maintaining police commuted for money 
payment.
an assessment equal to one-fourth of the 
original standard assessment or generally 
to one fourthsr of the actual Government 
collections demanded by the Marathas from 
the Muhammadan or Hindu princes as the 
price of forbearing to ravage their 
countries.
Chhatak one sixteenth part of a seer measure, 
either of weight or capacity.
Chitthi, chit - a letter, a note.
Chohar - a tribe of mountaineers in the hills of
Orissa.
Chulha - a fire place.
Coss - (vide) Kos.
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Dadni
Dak
Dal
Dalai
Dalbeh&ra
Darbar
Darogha
Dastak
Desi
Dewal purcha 
Dhuja
Diwan
Diwani Adalat 
Do
Dobundhee
Do-fasfui
Doli
- advance
- post
- a general term for pulses
- a subordinate officer in command of paiks.
- headman among paiks; an officer in command 
of paiks*
- a court, a royal court, an audience*
- the head of a police. It is also applied 
to a native officer in other departments.
- it applies more generally to a summons,
a writ, a warrant; specially to a process 
served on a revenue defaulter to compel 
him to pay any balance that may be due.
- belonging to, born in a country, a native 
of a country.
- a head priest of Jagannath.
- the quantity and the value of cloth 
presented for the purpose of being 
displayed on the wheel at the top of the 
temple of Jagannath on which the government 
received from the person presenting it its 
full value as a fee under the head Dhuja.
- a minister, a revenue minister.
- civil court.
- two
- having double bunds
- yielding two crops in a year (land)
- a sort of sedan in which women are carried.
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Fakir
Faujdar
Faujdari
Ganda
Ghat
Ghee or ghi 
Gola
Gosain,
Goswami
Gumashta
Harkara
Hastobud,
Hustobood
- a poor or indigent person; the most 
general application is a Muhammadan 
religious mendicant who wanders about 
the country and subsists on alms.
- an officer enjoying both civil and 
military power over one division of 
a country; the chief of a body of 
troops; an officer in charge of the 
police and jurisdiction in all criminal 
matters.
- criminal as opposed to civil.
- a money of account, equivalent in 
reckoning to four Kauris or the 
twentieth part of one anna; twenty 
gandas make one pan; to count by gandas 
is to count by four; the value of ganda 
implies four.
a place where customs are commonly levied, 
a station.
- clarified butter.
- a granary, a storeroom, a place in which 
grain or salt is kept for a season.
- a religious mendicant.
- an agent, a representative, e.g. an officer 
employed by the £amindars to collect their 
rents.
- a messenger, a courier, an emissary.
- an examination of the assets or resources 
of a country; a comparative account 
showing the present and past produce of 
an estate.
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Hat
Hawaldar 
(corruptly 
Havildar)
Ikrar
Isht ihar-nama 
Jagir
Jagirdar
Jama
Jamaband! 
Jamadar 
Jama-muf as sal
Jama-sadar
Jatra
Jatrl
- a market, one held only on certain days 
In a week, a fair,
- a native officer of the Indian army 
subordinate to a subahdar.
- agreement, assent, ratification.
- a written notice or proclamation.
- a tenure common under native Government in 
which the public revenues of a given tract 
of land were made over to a servant of the 
state together with powers requisite to 
enable him to collect and appropriate such 
revenue, and administer the general 
Government of the district,
* the holder of a jagir, the holder of any 
assignment of revenue.
- the total amount of rent or revenue.
- settlement of the amount of revenue
assessed upon an estate, village or district.
- an officer of police, customs or excise,
second to the darogha.
- the gross revenue to be collected in all 
the villages of a zamindari as rated in
the accounts and to be paid after deducting 
charges to the zamindar.
- the revenue assessment settled with the 
government direct by the proprietor in 
opposition to the jama-mufassal.
- a religious festival.
- a pilgrim.
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(cprruptly
4ubool/eat)
Kachahri
(corruptly
Cutchery)
Kahan
Kandh
Kangal
Kanungo
Karfeach,
Kurkuch
Katki seer
Kauri
(corruptly
cowry)
Khalas
Khalas Chitthi
a written agreement, especially one 
signifying assent, as a counter part 
of revenue lease or the document in 
which a payer of revenue, whether to 
the government, the 2amindar or the 
farmer expresses his consent to pay 
the amount assessed upon his land.
- a court, an office.
- a measure of value equal to sixteen 
panas of Kauri shells or 1,280 Kauris.
- a class of mountaineers or wild tribes.
- poor, miserable, bankrupt.
- a revenue officer; generally applied to 
village and district officer who recorded 
all circumstances within their sphere 
which concerned landed property and 
realization of revenue etc.
- salt obtained by solar evaporation.
- the seer in common use in Cuttack and Puri 
It weighs 105 tolas or sicca rupees.
a small shell used as a coin. In account 
four Kauris are equal to one ganda and 
80 Kauris to one pah.
release, freedom.
letter of release.
Khalisa,
Khalsa - lands or villages held immediately of 
government and of which the state is the 
manager or holder.
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Khandait - a name of a class of military landholders
residing in the hills in i&ilas or fortified 
dwellings and holding their lands at a quit 
rent on condition of acting as a feudal militia.
Kharch, Khurch
- expense, disbursement.
Khas - as a revenue term it is applied to the
management of estates and the collection
of the revenue by the officers of the 
Government, without any intermediate person 
between them and the cultivators.
Khas -
mahal - district held in the management of the
government •
Khilat - a dress of honour.
Khoraki - diet allowance.
Khud-Kasht - cultivating one’s own field.
Kila - a fort, a fortress, a castle.
Kiraya - hire, fare, the money or the rate at which
anything may be hired or rented.
Kist - instalment.
Kistbandi - settlement of the revenue by instalments.
Kol - a class of wild tribe inhabiting forests
and mountainous tracts.
Kos, coss - a measure of distance varying in different 
parts of India from one to two miles, but 
most usually about the latter.
Kothi - a store room.
Xotwal - a chief officer of police for a city or town.
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Krori, or ) 
Karori, also) 
Grori )
Lakhiraj
Lashkar
Mahajan
Mahal
Mahalla 
Mahaprasad 
Malangi 
Malikana
Mamlatdar
Mashal (corruptly 
morchul)
Math
Mathdhari
- The possessor or collector of a 
Kror or ten millions of any given 
kind of money, a collector of 
revenue, a tax gatherer.
- revenue free (land).
- a gun carrier, a tentpitcher, a bearer.
- a banker, a money changer, a creditor.
- a province or district, in the language 
of regulations a mahal is called an 
estate and is defined any parcel or 
parcels of land which may be separately 
assessed with the public revenue.
- a division of a town, a quarter, a ward.
- holy food.
- a manufacturer of salt.
- relating to the proprietor as his 
right or due applied to an allowance 
assigned to a zamindar who from some 
cause as failure in paying the revenue 
or declining to accede to the rate at 
which his lands are assessed is set aside 
from the management of the estate, the 
per centage was 10 per cent on the net 
amount realised by the government.
- the head revenue and police native 
officer of a district.
- torch
- monastery.
- abbot.
Mauza
Mufassal
Muharrir
Mukaddam
Mulki
Munshi
Munsif
Naib
Nal, Nul
Nala
Nankar
Nawab
Nazir
Nerick, Nirkh 
Nirkhi
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- a village or a group of villages; a 
parcel or parcels of lands having a 
separate name in the revenue records 
and known limits.
- the country, the provinces or the stations 
in the country as opposed to the Sadar
or principal station or town.
- a clerk, a writer, a scribe.
- a chief applied specially to the headman 
of a village - under the Marathas usually 
charged with the realization of the revenue 
and its payment to the collector.
- relating to a kingdom or country 
provincial, native.
- a secretary, a writer; a term applied 
by Europeans usually to interpreters 
of Persian or Hindustani.
- a judge.
- a deputy, a representative.
- a hollow bamboo, a measure of grain or 
salt.
- a rivulet, a watercourse.
- an assignment of a portion of land or 
revenue of an estate made to the zamindar 
or any revenue officer as his subsistence 
allowance.
- a viceroy or governor of a province.
- an officer who sees to the service of the 
writs and the execution of orders.
- price, rate, rate of revenue payments.
- an officer who fixes or records the 
prices of articles.
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Nizamat Adalat 
Ogrey 
Pagoda 
Pahikasht
Paik
Pan, Pun,, Pana
Panda
Pandit
Pankha, Punkha
Parda
Pargana
Parihari
Parwana
Patel
Patta
- supreme court of criminal justice.
- etcetera; and the like; and so on.
- a Hindu temple.
- non-resident cultivators or tenants 
at will.
- the paiks constituted a local militia 
holding the lands of the military chiefs
or Rajas by tenure of military service.
- a sum of eighty kauri shells equal to 
twenty gandas and of which sixteen 
are equal to a Kahan.
- a priest of Jagannath.
- a learned Brahman.
- fan.
- a veil, a screen.
- a district, a tract of country comprising 
many villages•
- a servant of Jagannath, who conducts the ^
^doors and presents them to Jagannath.
- an order, a written command.
- the headman of a village.
- a document given by the collector to the 
zamindar or by some other receiver of 
revenue to the cultivator or under-tenant 
specifying the conditions on which the 
lands are held and the value or the 
proportion of the produce to be paid to 
the authority or person from whom the 
lands are held.
Peon
Peshkash
Pindika
Pitrali 
Pungah salt 
Purcha 
Raiyat 
Raiyatwar
Rakam, Rukum 
Rawana 
Sadar, Sadr
Sadar Jama
Salami
Sanad
Sarbarahkar
Sardar
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- a piadda, a footman, a messenger.
- a tribute, a quit rent.
- voluntary presents made at the throne 
of Jagannath in cash^bullion and Jewels.
- land enjoyed through ancestors.
- salt produced by boiling the brine.
- a head priest of Jagannath.
- a cultivator, a peasant, a farmer.
- according to or with raiyats applied to 
revenue settlement.
- an item of an account.
- a passport, a pass.
- usually means the chief seat of government, 
the presidency as opposed to the provinces 
or mufassal.
- the sum total of revenue payable to the 
government direct exclusive of the charges 
of collection.
- a complementary present, a present to
a superior especially upon being introduced 
to him.
- a grant, a charter, a document conveying 
an individual titles, privileges, offices.
- title given to the village accountant.
- a chief, a headman, a commander.
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Sarkar
Sarishtadar
Savara, Sabar 
Sayar, Sair.
Subahdar
Tahsildar
Tahsildari
Taluk
Talukdar
Tanki
Thana
Thanadar
Thani
Tour chitthi
Vakil
Zila
- the government or administration, 
a division of a country.
- a registrar, a record keeper applied 
specially to head native officer of a 
court of justice, or collector’s office.
- a class of hill tribe.
- This term denotes all other sources of 
revenue accruing to the government in 
addition to land tax from a variety of 
imposts as customs, transit duties, 
licences fees, house tax, market tax, 
etc.
- the governor of a province, a viceroy 
under the Mughal Government, a native 
officer in the Compamy’s army holding a 
rank equivalent to that of captain under 
the European officers.
- a native officer collecting the revenue 
from the cultivators.
- the office or duty of tahsildar.
- a division of a province.
- the holder of a taluk, a collector of 
revenue from the cultivators.
- a quit-rent.
- a police station
- an officer in charge of a thana.
- a permanent (cultivator)
a stationary (cultivator).
- a pass, a permit.
- an agent, an attorney.
- a district, a division.
288
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. Manuscript Records
A# At the India Office*
The items relating to Orissa in the following series
Bengal Board of Revenue proceedings 1803-1817•
Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 1803-1822.
Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations 1803-1822.
Bengal Political Consultations 1789-1818.
Bengal Revenue Consultations 1803-1822.
Bengal Salt and Opium Consultations 1803-1822.
Bengal Secret'..and Military Consultations 1760-1790.
Bengal Secret Persian Correspondence (trans.),
Letters Received 1803-18,
Letters Sent 1803-18.
Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1788-1803*
Boards Collections Vols. 223, 313, 318, USk-j 505, 582,
583, 58^, 585, 586, 587.
Draft Despatches submitted by the Court to the Board
of Control, 1803-181U.
Home Miscellaneous 59, 511, 603-^S-, 623*
Judicial Despatches to Bengal 1802+-1820.
Judicial Letters from Bengal 1803-1822.
Letters from the Court 1788-1821.
Letters to the Court 1801-1822.
Military Despatches to Bengal 1803-1808.
Military Letters from Bengal 1803-1808*
Orme MSS. India Vol* 18.
Revenue Despatches to Bengal I80lj.-1822*
Revenue Letters from Bengal 1803-1821.
At the British Museum.
Add. MSS.
Wellesley papers. I36OU, 13608, 13609, 13610, 13611.
290
2.
A.
I* Reports
Aggarwal, S.C. 
Aitchison, C .W.
Arbuthnot, J*
Ascoli, F.D.
Aspinall, A# 
Auber, P.
Baden-Powell, B.H
Banerjee, R.D.
Bengal and Madras
Blunt, 1 7 * and 
Shakespear,H*
Printed*
English*
letters, memoirs and sane 
select, works»
The Salt Industry In India, Simla 1937.
A Collection of treaties, engagements and 
sunnuds relating to India and, neighbouring 
countries * 7 Vols. Calcutta, 1876*
Sir Thomas Munro - Selections from his 
minutes and other official writings*
2 Vols. London, 1881.
Early Revenue History of Bengal and the 
Fifth Report 181& Oxford, 191V*~
Cornwallis in Bengal* Manchester, 1931.
Rise and progress of the British power in 
India. 2 Vols. ton'd on, 1837.
• The Land system of British India* 3 Vols . 
Oxford, 1892*
History of Orissa (from earliest time to 
the trltish period) * £ Vol's * r Calcutta* 1930.
papers♦ 3 Vols. Imperial Records
Department, Calcutta, 1928.
(Compilers) An Abstract of the Regulations 
enacted for the adm ini gTt rat ion of the police 
and criminal .justice in the provinces of 
Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Calcutta, 1824.
An Abstract of the Regnlations enacted for 
the' Assessment and Realization of the Land 
he venues in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa from 
the year 1793-1824. Calcutta, 1826.
An abstract of the Regulations enacted for the 
administration of civil .justice in the provin­
ces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa from the year 
1795 to the end of 1824. Calcutta, 1826.
291
Buchanan, 0. Christ Inn Researches In si a. London, 1319 •
L i1 c 1:1 a riel, C • P . Dictionary of India Biography • London, 1306 •
Qi Persian Correspondence* 9 Vols.
Accords Department, Lev/ Delhi, 1901-1953•
0 d r - , - n ■ ' e  1 1 ,  j l  •  D •  A Vindication of the Justice and Policy of
the late rare in India* London, 150o.
0 arey, 3 • P . YjJJJyny Garey • London, 1934*
Cn u 1 f ie 1 cl, J . Ooservat ions on our Indian administration•
~ London, 1832.
Census of India. Yol. VIA, Bengal Part II. Calcutta, 1902.
3hand, P . (ed.). - Selections from official letters and. . .
records relating to the History of i.Iayurbhanjfr.
Vol. I , A a ripada, 1942.
Chan.dhuri , S♦ B . Civil Pistur’psncos during the British rule
in India• CalcutTsT, 1955*
Clioksoy, P.P. The Aftermath. Bombay, 1950.
A history of British diplomacy at the court— —  ■.■ .I ■ ■ .fa —  — i . ■ ■— ■— .i -i—
01 11ie 1-e siiv/as. ?oona, 1951 •
Clarke, P • (ed.) Digest of Bengal Regulations, 1795-1354*
2 Vols. London, 1855•
Colehroohe , T .3• Life and Essays of H.T. Colehrooke. Vol• I,
London, 1873*
Descriptive ethnology of Bengal*
Calcutta, 1872.
Dcdv/ell, II.11. ( ed.) The Cambridge History of India•
Vol. V, Cambridge, 1926*.
Vol. VI, Cambridge, 1932.
292
Doss, Ramchunder (compiler) A General Register of the Hon*Die
East India Company1s civil servants of 
Bengal Establishment from 1790 to l6lj-2. 
Calcutta, 18UU. *
Drummond, J.G. Panchayats in India* Oxford, 1937*
Duff, J.G. A Histor:/ of the Harathas, 3 vols, Calcutta
1912.=
Dutt, R.C. Economic History of India, London, 1950.
Dutt, R.C. and others. Land Problems in India. Madras, 1903* 
Early European Travellers in the Nagpur Territory. Nagpur, 1930* 
East India Register. 1803-1819.
Einzig, P . ........ Primitive money, . London, 19^ -9.
Elphinstone, M. Report on the territories conquered from
the Paishv;a• Bomhay, 1838.
The Life of Lord Clive, 2 Vols.' London,
1918.
Selections from the state napers of the 
governors-general of India.
Warren Hastings. 2 Vols. London, 1910.
Selections from the state papers of the 
governors-general of India.
Cornwallis. 2 Vols. London,
3ff 1 c 1 a 1 vrrit inr;s of ITount stuart Elnhin- 
otone . London, 188’^T
Te n ry D u nd ee . London, 1931•
rnyernnent of India. London, 1832.
- T'ife of S i Thpmas_ jlunro • 3 Vols.
London, 18*30.
3hservations on the state of society among
Csiat ic "subpjects of Great Britain• 
jondon, 1813•
Forrest, G.
Forrest, G.YJ. (ed.)
F u r o e r , I I .  T
Gal loway, A. {
u T j - -  a  f  •  j
i
Grant, C • C
A
293
G-une , V . J . rJtA Judicial System of the HaratPias.
Poona, 1953*
JIarington, J . PI * An analysis of the_ls.y/s and re gulat t ons
in Bengal . Lond.on, 1821.
An elementary analysis of the lav/s and 
regul a t ions in B enga 1. 3 Vol s •
Calcutta, 1605-1817*
Hods on, V.C.P* List of officers of the Bengal A m y .
3 Vols. London, 1927-6-63
Hunter, 17• 7/* History of Orissa, 2 Vols. London, 1672.
Indian Eninire • Loridon, 1-582.
A History of British India. 2 Vols. 
...................................... London, 1899*
Land j? yet ex in Bengal. Vol. I, London,
1896-*
Hution, 17• PI. The Harouess Hellesley-K.G• 0 xf o rd, 1893*
3fyeL3-0er India. Vol. XIX, Oxford, 1208.
Inghan, X • P.eforrncrs in India • Caribridge, 1956 •
J o shi , V • V • C1 a sh_ of^thnee^ _eni~o ires. A11 a hat ad, 19 6-1.
Haile, Y.II. (ed.) P oona Hesi^ dencyt C o r re s aondenc e . Vol. V,
1 7 8 1 -1 8 2 8 .  B onto a y ,  1 9 3 8 .
Kayo, J.W. T h e a &h inlet rat ion of the E a_s t I n d i a
G^ oeiuaiiy. London, io59* ■
Christianity in India • London, 1859*
Hhe life and correspondence of Henry 
St. Guo rye Tucl:er*_ London, lo5U*
The life and correseondence_ of_Sir 
J. Ilalcolm. 2 Vols. ’ London, 1856.
TJieg life and correg -ondence of Charles 
Lord Hetcalfe. 2 Vo1s. London, 185V*
Select ions from they pa oers of Lord Vet calfe 
2 Vols. London, 1856-*
i
29k
Khan, G-.H. 2 i y a r - a 1 -urn t akhe r i n (t rans, Mu st g . f  a Ha tj :i i) .
Tl Vols. Calcutta, 1902-3♦
L unde rdal e , (V; arl
of) . Ineuiry i nt o t lie a radical me rits of t he 
system for the government of India.
London, 1809*
L au r i e , V/ .? .1. Orissa, the Garden of Surer st it ion and
Idolat ry• L ondon, 1650*
Lory:, J. Selections from uirnfo 11 shed records of
yovernment • Ca 1 cu11 a , 18^9 •
1 ’a d d o , S .L . l lripl report on the survey and' settlement of
Orissa • Calcu11a , 1100*.
Valc olm, J . Po 1 i11 c a 1 Fist ory of India. • London, 1811.
hnrathr v/ar in 1803: Benyal, Fort St. Georye and Bombay papers
rresented to the "House of Commons•
London, 1803-9L*
~ 'archione s s of
L ut e . The m i  vat e journal of the Varouess of
hastinys. 2 Vols. London, 1838.
1' arshraan, J .G . The 1 if e and times of Carey, h a r sham an and
hjyrd^ yhh^ stoiyy of Seram''ore Mission.J~
2 Vo1s. London, 1653 *
hartin, V • The Despatches, Minutes and Correspondence
of harquis Wellesley durlny his adminis- 
t rat ion in India. 5 Vols. I; ondon, 183&-k0*
ehta, h • S. Lord ITastinys and the^ Indian States,
1815-1825* ’ Bonibay, 1930.
hill, J. and
ViIson, H.H. The History of British India. 9 Vols.
London, 1850-U.8#
Minutes of_hvidence taken “before the Select Committee on the
~ 1 affairs of the East India Company.
Vol. Ill, Revenue, Vol. IV, Judicial.
London, 1832-33•
29£
ITotes relative to the Late Transactions in the liaratha empire
or Marat ha war i 603 ♦ London, 1804*
O'verton, J •H . The Evangelical revival in the eighteenth
century, London, 1893•
Ov;en, J.S. A Selection from the Despatches, Treaties
and other nap 
Oxford, 1877*
p ers of Harguis ofellesley ♦
? a r 1 j a me nt a r y nan ers. House of Commons, 1812-13* Vol. 8,
gaper 224*
? a r1iano nt ary uan e rs House of Commons 1812-13* Vol* 9,
paper 264.
Pariiamentary pacers House of Commons 1812-13* Vol. 10,
paper 331*
Pearce, P.P. Hanoire -and Correspondence of Richard
Harnuess V/e llesley. 3 Vol s. London, 1646.
P rinse o , II. T . Transaction s in India, 1813-23 • L o nd on,
1823*
A narrative of the political and military 
transactions of British India, 1813-1618• 
London, 1820.
Ray, R .R . Hxoosition of the practical operation of
Judicial and revenue system of India.
London, 1832.
Ray, S.C. The Permanent settlement in Bengal*
Calcutta, 1913*
Reoort oil the Administ rat ion of the Salt Department of the
Revenue of Bengal for the year -1633-54• 
Calcutta, 1855*
ienort■of the commissioners appointed to enquire into and report
uoon the manufacture and sale of and tax 
uoon salt in British India. London, 1836.
Richard, J . Reports on the territories of the Raja of
Ha,your. Nagpur, 1901.
296
Richards, R. India. 2 Vols. London, 1829*
Risley, H.H. T r ih e s a nd C a s tea of Be ny a 1. 2 Vols.
Roberts, P.S. India under Wellesley. London, 1929«
History of British India under the 
Company and the Crown• London, 1938*
Ross, C. (ed.) Correspondence of Charles,First Marouess
Cornwallis.., 3 Vols. London, 1859*
Salim, G.H. Riyaz-us Salatin (a history of Bengal),
translated,"by Hanlavi Abdus Salam. 
Calcutta, 1902.
Sardesai, G.S. (ed.)Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. II
Poona affair*?. . Bombay, 1936.
New History of the llarathas.' 3 Vols........
Bombay, l8l|6-48”.
Ss.stri , K • N • V • Vhe Munro System of British Statesmanshio
in India. Mysore, 1939•
Selection of raners frojn the records at the East India House.
TTVoIe. Lonaon, 1820-182"51
Selection from the Records of Bengal government. Calcutta,1831*
Sen, S.N. Administrative system, of the Marat ha s.
Calcutta, 1923*
Sen, S.IT. and
U • LIishra ( eds.) Sanskrit Documents• Allahabad, 1951*
Seton-Karr, V/• S• Selections from Calcutta Gazettes•
5 Vols. Calcutta, 1864-69•
Shore, P.H. Notes on Indian affairs. 2 Vols.
London, 1836.
Sinha, U.K. India House Correspondence. Vol. V.
Delhi, 1949.
Stirling, A. An account (geographical, statistical and
historicalj of Orissa proper or Cuttack•
C a 1 cut t a 7~1905'* ””  ' ~
£97
Sutherland, J• Sketches of the relations between the 
British government in India and t£e 
different native states* Calcutta, 1837.
Teignmouth, Lord. Memoir of Lord Teignmouth.
2 Vols". London, 1843.
Temple, R.C. (ed.) The Dairies of Streynsham Master.
2 Vols. London, 1911.
Thompson, E. and Rise and fulfilment of British rule in
Garrett, G.T. JndiaT. London, 1934'.
Thornton, E.
Thorn, W . 
Tone, W.H.
Toynbee, G.
Tupper, C.L. 
Warner, V/.L.
History of British Empire in India.
6 Vols*. London, 1841-45.
Memoir of the War in India. London, 1818.
Illustrations of some institutions of the 
Mara-bHa people . Calcutta,' 1818.
A Sketch of the History of Orissa. 
Calcutta, 1873.
Our Indian protectorate• London, 1893.
The protected princes of India. London,
1894.
vfelllngton1 s Campaign in India. Calcutta, 1908.
Wheeler, J.T 
Wills, C.W. 
Wilson, C.R.
Early Records of British India. Calcutta,
1878.
British relations with the Nagpur State. 
Nagpur, 1926.
English chiefs at Balasore in the Bay of 
Bengal. 3 Vols. Calcutta, 1895.
The Early Annals of the English in Bengal. 
3 Vols. Calcutta, 1895.
Wilson, H.H. A Glossary of Judicial and Revenue terms. 
London, 1855.
298
IX* Periodicals
Asiatic researches# Vol. XV, Serampore, 1825*
Calcutta Gazette. 1803*
Indian Historical Records Commission, Vol. XIX, December 19U-2,
Nev/ Delhi, 19U3*
Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal•
Vol. LII, nart I, Calcutta, 1883*
Vols. LZVII, Calcutta, 1898.
Journal of Ecclesiastical History, Vol. Ill, London, 1952*
JournaI of In.dian History. Vol. VIII, part III, December 1929?
Madras.
Periodical Accounts of the Baptist' Missionary Society. Vol. IV,
Bristol, 1817*
Oriva
Mahanty, A.B. (ed.) Ha dal an an .ji . Cuttack, ’19U0.
